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Abstract
The pervasiveness of cooperation in Nature is not easily explained. If evolution is
characterized by competition and survival of the fittest, why should selfish individuals
cooperate with each other? Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) provides a suitable math-
ematical framework to study this problem, central to many areas of science. Conven-
tionally, interactions between individuals are modeled in terms of one-shot, symmet-
ric 2-Person Dilemmas of Cooperation, but many real-life situations involve decisions
within groups with more than 2 individuals, which are best-dealt in the framework
of N -Person games. In this Thesis, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of two
paradigmatic collective social dilemmas - the N -Person Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD) and
the N -Person Snowdrift Game (NSG) on structured populations, modeled by networks
with diverse topological properties.
Cooperative strategies are just one example of the many traits that can be trans-
mitted on social networks. Several recent studies based on empirical evidence from
a medical database have suggested the existence of a 3 degrees of influence rule, ac-
cording to which not only our "friends", but also our friends’ friends, and our friends’
friends’ friends, have a non-trivial influence on our decisions. We investigate the de-
gree of peer influence that emerges from the spread of cooperative strategies, opinions
and diseases on populations with distinct underlying networks of contacts. Our results
show that networks naturally entangle individuals into interactions of many-body na-
ture and that for each network class considered different processes lead to identical
degrees of influence.
Keywords: Evolutionary Game Theory, Complex Social Networks, Evolution of Co-
operation, N -Person Social Dilemmas, Peer Influence.

Resumo
De uma perspectiva Darwinista, a evolução das espécies resulta da acção conjunta
da selecção natural e da mutação (ao nível genético). A sobrevivência dos mais for-
tes - ou melhor, a sobrevivência dos melhor adaptados às exigências do ambiente cir-
cundante - pode ser entendida como um processo de competição em que indivíduos
egoístas, que se preocupam em prolongar o seu tempo de sobrevivência de forma a
maximizar a probabilidade de propagação dos seus genes para a próxima geração, aca-
bam por ganhar. Não é pois de esperar que existam quaisquer manifestações de ajuda,
de cooperação, entre indivíduos, em que se quantifica um acto cooperativo como aquele
que envolve um custo c para quem coopera resultando num benefício b a quem o recebe
(b > c).
A Natureza no entanto revela-nos evidências do contrário em todas as escalas, desde
a origem dos organismos multi-celulares, ao desenvolvimento da cultura humana, que
só foram possíveis graças à existência de cooperação. Como explicar então a ocorrência
de tantos exemplos de cooperação na Natureza, e como solucionar este (aparente) pa-
radoxo? Esta é uma questão central em áreas científicas tão diversas como a Biologia,
a Matemática, as Ciências Sociais ou a Física, e tem recebido uma atenção crescente
nas últimas décadas. Nesta tese, começamos por estudar a dinâmica da cooperação
associada a diferentes dilemas sociais colectivos em populações estruturadas, isto é,
em que os indivíduos não interagem com quaisquer outros indivíduos mas apenas com
um sub-conjunto fixo de indivíduos determinado por uma arquitectura complexa. Estas
estruturas podem ser facilmente modeladas recorrendo a redes, em que os seus nodos
representam indivíduos e as ligações determinam o padrão de interacções entre eles.
Estas redes podem ser encontradas nos mais diversos contextos, desde redes eléctri-
cas a redes de transportes (como tráfego aéreo e auto-estradas) e redes sociais reais e
virtuais (isto é, baseadas na Internet). Neste último caso, a franca expansão da Inter-
net, associada à sua crescente democratização e à utilização em massa de ferramentas
como o Facebook ou o Twitter tem permitido, pela primeira vez, o estudo exaustivo de
redes sociais com milhares ou milhões de indivíduos. A ciência de redes acompanhou
este desenvolvimento, registando um enorme crescimento nos últimos anos, e permitiu
aprofundar as principais características destas estruturas e avaliar as suas proprieda-
des. A avaliação do impacto de populações estruturadas na dinâmica evolutiva da
cooperação é um tópico de investigação muito recente, para o qual esta tese procura
contribuir.
A Teoria de Jogos Evolutiva permite estudar situações estratégicas em que o sucesso
de cada indivíduo depende das escolhas de outro ou outros, e proporciona o formalismo
matemático adequado ao estudo da emergência e evolução da cooperação. A aborda-
gem mais convencional consiste em considerar indivíduos sem memória que interagem
2 a 2 podendo optar por duas estratégias unilaterais, Cooperar ou Não Cooperar. Adi-
cionalmente, também se consideram que as populaçoes são infinitas e sem estrutura e
que a dinâmica evolutiva é modelada através da equação do replicador. Estas hipóteses
são aproximações mas, como demonstraremos, constitutem uma referência importante
para a avaliação do impacto de populações estruturadas.
Muitos dilemas cooperativos envolvem decisões resultantes de grupos que englo-
bam N ≥ 2 individuos. Desde a participação em projectos comunitários, ao pagamento
de impostos, passando por aquele que será um dos mais importantes problemas de ac-
ção colectiva da actualidade e que envolve todos os indivíduos do planeta - a questão
das alterações climáticas e o que podemos fazer para as minorar - os exemplos são
inúmeros. O Dilema do Prisioneiro para N Pessoas surge como o modelo adequado
a descrever problemas em que o beneficio é proporcional ao número de cooperadores
no grupo sendo, no contexto dos dilemas de bem público aquele que tem sido alvo
de maior atenção na literatura. À semelhança do que sucede no dilema do prisioneiro
envolvendo 2 pessoas, em populações sem estrutura aqueles que não cooperam estão
sempre em vantagem, e portanto a cooperação está condenada à extinção.
Neste trabalho, estudamos não só qual o impacto de tornar as interacções locali-
zadas através da introdução de estrutura na população, como também quais as con-
sequências da mudança de paradigma contributivo. Tradicionalmente, assumia-se que
todos os cooperadores contribuiam com um mesmo esforço em cada um dos dilemas
em que participavam. No entanto, a introdução de estrutura na população fez com que
tivéssemos de rever esse paradigma. Demonstramos que, assumindo que cada coope-
rador reparte o seu esforço igualmente pelos vários dilemas em que participa, os níveis
de cooperação disparam. Em suma, no contexto deste modelo os nossos resultados
demonstram uma mensagem que consideramos encorajadora - o acto de dar é mais
relevante que o montante dado.
Também existem situações em que o benefício, quando obtido, é fixo, indepen-
dente do número de Cooperadores, e está igualmente disponível a todos os elementos
do grupo. Nestes casos, o modelo mais adequado é o Jogo da Avalanche de N Pessoas,
que facilita a emergência da cooperação. Com efeito verifica-se que mesmo no cená-
rio tradicional de população sem estrutura, este modelo prevê uma coexistência entre
cooperadores e não-cooperadores.
No decurso deste trabalho, adoptamos uma nova abordagem para estudar o im-
pacto de populações estruturadas na evolução da cooperação. Através do cálculo nu-
mérico de um análogo em populações estruturadas da equação do replicador - o Gra-
diente de Selecção - , torna-se possível acompanhar e analisar em detalhe a evolução do
sistema para o seu estado estacionário. Esta informação, que se perdia na abordagem
convencional, permite retirar conclusões surpreendentes. Demonstramos que o jogo
global, por consequência das interacções localizadas impostas pela rede de contactos,
é distinto das regras locais do Jogo da Avalanche de N Pessoas, e que diferentes redes
de contacto dão origem a diferentes jogos globais.
Estratégias cooperativas são um dos muitos exemplos possíveis de comportamentos,
ideias, em suma, informação, que se propagam nas redes sociais. Partindo da análise
de uma base de dados médica, e do estudo de correlações entre indivíduos em relação
a aspectos tão distintos como o consumo de álcool, hábitos tabágicos, obesidade, felici-
dade ou cooperação, foi recentemente proposta uma regra de 3 graus de influência para
a propagação de informação em redes sociais. Estas correlações reflectem o aumento
relativo da probabilidade, quando comparada com uma distribuição aleatória, de dois
indivíduos partilharem a mesma característica em função da distância social, medida
como o número mínimo de ligações que separam esses indivíduos na rede. Observou-
se a emergência de padrões de influência semelhantes e não triviais estendendo-se até
uma distância social de aproximadamente 3. Por outras palavras, não apenas os nossos
"amigos", mas também os seus amigos e os amigos deles exibem uma correlação posi-
tiva connosco em relação a determinada característica. Com o intuito de comprender a
origem de tal padrão, modelamos interacções a 2 pessoas, não apenas no contexto da
Teoria de Jogos Evolutiva, mas recorrendo também a modelos epidemiológicos e mo-
delos simples de formação de opiniões. Mostramos que, para cada classe de rede social
considerada, diferentes processos dinâmicos conduzem a iguais graus de influência, o
que sugere que a influência de pares não depende do processo em causa, e que a topo-
logia da rede associada determina o padrão de correlações emergente. Isto é, as redes
sociais efectivamente alargam, de uma forma não-trivial, as interacções diádicas das
quais partimos: sempre que estamos sujeitos a influência dos nossos contactos sociais,
não apenas aqueles com quem interagimos directamente afectam as nossas escolhas,
mas o nível de influência a que estamos sujeitos é definido pelas propriedades da rede
em que estamos inseridos.
Palavras-chave: Teoria de Jogos Evolutiva, Redes Sociais Complexas, Evolução da Co-
operação, Dilemas Sociais de N Pessoas, Influência de Pares.
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1Introduction
No man is an island.
– John Donne, in "Devotions upon emergent occasions" (1624)
Contrary to being solitary we participate, to a greater or lesser extent, in each
other’s lives: we act and live integrated in communities – and we cooperate with others.
Human culture is a living and evolving proof of such cooperation: the interchange of
tools, food and methods allowed the individuals involved in such exchange to gradually
rely on the knowledge and achievements of others and become specialized. Coopera-
tion paved the way to specialization and exchange of ideas, which have culminated in
a rich and fast evolving culture.
Many philosophers have tried to understand why, we humans, cooperate. Wouldn’t
it be easier to be egotistical and pursue only our own interests? Along history, there
have been many and contradictory views on this subject, with philosophers trying to
understand the role of society on the nature of the individual: from Thomas Hobbes,
who claimed that humans are born selfish and society teaches them better, to Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, who defended that humans are born cooperative and society later
corrupts them.
Cooperation seems to have played a fundamental role in some of the major transi-
tions in evolution. According to John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry,
"Major transitions are major stages in the evolution of complexity that involve
a change in the level of organization, and hence the level of selection."
– John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry in "The major transitions in evolution" (1995)
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Take for instance the emergence of multicellular organisms, that is, the transition
from protists (organisms that are unicellular, or multicellular but without specialized
tissues) to complex multicellular organisms such as animals, plants and fungi. This
transition occurred presumably at approximately 6 x 108 years ago, and required the
cooperation of cells. In this context, we do not refer to cooperation as a conscious
decision, of course, but as an interaction between elements in which each of the simple
constituent elements may be interpreted as paying a cost c and obtaining a benefit b
(with b > c). Associated with the cost c in this transition from protists to multicellular
organisms is for instance the fact that single cells are not able to replicate independently
anymore when they are part of the larger and more complex entity (the multicellular
organism). One of the advantages associated with the benefit b in this transition is the
fact that in a multicellular organism each cell does not have to ensure the execution of
several functions but can become specialized in a particular one.
Or take instead the most recent major transition in evolution, from primate societies
to the human societies of nowadays. This transition required the emergence of a new
way of transmitting information – it fostered the evolution of language. With language,
individuals were able to exchange more and more detailed information, and specialized
in particular tasks instead of having to ensure all tasks necessary for their survival.
They then came to rely on the knowledge of other individuals and gradually construct
a culture.
Human societies are embedded in complex social networks, determined by the pat-
tern of interactions between individuals. Despite social networks’ massive populariza-
tion, thanks to the democratization of the Internet and the massive access to social
online networking tools such as Facebook, Twitter and MySpace, this concept has been
widely used for over a century to describe complex sets of relationships between el-
ements of social systems. Although their systematic study began before, in the first
decades of the last century, they comprised only small-scale networks, with a few dozen
of individual at most, as it was not yet possible at the time to obtain more significant
data. Only recently it has been possible to start exploring the vast networks by which
we are in fact interconnected – structures with thousands, millions of elements.
Network science comprises a whole set of mathematical tools to analyze its topolog-
ical properties, but despite its recent bloom its roots date back to approximately three
centuries ago. Inadvertently and as a consequence of his simple and elegant reasoning,
Leonhard Euler founded graph theory with the publication of his 1736 paper with the
solution of the problem known as "The Seven Bridges of Königsberg". Königsberg was
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a city of Prussia (now Kalinningrad, in Russia) that consisted in two islands – these
were inter-connected and connected to the mainland by a total of seven bridges. The
challenge – which Euler proved to be impossible – was to devise a route that would
transverse each bridge exactly once. He based his reasoning, for the first time in the
history of Mathematics, in an abstract representation which eliminated all features
except the bridges and the land masses. The interest in graphs, its properties and ap-
plications bloomed, and several renowned mathematicians contributed to the field in
the centuries that followed.
In this thesis we aim to contribute for a better understanding of what is the impact
of population structure on the evolutionary dynamics of i) collective social dilemmas,
and ii) dyadic contact processes representative of propagation of behaviors and ideas
in social networks. Therefore, we start by discussing some central concepts of Network
Science in chapter 2, which will be recurrently used in the rest of the thesis. In chap-
ter 3 we present the mathematical framework of Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT),
which traditionally addresses the problem of evolution of cooperation in well-mixed
populations (i.e. populations in which each and every individual has the same proba-
bility of interacting with every other in the population). Although real populations are
far from being well-mixed and infinite, these theoretical foundations provide a solid
background for the analysis of the impact of the introduction of structure in a popu-
lation in the dynamical processes studied here. Chapters 2 and 3 correspond to the
theoretical introduction necessary for the understanding and discussion of the original
results presented in the chapters that follow.Finally, in chapters 4 to 6 we present and
discuss the results obtained in three distinct projects. In each of these chapters, we start
by presenting a brief discussion of the evolutionary dynamics of the model under study
in well-mixed populations (results already known in the literature), and then proceed
to discuss our original results in structured populations. In figure 1.1 we present a
flowchart with a brief outline of the thesis. The projects we discuss in chapters 4 to 6
are the following:
• Chapter 4: The N -Person Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD) is the most suitable model
to describe situations in which a benefit obtained from the completion of a task
is proportional to the number of cooperators in the group. We investigate not
only the impact of localized interactions in the average level of cooperation in a
population, but also the impact of modifying the contributive paradigm. We show
that in highly heterogeneous populations, when cooperators share their effort
equally among all the dilemmas in which they participate cooperation blooms.
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Our results demonstrate what we believe is an encouraging message – the act of
giving is more important than the amount given.
• Chapter 5: Less studied than the NPD, the N -Person Snowdrift Game (NSG) is
an interesting alternative to study the evolution of cooperation, appropriate for
situations in which the benefit, when obtained, is fixed and equally available to
all members of the group. We investigate the impact of structured populations
in the evolutionary dynamics of NSG resorting to a numerical analogue of the
replicator equation for structured populations – the gradient of selection. This
new approach provides information concerning the evolution towards the steady
state which in the end proves crucial, and how population structure affects the
global dilemma played in the population.
• Chapter 6: Cooperative strategies are just one of many possible examples of a trait
that may propagate in social networks. Recently, a 3 degrees of influence rule was
proposed for the propagation of traits in social networks, after analyzing empir-
ical correlations among individuals for traits as diverse as alcohol consumption,
smoking habits, obesity, cooperation or happiness in a social network extracted
from a medical database. Throughout this thesis, we refer to peer influence as
a synonym of this empirical observation that individuals influence the behavior
of their nearest neighbors. Similar and non-trivial patterns of correlation were
observed for each of these traits, extending to a social distance of approximately
3. We adopt simple dyadic interaction models, not only in the framework of EGT
but also epidemiological models and opinion formation models, and show how,
for each class of network modeling population structure, different dynamical pro-
cesses lead to similar degrees of influence. This suggests that peer influence does
not depend on the trait or dynamical process, and that network structure may
ultimately determine the pattern of peer influence.
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Figure 1.1: Outline of the thesis - Brief outline of the organization of the thesis, high-
lighting what are the research contributions and the necessary theoretical background.
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2Network Science
2.1 Introduction
Consider a system composed of several individual parts connected with each other in
some way. The complete study of such a system can follow diverse routes, as one can
investigate
• the properties of its individual elements,
• the nature of the interactions between them, and also
• the pattern of interactions between those elements.
Such pattern can be captured by a network (or a graph) – formally, a collection of nodes
connected by links or edges according to a certain structure.
In figure 2.1 we show two examples of systems of very different nature and their
respective networks: a railroad network of United States of America (panel A), and
a snapshot of the structure of the Internet (panel B). In the former case, the nodes
are cities, linked together by railroads; while in the latter nodes are computers and
routers, linked together by physical links, like cables and other data connections. On
both examples, when we study just the network a significant amount of information
is lost: it is not possible to know when the rails and roads were built, and the traffic
in each of them; or the operating systems of the computers and how many times they
are accessed. But the same simplification occurs in countless physical models. The
central point here is that networks may provide a convenient and useful formalism for
studying the interaction between the elements of a system. Perhaps because of this very
7
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A. B.
Figure 2.1: Examples of real world networks - A. The United States of America rail
network, which connects the main road systems (source: Wolfram Mathematica (3)). B. A
symmetrized snapshot of the structure of the Internet at the level of autonomous systems
(4) ; layout obtained using the algorithm OpenOrd (5), optimized for the representation
of large scale networks, of software Gephi (6)).
reason they have become fundamental in every area of Science and Technology – from
Mathematics, to Physics, Social Sciences, Biology or Telecommunications, to cite a few.
Networks will be a central element to all the original results discussed in this thesis.
Consequently, in this chapter we start with a brief introduction to the mathematical
formalism of network theory, and then proceed to present some of the most emblematic
network models and explore some of its topological properties. Theoretical elements
presented in this chapter will be limited to the scope of this thesis; a more detailed
exposition can be found, for instance, in (1, 2).
2.2 Quantifying Network Structure
In this thesis, we will consider only networks in which all links have the same weight
or strength, in which there are no multi-links (more than one link connecting the same
pair of nodes), no loops (links connecting a node to itself) and no directed links (if
node i is connected to node j then j is also connected to i). The structure of a network
can be mathematically represented in the framework of graph theory by its adjacency
8
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matrix A = Aij , a square matrix whose elements are simply given by
Aij =
{
1 if there is a link between nodes i and j
0 otherwise
(2.1)
A simple example is represented in figure 2.2. With the above mentioned simplify-
ing assumptions, the adjacency matrix is symmetric and all its diagonal elements are
zero. Also note that computationally speaking, depending on the network size, storing
network structure using its adjacency matrix can demand huge amounts of memory.
Although in this thesis we restrict ourselves to networks with a few thousands of nodes
at most, we use adjacency lists (a list of the neighbors of each node) to store infor-
mation instead of adjacency matrices, so as to ensure fast processing and low memory
consumption.
The number E of edges of a network with Z nodes is given by
E = 12
Z∑
i=1
ki, (2.2)
where ki represents the degree or connectivity of a node i – the number of nodes to which
it is connected. In the equation above we count the links of each of the Z nodes of the
network and therefore each link is counted twice, hence the factor 12 . Equivalently, we
can have E = Z〈k〉2 , where
〈k〉 =
∑Z
i=1 ki
Z
(2.3)
is the average degree or average connectivity of a network, an important measure that
will be used recurrently in the next chapters. The degree of a node is sometimes re-
ferred to as its degree centrality, to emphasize that it can be regarded as a measure
of the importance of that node in the network. Of course, depending on the particular
dynamical process being modeled in a network, the concept of importance can take dif-
ferent forms. Degree centrality is the simplest of such measures, counting the number
of connections of each node, but despite its simplicity it can be elucidating: regarding
the spread of a disease, rumor or idea on a (social) network, it is reasonable to think
that individuals with more neighbors will simultaneously be more exposed to it and
more able to infect or influence individuals.
One of the most important network properties is its degree distribution D(k) – the
frequency of nodes in the network exhibiting degree k or, equivalently, the probability
9
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na,e = 3
Figure 2.2: Quantifying network structure - We represent a simple network composed
of 7 nodes, without multi-links, loops and directed links. The degree (k), clustering co-
efficient (CWS) and shortest path length (nij) are given for specific nodes, and the corre-
sponding adjacency matrix is given on the right.
that a node of an infinite network has degree k. The degree distribution D(k) is given
by
D(k) = n(k)
Z
(2.4)
where n(k) is the number of nodes with degree k in a network of size Z. Alternatively,
one can also define the accumulated degree distribution, Dacc(k), which measures the
frequency of nodes with degree higher or equal to k:
Dacc(k) =
∑kmax
i=k D(ki)
Z
(2.5)
where kmax represents the maximum degree observed in the network. An important
distinction will be recurrent in the next chapters, between homogeneous and heteroge-
neous networks: in heterogeneous networks, different nodes may have different num-
ber of connections – some relevant examples, which will be discussed in more detail
in the following sections, are represented on panels B and C of figure 2.3. As for
homogeneous networks, all nodes have the same degree k, and therefore the degree
distribution is simply a Kronecker delta in k, examples being lattices and ring networks,
depicted in panel A of figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Network classes according to degree distribution - A. Lattices and ring
regular networks are examples of homogeneous networks, in which all nodes have the
same number of neighbors, and for which the degree distribution is simply D(k) = δ(i−k).
B. The degree distribution of random networks follows a Poisson distribution. C. Scale-free
networks are characterized by a marked degree of heterogeneity and small-world effects.
Its degree distribution follows a power-law.
The average degree of the network, 〈k〉, is given by the first moment of the degree
distribution D(k), 〈k〉 = ∑kmaxk=1 kD(k),while the second moment allows us to compute
the variance of k, σ2k:
σ2k =
kmax∑
k=1
k2D (k)−
kmax∑
k=1
kD (k)
2 = 〈k2〉 − 〈k〉 (2.6)
But D(k) (or Dacc(k)) does not provide a complete description of a network – for a
given network size Z, there can be several different networks for the same D(k) and
Dacc(k). Other important topological quantities can be measured that further charac-
terize a network and have been shown to have a significant impact on the dynamical
processes modeled on networks. One of such properties is the propensity that two
neighbors of a given node are themselves neighbors of each other. The clustering coef-
ficient, as proposed in 1998 by Watts and Strogatz (7) in the context of the analysis of
the small-world effect (see section 2.3), can be evaluated locally for each node. Suppose
nodes j andm are both neighbors of node i. If j andm are also connected to each other
themselves, we say that i, j and m form a triangle. The local clustering coefficient of
11
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node i, CWS(i), measures in how many triangles i takes part, over all possible triangles
that could be formed with i, that is,
CWS(i) =
# pairs of neighbors of i that are connected
# pairs of neighbors of i (2.7)
The global clustering coefficient of the network, CWS, is simply an average over the
clustering coefficient of all the nodes of the network:
CWS =
∑Z
i=1CWS(i)
Z
(2.8)
Transitivity, Tr, on the other hand, was proposed in 2002 by Newman, Watts and Stro-
gatz (8), and at the time was claimed to be equivalent to CWS. Transitivity corresponds
to counting how many triangles exist on the network over all the triangles that could
be formed or, alternatively,
Tr = (# triangles) x 6# paths of length 2 (2.9)
where the factor 6 comes from the fact that each triangle is counted 6 times when
counting the number of paths of length 2; if we assume that nodes i, j and m form
a triangle, then we count the paths ijm, jmi, mij, mji, jim,imj. As first noted in
(9, 10), these two quantities can in fact differ significantly when measured for the
same network. In this thesis we chose to use CWS. We are aware that in heterogeneous
networks the values obtained for CWS need to be taken into account with some cau-
tions, as smaller degree nodes will contribute more to the global clustering coefficient,
and for those nodes it is also easier to achieve higher local values of the clustering
coefficient. However, this will not affect the conclusions extracted from our results.
Last but not least, there are other important topological concepts which are related
with the distance between pairs of nodes in a network – measured as the number of
edges that lie in a path between them. Of special interest is the determination of the
geodesic paths, or shortest paths: denoting as nij the shortest distance between nodes i
and j (that is, the geodesic path between i and j), the average path length L is simply
an average over the shortest path lengths between all pairs of nodes in the network,
that is,
L = 1
Z(Z − 1)
∑
i,j∈Z,i6=j
nij (2.10)
The average path length L plays an important role in the dynamical processes modeled
on networks – intuitively, the smaller this quantity the easier a trait will spread over
12
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Z E L CWS
Network of Jazz Bands (11) 198 2 742 2.235 0.617
Coauthorship in Network Science (12) 1 589 2 742 5.823 0.638
C. Elegans Neuronal Network (7, 13) 306 2 345 3.992 0.284
Power Grid (7, 14) 4 941 6 594 18.989 0.08
Marvel Social Network (15) 10 469 178 115 2.889 0.458
Internet 22 963 48 436 3.842 0.23
Table 2.1: Number of nodes (Z) and edges (E), average path length L and clustering
coefficient CWS for: i) a network of jazz musicians, ii) a network of co-authorships in Net-
work Science (publications up to early 2006), iii) the C. Elegans neuronal network, iv)
a power grid, v) the Marvel social network, and vi) the Internet, also graphically repre-
sented in panel B of Figure 2.1. Values for the topological properties obtained using the
Gephi software (6).
a population located on the nodes of the network and inter-connected through the
links. Conversely, we can also determine a network’s diameter: the length of the longest
geodesic path between any pair of nodes in the network for which a path actually exists.
Note that without this last remark, the diameter of networks composed of disconnected
components would be infinite. However, we will be only concerned with connected
networks (in which there is at least one path between any pair of nodes). In figure 2.2
we illustrate the concepts of adjacency matrix, connectivity, local clustering coefficient
and shortest path length for a simple and small network.
In table 2.1 we present the number of nodes (Z) and edges (E), the average path
length (L) and the clustering coefficient (CWS) of some real world networks from dif-
ferent nature, from power grids to neuronal networks and a network of jazz bands
that performed between 1912 and 1940. Note that, to the exception of the power grid
network, all exhibit a significant value of clustering coefficient and a small average
path length. The Internet, the largest network analyzed in table 2.1, even exhibits an
average path length smaller than the network of co-authorships in network science,
despite the huge difference in the size of these two networks. These differences are
related with how nodes and links are organized in each of the networks, that is, with
the specific mechanisms that led to the growth of these networks. These mechanisms
have of course an impact in the degree distribution of the networks – an aspect which
13
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we will discuss in the following section.
2.3 The Regular, the Random, and the Small-World in be-
tween
Random networks were the first heterogeneous networks studied in detail. In general,
we say that a network is random if, while certain characteristics are fixed (say, the
number of nodes and/or links, the degree distribution, etc), the remaining ones are
random. Therefore, the random network model is not defined by a single network but
by an ensemble of all possible networks in which only the specified properties are fixed.
Although these networks were first studied by Solomonoff and Rapoport (16, 17),
this model is often associated with the names of Paul Erdös and Alfréd Rényi, who pub-
lished a series of papers in the late 1950s about a random network model in which the
number of nodes Z is fixed and a link between any pair of nodes would be established
with probability p. They have shown that, in the limit of large Z (Z →∞), the degree
distribution of the network follows a Poisson distribution, that is,
D(k)→ (Zp)
ke−Zp
k! , Zp = const (2.11)
The rail network depicted in panel A of figure 2.1 is one example of a random network
whose degree distribution, in the limit of large Z, would follow a Poisson distribution.
The physical impossibility (and the inefficiency) of building hundreds of rails connect-
ing the major roads causes the degree distribution of this network to be approximately
Poisson; in this case, the majority of nodes (roads) have 5 to 6 connections (railways).
Almost half century before the ER model, on December 11, 1909, Gugliemo Mar-
coni shared the Nobel Prize for Physics with Karl Ferdinand Braun "...in recognition of
their contributions to the development of wireless telegraphy". The possibility of com-
municating across long distances was a revolutionary mark in human history, and the
Nobel Prize reception speech of Marconi was visionary: he suggested that, on average,
it required only 5.83 radio delay stations to communicate over the entire globe. To
such a large and populated world, this sounded almost like science fiction. It is said
that these declarations inspired the author Frigyes Karinthy to write the short story
"Chains", 20 years later, in which he suggested that, as a consequence of technological
advancements in communication and travel, human beings were becoming more and
more inter-connected and the world was shrinking.
14
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This small-world effect was first observed experimentally in a series of famous exper-
iments undertaken in the 1960s by Stanley Milgram (18), an American social psycholo-
gist who was assistant professor in Harvard University at the time (he would be denied
tenure shortly after, most probably because of his polemic experiments on obedience
to authority (19)). Milgram sent several packages to randomly chosen individuals in
the U.S. cities of Omaha and Wichita; the packages’ final destination was a target in-
dividual located in Boston. The recipients of the package were only informed of his
name and home city. Each recipient was asked to forward the package to this target
individual or, if they did not know him (which was the most probable), to someone
who they thought could know him. Of the 296 packages sent, only 64 reached their
destination (one of the main criticisms to the conclusions taken from this experiment);
of these, the average number of links separating sender from recipient was close to 6
– giving rise to the expression 6 degrees of separation, although Milgram himself never
used it.
Despite some relevant criticisms pointed to this experiment, more recently several
other studies have reached similar qualitative conclusions, reinforcing the idea that
we indeed live in a small world. In 2003 (20) Dodds, Muhamad and Watts replicated
Milgram’s experiment using electronic mail, and reached a similar average path length.
Also, in 2008 a study of the Microsoft Messenger instant-messaging system revealed
that the average chain of contacts between its users was of 6.6 people (21). The Erdös
number (the same Erdös from the ER model), a humorous tribute to the prolific output
of the Hungarian mathematician Paul Erdös which measures an individual’s degree of
separation from Erdös based on article co-authorship, is another example: the fact that
approximately 90% of the mathematicians have an Erdös number smaller than 8 reveals
the small world nature of the mathematical community.
In 1998, Watts and Strogatz (7) proposed an algorithm which consisted in rewiring
each edge of a regular ring network with Z nodes and E edges, with a probability
prewire, and monitored both the clustering coefficient CWS and the average path length
L of the resulting networks as a function of prewire (an example of the application of
such algorithm is given in figure 2.4). The limiting cases prewire → 0 (prewire → 1) are
characterized by large CWS and L (low CWS and L) respectively. The authors showed
that there is a region of prewire values for which, while CWS remains high, L is quite
small due to the introduction of a few long range links that connect nodes that would
otherwise be far apart.
15
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Figure 2.4: Normalized average path length L/L0 and clustering coefficient CWS/CWS,0
for varying rewiring probability prewire in the Watts-Strogatz model - Data shown
corresponds to an average over 50 realizations of the rewiring process described in the
main text, starting from a ring regular network with size Z = 103, average connectivity
〈k〉 = 4, average path length L0 and clustering coefficient C0.
Networks exhibiting these properties (CWS  CrandomWS and L & Lrandom, where
CrandomWS and Lrandom stand for the clustering coefficient and the average path length
measured in a network with the same degree distribution and prewire = 1) are known
as small-world networks, and the study by Watts and Strogatz (7) as well as other
more recent studies (21, 22) have shown that many real world networks exhibit these
characteristics, ranging from neuronal networks to power grids.
A slight departure from this method originates yet another type of networks, which
are also frequently used in the literature. Also using as a starting point a regular ring
network with Z nodes and E edges, this method (23) consists of randomly swapping
the ends of pairs of links with probability prewire. This method ensures that the number
of connections of each individual remains unaltered, contrary to the method adopted
by Watts and Strogatz. When prewire = 1 in this case we obtain Homogeneous Random
networks (HoRand), characterized by both small average path length and clustering
coefficient.
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2.4 Scale-Free networks
The 1990s were marked by still another advance in network theory: just one year after
the work by Watts and Strogatz on small-world networks, in 1999, Barabási and Albert
proposed a model (24) which, for the first time, did not simply describe other, novel
(at that time), network characteristics, but succeeded in explaining why they exhibited
those properties. On random networks, the only heterogeneous networks that had
been studied so far, all nodes had approximately the same degree. However, in real
networks we frequently encounter a small fraction of hubs – nodes with a large number
of connections –, and a large number of nodes with just a few connections – the leaves.
The algorithm for building Scale-Free Barabási-Albert networks (BA) starts from a small
number m0 of disconnected nodes, and new nodes and edges are added combining the
following steps:
• Growth: In every fictitious time-step t, a new node is added to the network es-
tablishing links with m different nodes (with m ≤ m0) that were present in the
network in time-step t− 1. After t time-steps, the network has Z = t+m0 nodes
and mt edges.
• Preferential Attachment: each of the m links mentioned above is established pref-
erentially to highly connected nodes; that is, the probability p that the new node
connects with node i depends on its degree ki, according to
p (ki) =
kαi∑
j k
α
j
(2.12)
with α = 1.0 (it has been shown, both by computer simulations (24) and analyti-
cally (25), that only linear preferential attachment (α = 1.0) leads to a power-law
degree distribution. Preferential attachment leads to the popular rich get richer
effect: highly connected nodes will become more and more prone to receive more
links.
When α = 0 in equation 2.12, we have
p(k) = 1
m0 + t− 1 = const, (2.13)
that is, new links are established randomly, and the degree distribution of the emerging
network does not follow a power-law but an exponential distribution. That is, when
preferential attachment is replaced by random attachment the tail of the degree dis-
tribution of the emerging network with a given size will be much smaller than the
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maximum connectivity observed in a scale-free BA network grown with the same pa-
rameters, and for this reason for exponential networks we cannot really refer to the
existence of hubs (as nodes with a connectivity much larger than all the others in the
network).
Many real world networks are conjectured to be scale-free, but results are many
times still inconclusive. Very frequently, the data available corresponds to a sampling
of the entire network, and from such sub-network it is not possible to affirm that the
degree distribution of the total network is scale-free, even if the one of the sub-network
is.
In order to determine analytically the expression for the degree distribution D(k)
and the exact scaling exponent γ of the power-law, Barabási and colleagues (24, 26)
have adopted the continuum limit method, in which it is assumed that k is continu-
ous†. In this way, the probability for preferential attachment p (ki), expressed in equa-
tion 2.12, can be interpreted as a continuous rate of change of ki (from here on we will
consider α = 1 in equation 2.12). As Barabási and Albert show (24), the rate at which
a node acquires links is given by
∂ki
∂t
= ki2t ⇒ ki(t) = m
(
t
ti
)1/2
(2.14)
From equation 2.14 Barabási and colleagues were able to determine analytically the
value of γ:
D [ki(t) < k] = D
[
ti >
m2t
k2
]
= 1−D
(
ti ≤ m
2t
k2
)
= 1− m
2t
k2
(t+m0) (2.15)
which for long time periods gives
D(k) = 2m
2
k3
, (2.16)
that is, γ = 3. Note that, in the limit of infinite size, in the continuum limit the average
degree 〈k〉 is given by
〈k〉 =
∫ kmax
kmin
kD(k)dk = 2m2
∫ kmax
kmin
k1−γdk = 2m2
[
k2−γmax
2− γ −
k2−γmin
2− γ
]
(2.17)
where kmin and kmax and the minimum and maximum degrees observed in the net-
work, respectively. Given that kmax →∞ and kmin = m, we obtain
〈k〉 = −2m4−γ 12− γ (2.18)
†Dorogovtsev, Mendes and Samukhin derive an exact solution to a more general network model, of
which the Barabási-Albert model is a particular case, by solving the master equation of the system, in (27).
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which for γ = 3 simplifies to
〈k〉 = 2m (2.19)
The variance of the degree distribution D(k) in the limit of infinite size is given by
σ2k =
∫ kmax
kmin
k2D(k)dk −
∫ kmax
kmin
kD(k)dk =
= 2m2
[
k3−γmax − k3−γmin
3− γ −
k2−γmax − k2−γmin
2− γ
] (2.20)
Once again, given that kmax →∞ and kmin = m, we obtain
σ2k = 2m2
[
1−m3−γ
3− γ +
m
2− γ
]
(2.21)
which diverges for γ = 3. That is, scale-free networks grown according to the Barabási-
Albert model exhibit infinite variance. In fact, the term "scale-free" originates in the
fact that these networks, contrary to the ones discussed so far, do not have a character-
istic scale. While for previous networks we could state, for instance, that the average
degree had a certain value plus or minus a given standard deviation, the same does not
happen in this case because the second moment of its degree distribution, its variance,
diverges. As such, the notion of average degree has to be taken with special care when
considering these networks.
Another important property of scale-free networks is the very small average distance
between any two nodes: it has been shown (28) that the average path length of (very
large) random scale-free networks scales as L ∼ ln lnZ, and because of such it is said
that scale-free networks are ultra-small (in comparison to the small world networks
discussed above, for which the average path length scales as L ∼ lnZ).
Despite its many advantages, this model also has some shortcomings. On the one
hand, this model only accounts for degree distributions D(k) ≈ k−γ with γ = 3, ignor-
ing other possible γ values. In fact, several real networks whose degree distribution
is candidate to be classified as scale-free have γ values in the interval 2 < γ < 3. On
the other hand, in the scale-free BA model newly added nodes never have the chance
of obtaining a higher degree than those nodes that were already in the network by the
time they arrived. This age effect does not always occur in real networks: for instance,
Google appeared 7 years after the World Wide Web (WWW) was made public, and even
so became the largest hub. To address these and other issues several other models were
proposed in the literature shortly after the BA model. One of them is the fitness model
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(29), also proposed by Barabási and colleagues: this consists of a slight modification of
their original model to take into account the different capacity that nodes may have to
acquire links. In this case, each newly added node i is attributed a fitness ηi extracted
from a distribution ρ (η). This ηi is constant in time and represents the capacity of an
individual i to establish more or less links. As previously discussed for the BA model,
each newly added node establishes m links to nodes already present in the network,
and the probability of connecting to a node i is proportional to the product of his degree
and fitness,
pi =
ηiki∑
j ηjkj
(2.22)
With this generalized preferential attachment newer nodes in the network have now
the possibility of surpassing older ones in the number of established connections. Also,
with this generalization γ is now dependent of the fitness distribution chosen.
The models for growth of scale-free networks described so far lead naturally to
a low clustering coefficient – the probability of building loops is very low. But real
(social) networks usually exhibit sizable values of clustering, as shown in table 2.1. To
account for this property, yet another model has been proposed in the literature, the
Minimal Model (30): starting with a seed of m0 fully connected nodes as described
above, each newly added node establishes m (with m ≤ m0 and m even); each pair
of links is established to the ends of a randomly chosen link already existing in the
network. Although the preferential attachment mechanism is not imposed as a rule, it
emerges naturally as in other duplication-based models (31, 32).
Table 2.2 compares the clustering coefficient CWS and the average path length L of
the network models discussed in this chapter, namely ring networks, lattices and ho-
mogeneous random (HoRand) as representative of homogeneous networks in which
all nodes have the same number of connections; and small-world (SW), scale-free
Barabási-Albert (BA), scale-free Minimal Model (MM) and exponential networks as
representative of heterogeneous networks.
Ring SW HoRand SF Bara SF MM Exponential
CWS High High Low Low High Low
L High Low Low Low Low Low
Table 2.2: Qualitative comparison of the values of clustering coefficient (CWS) and average
path length (L) of important homogeneous and heterogeneous network models that will
be referred to later in this thesis.
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3.1 Game Theory
Game Theory provides a convenient mathematical framework for the study of strategic
situations, where the success of an individual depends on the decisions adopted by
others. Individuals interact according to the rules of a given game, from which they
obtain a certain gain (or loss) – denoted as payoff – dependent on the other players’
actions – denoted as strategies. Individuals are typically assumed to be perfectly rational
and aware of the structure of the game in which they participate. Rational individuals
are expected to adopt strategies that maximize their payoff. Since everyone is equally
rational, this can lead to situations in which there is a conflict between individual
rationality and collective interest. These special cases are known as social dilemmas.
Game Theory established itself as a unique field in 1944, with the publication of
(33); however, there are records of early discussions of game theoretical ideas that
date as early as the beginning of the 1st millennium. The Babylonian Talmud (0-500
AD) consisted of a compilation of Jewish laws and traditions; among these, the Talmud
stated how the estate S of a recently deceased individual should be divided among the
debts d1, d2 and d3 that he had left to his three wives (with d1 + d2 + d3 > S). An
intuitive reasoning would suggest to distribute S equally among the three of them, or
proportionally to the debts owed to each wife. However, the Talmud presented some
different alternative solutions depending on the specific value of S which intrigued
scholars for almost two millenia. In 1985 (34), Robert Aumann and Michael Mashler
finally demonstrated that the intriguing solutions on the Talmud could be interpreted
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as the anticipation of the modern game theory. More recent accounts of game theo-
retical elements comprise a letter written by James Waldergrave (a British ambassador
in Austria and France) to Pierre-Remond de Montmort (a French mathematician) con-
cerning the best strategical solution to the card game Le Her, which remounts to the
18th century (35); as well as works by the French mathematicians Antoine Augustin
Cournot (36) and Émile Borel (37).
In Physics, determining the motion of two point particles is conceptually a simple
problem: depending on the system, either a classical or quantum mechanical approach
leads to a correct and well-behaved analytical solution. Increasing the number of in-
teracting particles increases the complexity of the problem †: several approximations
can be adopted to restrict the motion of the particles (to a plane or a specific orbit, for
instance), and often results can be obtained that rely on numerical simulations. But
even in the restricted case the orbits are chaotic. Similarly, while games with N = 2
individuals have simple and well understood solutions, N -Person Games (with N > 2)
lead to far more complex possibilities. We will address both cases on this thesis; fur-
thermore, we will focus on games with only two, unconditional, strategies. In this
chapter, we will start by over-viewing the main concepts of Game Theory: we discuss
the fundamental concept of Nash equilibria (section 3.1.1), which allows us to compute
the optimal strategies for rational individuals, and proceed to analyze the parameter
space of symmetric 2-person social dilemmas with two strategies. Three social dilem-
mas can be defined: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Snowdrift Game, and the Stag-Hunt
Game. Subsequently, we address the issue of N -Person games, namely Public Goods
Games (PGGs). Afterwards we shift our focus to Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT),
introducing the concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (section 3.2.1) and analyzing
the dynamics on both infinite (section 3.2.2) and finite (section 3.2.3) populations.
3.1.1 Nash Equilibria
In Game Theory, not only individuals are assumed to be perfectly rational, but each one
is also aware that the others are rational and will adopt the same reasoning to evaluate
†Briefly, given that each particle is represented by six variables (three spatial and three momentum
components), we face a 6N variables problem, where N stands for the number of particles. There is a
total of ten independent first integrals (for the center of mass, linear momentum, angular momentum and
energy), which for N ≥ 3 is insufficient to reduce the number of variables in a way that the equation
obtained could be solved directly.
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what is their best move. The concept of Nash equilibrium, introduced by the American
mathematician John Nash (38) (who was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in
1994 for his work on this subject) and of fundamental importance in Game Theory,
states that a set of strategies is said to be a Nash equilibrium if no player can increase
his/her payoff of an N -Person game by unilaterally changing his/her strategy. That
is, each strategy in a Nash equilibrium is a best response to all the N − 1 others in
that equilibrium. Formalizing this concept for 2-person games with 2 strategies (a
generalization for a higher number of strategies and/or players is straightforward), if
player i (j) adopts strategy si (sj), the solution
(
s∗i , s∗j
)
is said to be a (weak) Nash
equilibrium whenever
Π(s∗i , s∗j ) ≥ Π(si, s∗j ) ≥ Π(s∗i , sj); with s∗i 6= si and s∗j 6= sj (3.1)
where Π (si, sj) represents the payoff obtained by individual i with strategy si when
playing with individual j with strategy sj . The weak Nash equilibrium becomes strict
whenever the inequality in equation 3.1 becomes strict. Note that this concept is ap-
plicable both to pure strategies – in which an individual always adopts the same action
– and to mixed strategies – in which individuals opt probabilistically among the set of
available pure strategies. John Nash proved that, if we allow for individuals to adopt
mixed strategies, then any game with a finite number of players and a finite set of pure
strategies has at least one Nash equilibrium.
3.1.2 2-person Games
We consider games in which individuals may adopt either one of two possible pure
strategies: to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) with all of their opponents. A cooperator
is an individual who pays a certain cost, c, to provide a certain benefit, b, to another
individual (with b > c). The payoffs for 2-person games with such strategies can be
organized in the payoff matrix

C D
C (R,R) (S, T )
D (T, S) (P, P )
 (3.2)
The first element on each entry of the above payoff matrix represents the payoff ob-
tained by the first player (the row player), while the second element stands for the
payoff of the second player (the column player). The payoff matrix above represents a
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Figure 3.1: Parameter space for 2-Person games with 2 strategies. - Of the four regimes
identified, all but the Harmony Game classify as social dilemmas.
symmetric game, for which the order of the players that adopt each strategy does not
matter, and so we can adopt the simpler representation

C D
C R S
D T P
 (3.3)
in which we represent only the payoff of the row player. Mutual cooperation is awarded
with a Reward (R), and mutual defection with a Punishment (P ); if individuals opt
for opposite strategies, the defector falls into the Temptation (T ) to defect, while the
cooperator receives the Sucker’s Payoff (S). Assuming that R > P we can define
four different regimes according to the relative values of R, S, T and P , identified
in figure 3.1. The Harmony Game (represented on the upper left panel) corresponds
to a special case in which the only rational decision is to cooperate regardless of the
partner’s choice, and for that reason it is not classified as a social dilemma, since both
players opting for C leads to the maximum collective return R instead of the alternative
P . The remaining three are:
• Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (T > R > P > S)
This dilemma was originally introduced by Merrill Flood and Mervil Desher as
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a model of cooperation and conflict in 1950, when working at RAND Corpo-
ration (Research ANd Development), a non-profit research organization origi-
nally funded to work for the United States armed forces. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
denomination came shortly after, when Albert Tucker, a Canadian mathemati-
cian and colleague of theirs, devised a suitable metaphor involving prisoners and
prison sentences. Two alleged criminals, recently caught by the police who does
not have sufficient proofs to take them to court, are interrogated separately and
each one is offered a deal: to testify against his partner and, if he remains silent,
go free while the other receives the full charge, 1 year. If both remain silent, each
serve 1 month in jail. While if both betray each other, each serves 3 months in jail.
None of them can know what the other will choose, they decide simultaneously
and independently. However, regardless of what the other decides, each individ-
ual gets a lighter conviction by betraying the other (by defecting, if we identify
cooperation with remaining silent and not testifying against their partner). Al-
ternatively, we can adopt a parametrization in terms of costs (c) and benefits (b),
and setting R = 1 and P = 0 we obtain the payoff matrix

C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
, b > c > 0 (3.4)
leaving only one free parameter (b−c = 1). Note, however, that this parametriza-
tion represents a special case: other values for R, S, T and P are possible as long
as the inequality T > R > P > S holds †. This same remark is valid for the pay-
off matrices 3.5 and 3.6 given that the corresponding inequalities are respected.
The (D,D) pair is the only Nash equilibrium of this game, and because of this
the Prisoner’s Dilemma represents the essence of the conflict between individ-
ual and collective interest – although a rational player would always choose to
defect regardless of his partner’s option, both individuals would be better off by
cooperating.
• Snowdrift Game (SG) (T > R > S > P )
This game has been used in the study of the problem of evolution of coopera-
†If the players play the Prisoner’s Dilemma more than once with each other, and are able to remember
their past actions, one must also ensure that 2R > T + S, to prevent that the individuals can obtain a
greater reward from alternating between (C, D) and (D, C), than by mutual cooperation (C, C). Iterated
games will be further explored in section 3.3.2
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tion since 1986, by the English economist Robert Sugden (39). However, the
basic concepts that underly its formulation date back from the 1950s, when it
was known as the Chicken game – from the 1955 film Rebel without a cause, in
which two youths drive their cars towards a cliff: the one who first turns away is
"chicken" but if none of them turns away they both end up dying (40). Also, in
1973, John Maynard Smith and George Price introduced this game in the study
of the logic of animal conflicts, under the name of Hawk-Dove game (41). In its
original formulation, two individuals are driving on a road which gets blocked
by a snowdrift. To proceed their journey home (the benefit b), the snow must be
removed (incurring in a cost c), which will happen if at least one of the drivers
decides to cooperate and shovel the snow. Of course, if both shovel (cooperate)
each one spends only half of the workload of shoveling the snow. This metaphor
can be translated in the payoff matrix

C D
C b− c/2 b− c
D b 0
, b > c > 0 (3.5)
The pairs (C, D) and (D, C) are both Nash equilibria – intuitively, each individual
is better off if the other one invests all the effort necessary for shoveling the snow
without investing anything himself. A third Nash equilibrium exists if one con-
siders mixed strategies, but in this thesis we will only study situations involving
pure strategies.
• Stag-Hunt Game (SH) (R > T > P > S)
The Stag-Hunt denomination comes from a metaphor described by Jean-Jacques
Rousseau in (42, 43) concerning two individuals that go on a hunt. Each of
them has two options: to hunt a stag, for which he needs the collaboration of his
partner; or to hunt a hare, that he can hunt by himself (but is worth less than a
stag). If, as a simplification, we assume that hunting a stag provides a reward b
and hunting a hare simply provides a reward b2 , this metaphor can be translated
by the payoff matrix

C D
C b− c −c
D b/2− c 0
, b > c > 0 (3.6)
where c represents the cost associated with the hunt. Of course, as in the previous
cases, the values for each of the entries of the payoff matrix above can be any as
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long as the inequalities R > T > P > S are respected; the payoff matrix 3.6
corresponds to a simplification frequently found in the literature.
This dilemma, also known as Coordination Game, Assurance Game and Trust
Dilemma, has two (pure strategy) Nash equilibria, (C, C) and (D, D).
3.1.3 N-Person games
Many real-life situations, however, involve decisions derived from groups composed by
more than two individuals. Group hunting, the payment of taxes, the participation in
open source projects, trying to solve the problem of global warming – are just a few of
the many examples that can be given. This type of collective action problems – which
abound, not only in humans (44, 45, 46), but also in other upper primates (47, 48) –
is best described in the framework of N -Person games (44, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53), which
provide a richer spectrum of evolutionary possibilities, but are also more complex to
analyze, as recognized by the evolutionary biologist W. D. Hamilton:
"The theory of many person games may seem to stand to that of two-person
games in relation of sea-sickness to a headache."
– W. D. Hamilton in "Innate Social Aptitudes of Man: an Approach from Evolutionary Genetics" (1975)
There are many types of N -Person games (53). Public Goods Games (PGGs) are a
special case of N -Person games. PGGs concern the provision of a certain benefit that
will be available to all individuals of the group (48, 54) and which depends on how
many cooperate towards its attainment.
A public good is a certain resource, a benefit, that is both non-excludable and non-
rival: all can benefit from it, irrespectively of having contributed to its provision or
not; and one individual benefiting from the public good does not exclude another from
obtaining the same benefit.
Another special class of N -Person games is the Tragedy of the Commons, which
owes this denomination to the homonym article by Garrett Hardin in 1968 (44). The
Tragedy of the Commons addresses the problem of how a given common good should
be explored by a group of individuals – each one obtains a benefit by using that common
good, but if all use it to its maximum potential it will be overexploited and no one
will be able to benefit from it anymore. One can benefit from public parks or public
television without paying taxes (the most profitable situation), but if all adopt the same
behavior that public service can no longer be provided – the result is the tragedy of the
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commons. Note that on this case we are referring to common goods (that are available
to all individuals), but these can be exhausted, that is, an individual benefiting from it
can affect another individual benefiting or not (if not sufficient people pay the necessary
taxes for the maintenance of public television and yet benefit with it, it cannot be
further maintained). On this thesis we will focus solely on PGGs.
The generalization from 2-Person to N -Person games adds some new possible sce-
narios. While on 2-Person Games an individual is always aware of his partners’ choice
(to cooperate or to defect) after payoffs are attributed, in the latter it may happen that
actions are not disclosed, and as such, defectors can exploit the public good without
being noticed. Also, while in dyadic interactions the costs of the defection of an in-
dividual relies completely on his partner, on multi-person interactions that impact is
shared through all the members of the group.
The mapping of the contributions of Cs onto the public good is given by a production
function; that is, a production function establishes the relationship between the level
of contributions and the level of public good produced. Some examples of production
functions are depicted in figure 3.2. Note that the production function can overlay
with the fitness of a given strategy as a function of the number of cooperators in the
group, but that is not always the case. In this thesis we will focus on the N -Person
generalization of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD) and the N -Person generalization of
the Snowdrift Game (NSG). The NSG is characterized by a benefit that once obtained
is fixed, and so the production function corresponds to a step-function (Figure 3.2D).
As for the NPD, it is characterized by a benefit proportional to the number of contrib-
utors – we will consider a linear production function (Figure 3.2A), but accelerating
(Figure 3.2B, also known as increasing returns) or deccelerating (Figure 3.2C, also
known as decreasing returns) production functions would also be possible choices. In
the literature, most attention has been dedicated to collective social dilemmas char-
acterized by linear production functions; however, it has been shown that in the real
world non-linear dilemmas are more common, by far, than linear ones (55, 56, 57, 58).
Importantly, the evolutionary dynamics of an N -Person social dilemma are significantly
altered depending on the choice of the production function, as will be shown in chap-
ters 4 and 5: one may pass from a scenario of D-dominance, for a linear production
function, to a scenario of coexistence of cooperators and defectors, depending on the
particular details of a non-linear production function (59, 60).
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Figure 3.2: Production functions in N-person games - Production functions establish
the relationship between the level of contributions and the level of public good obtained.
We schematize the following examples of production functions: A. linear, in which all
contributions have the same impact, B. accelerating, in which initial contributions have
little effect but increasing contributions lead to increasing outcomes, C. decelerating, in
which initial contributions have the greatest effect, and D. step function, in which the
public good is only obtained after a certain minimum number of contributions is reached.
Figure based on the one in (48), page 8.
3.2 Evolutionary Game Theory
Game Theory provides convenient tools to analyze strategic situations in which N ≥ 2
perfectly rational individuals interact. Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), which has its
origins in the pioneer work of John Maynard Smith and George R. Price (41, 61) (who
applied the notions of game theory to biology) is a dynamical description, contrary to
the static description of Game Theory: it expands the description of Game Theory to
a population, where the individuals interact according to the rules of the games pre-
viously described. The payoff the individuals obtain from all interactions is translated
onto individual fitness. This, in a biological context, is associated with reproductive
success: more successful individuals can, by reproduction, spread their strategy, which
will increase its frequency in the population. Besides the biological interpretation, one
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may also think in terms of cultural evolution in populations: more successful ideas or
behaviors – memes – will be more imitated and consequently will spread in the popula-
tion.
In the following sections, we will start by introducing the concept of Evolutionary
Stable Strategy (ESS), an analogue of the Nash equilibrium for the Evolutionary Game
Theory, and present the mathematical formalism for both infinite and finite well-mixed
(WM) populations†, for the simpler case of 2-person games. Chapters 4 and 5 will
comprise the mathematical formalism for the corresponding N -person games.
3.2.1 Nash equilibrium revisited – ESS
The concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) was introduced in 1973 by John
Maynard Smith and George R. Price (41) (however, the peer-reviewing of this paper
took so long that John Maynard Smith decided to introduce this concept in an essay in
(62) in 1972). A more detailed analysis was presented the year after in (63). While
the concept of Nash equilibrium emerges as the consequence of individuals’ perfect
rationality and complete knowledge of the structure of the game in which they are
participating, the motivation for the concept of ESS is quite different: it is a result of the
application of the concepts of Game Theory to Biology, and players are assumed to not
have any saying in their strategy, because strategies are interpreted as being inherited
from one generation to the next, and hence an individual will play unconditionally his
strategy against any opponent. Informally, a strategy is said to be ESS if, when adopted
by a population, it cannot be invaded by another strategy, initially rare. Formalizing this
concept mathematically, a strategy s∗ is an ESS if it obeys either one of the following
conditions,
Π (s∗, s∗) > Π (s, s∗) (3.7a)
Π (s∗, s∗) = Π (s, s∗) and Π (s∗, s) > Π (s, s) (3.7b)
In equations 3.7, Π (s∗, s) represents the payoff obtained by the individual adopting
strategy s∗ (the evolutionary stable strategy) when he plays with an individual adopting
strategy s (where s∗ and s represent distinct strategies).
†That is, populations in which each and every individual has the same probability of interacting with
every other in the population; we may also refer to this class of populations as structureless, in relation
with the absence of structure in the contacts between individuals.
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Note that the first ESS condition corresponds to the definition of strict Nash equi-
librium presented in equation 3.1 for the strict inequality. The second condition can be
understood as follows: if Π (s∗, s∗) = Π (s, s∗), then strategy s could invade the pop-
ulation of s∗ players by random drift. But Π (s∗, s) > Π (s, s) ensures that s∗ players
continue to be advantageous when playing against partners adopting s and hence the
population will not be invaded.
Note that, while the Nash equilibrium corresponds to a set of strategies (the strate-
gies of each of the N individuals playing the game), an ESS is a single strategy. Also,
while all ESSs correspond to Nash equilibria, the reciprocal is not true: not all Nash
equilibria are ESSs. For instance, when two individuals play a Snowdrift Game (sec-
tion 3.1.2), both (C,D) and (D,C) are Nash equilibria. However, since in the Snowdrift
game we have T > R > S > P , no pure strategy can be an ESS; that is, if all the
population adopted cooperation (defection) as strategy, an individual that switched to
defection (cooperation) would obtain a higher fitness than the rest of the individuals
in the population and would be able to spread his strategy.
3.2.2 Infinite, Well-Mixed Populations
As previously stated, we consider two types of pure strategies: individuals that always
cooperate (C), and individuals that always defect (D). Let us denote the fraction of Cs
(Ds) in the population by xC (xD). Individuals interact following the payoff matrix 3.3,
and we assume that their average payoff reflects their fitness, associated with repro-
ductive or social success. The fitness fC (fD) of a C (D) can therefore be written as
fC (xC , xD) = xCR+ xDS (3.8a)
fD (xC , xD) = xCT + xDP (3.8b)
That is, the fitness of each individual is frequency-dependent. The evolution of strate-
gies is modeled by the replicator dynamics (64, 65): a strategy spreads in the population
when its fitness is larger than the average fitness of the population. This is translated
into the following set of ordinary differential equations
x˙C = xC
(
fC (xC , xD)− f¯ (xC , xD)
)
(3.9a)
x˙D = xD
(
fD (xC , xD)− f¯ (xC , xD)
)
(3.9b)
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that describe how the frequency of individuals adopting each strategy varies over time,
where f¯ (xC , xD) = xCfC (xC , xD) + xDfD (xC , xD) represents the average fitness of the
population. Noting that 1 − xD = xC ≡ x, this set can be simplified into the single
ordinary differential equation
x˙ = x (1− x) (fC (x)− fD (x)) (3.10)
We shall also refer to the right-hand side of the replicator equation 3.10 by gradient of
selection g(x) ≡ x˙ = x(1−x) (fC(x)− fD(x)). The sign of x˙, which is solely determined
by the fitness difference fC (x)− fD (x), indicates the direction of selection: whenever
x˙ > 0 (x˙ < 0) selection favors cooperation (defection). In a biological context, the
replicator equation 3.10 translates the idea that individuals reproduce proportional to
their fitness. In a cultural context it may be interpreted as ideas or behaviors with
higher fitness being more imitated. Equation 3.10 has two trivial equilibria, x∗triv = 0
and x∗triv = 1, but depending on the details of the game one further interior equilibria
x∗int ∈ ]0, 1[ can exist,
x∗int =
P − S
R− S − T + P . (3.11)
Depending on the values of R, S, T and P , one can distinguish four evolutionary
scenarios, schematized in Figure 3.3 according to the profile of the gradient of selection
g(x):
• C-dominance (panel A): It is characterized by R > T and S > P - cooperators
always have a higher fitness regardless of their initial fraction on the population,
and so the population will evolve towards the fully cooperative state. As discussed
for the Harmony Game, this is the best scenario possible for cooperators, and does
not pose a social dilemma. No interior root exists.
• Coexistence (panel B): In this case T > R and S > P , the interior fixed point
x∗int is stable, while the trivial solutions are unstable. The direction of selection
depends on the initial fraction x of cooperators in the population: for x < x∗int
(x > x∗int) the fraction of cooperators increases (decreases), as the population
evolves towards the stable interior root.
• Coordination (panel C): In opposition to the coexistence scenario, coordination
is characterized by R > T and P > S – the interior root x∗int is unstable, and
selection will act in order to push the fraction of cooperators towards one of the
monomorphic states depending on the initial composition of the population.
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Figure 3.3: Possible evolutionary scenarios for 2-person games with 2 strategies -
Panels A. to D. show typical shapes of the replicator equation for 2-person games with 2
strategies, which depends on the fitness difference fC(x) − fD(x). Solid (open) circles
represent stable (unstable) equilibria; arrows indicate direction of selection.
• D-dominance (panel D): Opposite to the C-dominance scenario, it is character-
ized by T > R and P > S – defectors always have a higher fitness than the
cooperators regardless of the initial composition of the population. No interior
root exists: for the trivial solutions, x∗triv = 0 is a stable fixed point, while x∗triv = 1
is unstable.
3.2.3 Finite, Well-Mixed Populations
Assuming that a population is infinite is always an approximation, and in many cases
a very unrealistic one. To describe the evolutionary dynamics of the propagation of
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strategies in a finite population, it is necessary to take into account stochastic ef-
fects. All finite populations are subject to fluctuations, which cannot be described
in a deterministic formulation. The assumption behind the replicator equation 3.10,
x˙ = x(1−x) (fC(x)− fD(x)), is either that individuals reproduce at a rate proportional
to their fitness (in the biological context), or that individuals imitate actions or behav-
iors that exhibit a higher fitness, with a probability proportional to the fitness difference
(in the cultural context). The detailed way in which we model these assumptions in
finite populations (which we will call update methods) can have decisive consequences
in the evolutionary dynamics of the population, even though in the limit of an infinitely
large population those detailed update methods can converge to the replicator dynam-
ics previously discussed.
In the next sections, we will adopt the formulation of stochastic processes for the
modeling of evolution of cooperation in finite populations. In particular, we will adopt
the formalism of Markov processes, processes in which the state of the system at time
t + 1 only depends of its state at time t (and not of all the previous history of the
system starting from its initial configuration). Afterwards, we will discuss some detailed
update methods that in the limit of infinitely large populations lead to the replicator
dynamics (but which exhibit very distinct dynamics for finite populations), and we
will end by discussing some mechanisms that promote the emergence and evolution of
cooperation.
3.2.3.1 Markov Processes
EGT in finite populations was pioneered by Young (66) and by Kandori, Mailath and
Rob (67).The fraction of Cs ceases to be a continuous variable, and varies in steps of
j/Z, where j represents the number of Cs in the population and Z the population size.
Fitnesses are now given by
fC(j) =
j − 1
Z − 1R+
Z − j
Z − 1S (3.12a)
fD(j) =
j
Z − 1T +
Z − j − 1
Z − 1 P (3.12b)
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where we exclude self-interactions†. We will assume that evolution occurs in the ab-
sence of mutations, and that it satisfies the Markov property, that is, it is memoryless:
the state of the system at time t + 1 only depends of its state at time t, and not on
past states. Formally, a stochastic process is identified as a Markov process if, for any a
successive times (that is, t1 < t2 < ... < ta), it obeys the property (68)
P (xa, ta|x1, t1;x2, t2; ...;xa−1, , ta−1) = P (xa, ta|xa−1, ta−1) (3.13)
where xa represents the state of the system at instant ta. That is, the probability of
encountering the system in state xa at time ta does not depend on the whole history of
the system, P (xa, ta|x1, t1;x2, t2; ...;xa−1, ta−1), but only on the previous state xa−1 at
time ta−1.
Once we consider evolutionary dynamics on finite populations, it is necessary to
adopt an update mechanism that models the transitions between different states of the
population. We will represent by T+n(j) (T−n(j)) the probability that at time t+ 1 the
population will have j + n (j − n) Cooperators, given that it has j Cooperators at time
t. All transition probabilities can be generally summarized in the stochastic transition
matrix
T =

T0(0) T+1(0) T+2(0) · · · T+Z(0)
T−1(1) T0(1) T+1(1) · · · T+Z(1)
T−2(2) T−1(2) T0(2) · · · T+Z(2)
...
...
...
. . .
...
T−Z(Z) T−(Z−1)(Z) T−(Z−2)(Z) · · · T0(Z)

(3.14)
From the transition matrix we can compute the stationary distribution – the fraction of
time the system spends on each state, or alternatively the probability of encountering
the system in state j at any time. The stationary distribution pi can be defined as a
vector which is not altered by the application of the transition matrix T, that is, it
satisfies the equation piT = pi. In other words, pi corresponds to the left eigenvector of
the transition matrix T with eigenvalue 1 (69) (which is the highest eigenvalue, since
T is a stochastic matrix).‡
†Since we assume R > P , self-interactions would introduce a built-in advantage for cooperators.
Self-interactions are also unrealistic in most real world scenarios, and for these reasons we opt to exclude
them in this thesis.
‡If T is a symmetric matrix, left and right eigenvectors are equal; however, T will not be symmetrical
for any of the update methods considered here.
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Figure 3.4: Markovian birth-death process - Markov chain describing the evolutionary
dynamics of a birth-death process in a population with j cooperators. Dashed curves rep-
resent transitions only possible for innovative update methods. For non-innovative update
methods, j = 0 and j = Z represent absorbing states.
In the transition matrix 3.14 one assumes that all transitions from any state to any
other state are possible from t to t+ 1. For that to occur, one may for instance consider
that all individuals may revise their strategy in each instant. A well-known example is
the Wright-Fisher process, with roots in population genetics (70, 71). In each generation
(1 generation = Z strategy revisions) each individual reproduces proportionally to
his/her fitness, and from the offspring pool Z individuals are randomly chosen to form
the next generation.
The analytical study of the general matrix 3.14 is very complex. For the sake of sim-
plicity we adopt a birth-death process: at each time-step in discrete time only one indi-
vidual may revise his/her strategy. In this case, the transition matrix T is tri-diagonal:
it is only possible to vary the number of cooperators by one, T±1(j) (to simplify no-
tation, from here on we assume T±1(j) ≡ T±(j)). The Markov chain schematized in
figure 3.4 represents the possible transitions for birth-death processes, in a population
of size Z with j cooperators. Depending on the details of the update method adopted,
individuals may either be able to adopt a strategy if it has already been adopted by one
of the members of the population (non-innovative update methods), or have access to
the whole set of strategies allowed by the rules of the game even if no individual in the
population is currently adopting one of them (innovative update methods). In the latter
case, the dashed transitions signaled in figure 3.4 can happen (that is, their probability
can be different from zero): when the population is in a monomorphic state (either all
Cs or all Ds) an individual revising his strategy can change to a different one. Some
examples of innovative update methods are the Best-Response (72, 73) and the Rein-
forcement Learning (74). For non-innovative update methods, the dashed transitions
shown in figure 3.4 cannot occur, and this class of update methods will be the focus of
our research for the remainder of this thesis.
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For non-innovative update mechanisms, j = 0 and j = Z are absorbing states,
that is, states that when reached it is impossible to move out. In these cases, it may
be relevant to compute the fixation probability φj: the probability that j cooperators
invade a population in which the remaining Z − j individuals are defectors. It is given
by
φj =
∑j−1
i=0
∏i
m=1 λm∑Z−1
i=0
∏i
m=1 λm
(3.15)
where λj = T−(j)/T+(j). The scenario T−(j) = T+(j) corresponds to neutral selection,
for which λj = 1 and the fixation probability is simply φj = j/Z. In the case of non-
innovative update mechanisms, for which j = 0 and j = Z are absorbing states, it
may be useful to compute the fraction of time the system spends in eventual internal
stable equilibria. This cannot be obtained with the stationary distribution pi (since it
will simply reflect the fact that the system converges in either one of the absorbing
states); but such difficulty can be overcome by introducing a small mutation rate µ.
In each state a randomly chosen individual may either mutate to the other strategy
with probability µ or follow the standard update update mechanism with probability
1−µ. The quasi-stationary distribution piµ satisfies the condition piµTµ = piµ , and the
transition probabilities Tµ of the transition matrix Tµ are now given by
T+µ (j) = (1− µ)T+(j) + µ
Z − j
Z
(3.16a)
T−µ (j) = (1− µ)T−(j) + µ
j
Z
(3.16b)
where jZ (conversely,
Z−j
Z ) represents the probability of selecting a cooperator (defec-
tor), and T±(j) represent the usual transition probabilities obtained according to the
preferred update mechanism. This is the only context where we consider the occur-
rence of mutations; in the remainder of this chapter and in the following ones, we
consider µ = 0 unless explicitly stated otherwise.
The Master Equation of the system is written as
P t+1(j)− P t(j) = P t(j − 1)T+(j − 1)+
+ P t(j + 1)T−(j + 1)− P t(j)T+(j)− P t(j)T−(j)
(3.17)
where P t(j) represents the probability of the population to be in configuration j at
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time t, or, equivalently,
ρ
(
x, τ + 1
Z
)
− ρ (x, τ) = ρ
(
x− 1
Z
, τ
)
T+
(
x− 1
Z
)
+
+ ρ
(
x+ 1
Z
, τ
)
T−
(
x+ 1
Z
)
− ρ (x, τ)T− (x)− ρ (x, τ)T+ (x)
(3.18)
where we have replaced x = jZ , τ =
t
Z and ρ (x, τ) = ZP t (j) for Z  1. We can
perform a Kramers-Moyal expansion of the Master Equation 3.17 by expanding it in a
Taylor series at x and τ , yielding
ρ
(
x, τ + 1
Z
)
≈ ρ (x, τ) + ∂
∂τ
ρ (x, τ) 1
Z
+ ∂
2
∂τ2
ρ (x, τ) 12Z2 , (3.19a)
ρ
(
x± 1
Z
, τ
)
≈ ρ (x, τ)± ∂
∂x
ρ (x, τ) 1
Z
+ ∂
2
∂x2
ρ (x, τ) 12Z2 , (3.19b)
T±
(
x∓ 1
Z
)
≈ T± (x)∓ ∂
∂x
T± (x) 1
Z
+ ∂
2
∂x2
T± (x) 12Z2 . (3.19c)
If we plug these expansions in equation 3.17 and neglect the terms of order higher
than 1/Z2, we obtain the Fokker-Planck equation of the population (of course, we
could preserve all the terms of the Taylor series of each of the expansions performed,
but in that case we would still be handling the Master Equation itself, which would be
equally hard to analyze). Considering the terms in 1/Z we obtain
1
Z
∂
∂τ
ρ (x, τ) = −ρ (x, τ) ∂
∂x
T+(x)−
(
∂
∂x
ρ (x, τ)
)
T+ + ρ (x, τ) ∂
∂x
T−(x)+
+
(
∂
∂x
ρ (x, τ)
)
T−(x) = − ∂
∂x
[
T+(x)− T−(x)
]
ρ (x, τ) ,
(3.20)
and grouping the terms in 1/Z2 yields(
∂
∂x
ρ (x, τ)
)(
∂
∂x
T+ (x)
)
+ 12ρ (x, τ)
∂2
∂x2
T+ (x) + 12T
+ (x) ∂
2
∂x2
ρ (x, τ) +
+
(
∂
∂x
ρ (x, τ)
)(
∂
∂x
T− (x)
)
+ 12ρ (x, τ)
∂2
∂x2
T− (x) + 12T
− (x) ∂
2
∂x2
ρ (x, τ) =
= 12
∂2
∂x2
[
T+ (x) + T− (x)
]
ρ (x, τ) .
(3.21)
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Equations 3.20 and 3.21 lead to the Fokker-Planck equation
∂
∂τ
ρ (x, τ) = − ∂
∂x
a(x)ρ (x, τ) + 12
∂2
∂x2
b2(x)ρ (x, τ) (3.22)
where
a (x) = T+ (x)− T− (x) (3.23)
and
b2 (x) = T
+ (x) + T− (x)
Z
. (3.24)
It has been shown (68, 75) that the Fokker-Planck equation can be equivalently
described by a stochastic differential equation – a Langevin equation. In this particular
case, assuming the noise is microscopically uncorrelated, we can adopt the Itô interpre-
tation, which after a proper transformation of the coefficients a(x) and b(x) (68) yields
x˙ = a(x) + b(x)ξ (3.25)
where ξ stands for (uncorrelated) Gaussian noise. The coefficient a(x) is known as
the drift term, while b(x) is known as the diffusion term. Note that for non-innovative
update mechanisms we have T+(0) = T−(0) = 0 and, conversely, T+(Z) = T−(Z) = 0,
which yields b(x) = 0 at the absorbing states (x = 0 and x = 1).
For Z → ∞ we get b(x) → 0 and therefore only the a(x) term determines the
dynamics. In this case we have the deterministic equation
x˙ = T+(x)− T−(x) (3.26)
The difference T+(x)− T−(x) represents the gradient of selection, which in the limit of
large Z is equivalent to the replicator equation 3.10 for infinite populations.
3.2.3.2 Update mechanisms
In order to fully define the Markov chain introduced above, we must introduce a local
update mechanism that allows us to obtain an expression for T±(j). One commonly
used in the literature is the replicator analogue for finite populations (64, 76), in which
individuals only imitate others if they are more successful than themselves. Two indi-
viduals, A and B (with strategies sA and sB, and fitnesses fsA and fsB respectively) are
randomly chosen from the population. Given that sA 6= sB (sA, sB ∈ {C,D}), A imitates
B if and only if fsB (j) > fsA(j), with a probability given by
pRD(j) =
fsB (j)− fsA(j)
G(j) (3.27)
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G(j) stands for the adequate normalization factor: taking sA (sB) as the strategy of
individual A (B) – si = 1 if cooperator, si = 0 if defector – G(j) consists of the
difference between the maximum fitness possible when adopting sB, and the minimum
fitness possible when adopting sA, when there are j cooperators in the population. The
transition probabilities are in this case given by
T+(j) =

Z−j
Z
j
Z−1
fC(j)−fD(j)
G(j) if fC(j) > fD(j)
0 otherwise
(3.28a)
T−(j) =

j
Z
Z−j
Z−1
fD(j)−fC(j)
G(j) if fD(j) > fC(j)
0 otherwise
(3.28b)
In equation 3.28a for the transition probability T+, the term Z−jZ corresponds to the
probability of selecting a defector among the Z individuals in the population, and the
term jZ−1 corresponds to the probability of subsequently selecting a cooperator to be
imitated, among the Z − 1 individuals that are left in the population (selection is made
without replacement). Conversely, in equation 3.28b for the transition probability T−,
the term jZ corresponds to the probability of selecting a cooperator from the population,
and the term Z−jZ−1 corresponds to the probability of subsequently selecting a defector
from the Z − 1 remaining individuals.
Note that this update mechanism does not leave room for errors in strategy adop-
tion: an individual only evaluates the possibility of imitating a partner if he is more
successful than him.
To account for errors in the update process a non-linear alternative to the mecha-
nism described above, widely used in the literature, is the Fermi process (77, 78, 79):
a randomly chosen individual A, with strategy sA, imitates a randomly chosen partner
B, with strategy sB (sA 6= sB), with a probability pFermi given by the Fermi probability
distribution from statistical physics
pFermi(j) =
1
1 + e−β(fsB (j)−fsA (j))
, (3.29)
where β stands for the intensity of selection regulating the accuracy of the imitation
process, and fsi the fitness associated with individual i adopting strategy si. Figure 3.5
shows how this probability function varies with fitness difference for several β values.
For β → ∞ we obtain pure copying dynamics, commonly used in studies of cultural
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Figure 3.5: Probability function pFermi for the Fermi Imitation update method - We
plot the probability pFermi that an individual A imitates the strategy of a randomly chosen
player B, pFermi(j), as a function of their fitness difference fsB (j) − fsA(j) for different
values of β. The parameter β regulates the intensity of selection: note how pFermi(j)
approaches a step-function for increasing β.
evolution, whereas in the limit of weak selection β → 0 evolution proceeds by random
drift.
The transition probabilities T±(j) are given by
T±(j) = j
Z
Z − j
Z − 1
[
1 + e∓β(fC(j)−fD(j))
]−1
(3.30)
The first and second terms have a similar interpretation: jZ corresponds to the probabil-
ity of selecting a cooperator, and Z−jZ−1 to the probability of selecting a defector. The last
term corresponds to the probability of a cooperator imitating a defector, or vice-versa.
The balance of transition probabilities, G(j) = T+(j)− T−(j), can be written as
G(j) ≡ T+(j)− T−(j) = j
Z
Z − j
Z − 1 tanh
[
β
2 (fC(j)− fD(j))
]
(3.31)
Note that, in the limit of weak selection (β → 0) we may rewrite equation 3.31 as
G(j) ' j
Z
Z − j
Z − 1
β
2 (fC(j)− fD(j)) (3.32)
which for large populations is equivalent to the replicator equation 3.10 with a different
timescale. The sign of G(j) informs about the preferred direction of selection: when
G(j) > 0 (G(j) < 0) selection favors cooperators (defectors), and the number of Cs will
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most likely increase (decrease). The case G(j) = 0 corresponds to the case of neutral
selection.
For the particular case of the Fermi process the general formula for the fixation
probability 3.15 can be simplified to
φj =
j−1∑
i=0
exp [−βi(i+ 1)u− 2βiv]
Z−1∑
i=0
exp [−βi(i+ 1)u− 2βiv]
(3.33)
where 2u = R − S − T + P and 2v = −R + SZ − PZ + P . When the entries of the
payoff matrix satisfy the condition R + P − S − T = 0, equation 3.33 can be further
simplified to
φj =
1− e−βvj
1− e−βvZ (3.34)
This case is known as equal gains from switching (80) - the change in fitness an individ-
ual obtains from switching strategy is the same regardless of his opponent’s strategy.
3.3 Rules for the evolution of cooperation
According to Darwin’s perspective in his Theory of Natural Selection, the individuals
that are better adapted to their surroundings survive longer, which is translated in a
higher reproductive fitness - their genes are passed on to the next generation. This
survival of the fittest can be interpreted as a competition between egoistic individuals.
How to explain the pervasiveness of cooperation in Nature, if cooperating implies in-
curring in a cost to the cooperative individual, thereby decreasing his fitness? Darwin
himself was puzzled by this (apparent) paradox:
If it could be proved that any part of the structure of any one species had been
formed for the exclusive good of another species, it would annihilate my theory,
for such could not have been produced through natural selection.
- Charles Darwin in "On the Origin of Species" (1859)
However, cooperation remained as a secondary aspect in his work, a problem that
would be solved later on. In the 1950s, with the advent of Game Theory and the for-
mulation of the first social dilemma - the Prisoner’s Dilemma - the paradox remained:
if rational individuals, interested solely in maximizing their own gains, always opt for
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defection, how do we explain the pervasiveness of cooperation in Nature? Two prob-
lems can be identified in this reasoning. One, is that individuals need not be perfectly
rational: several recent experiments have shown that humans’ decisions in economic
experiments are not perfectly rational - that is, individuals do not aim exclusively at
maximizing their fitness. On the other hand, there are other social dilemmas besides
the PD - such as the Stag-Hunt (SH) and the Snowdrift Game (SG) - that are less strict
for cooperation. In the case of the SG, it is possible to observe a coexistence of coopera-
tors and defectors, and in the case of the SH, depending on the initial composition it is
even possible for the population to evolve towards a fully cooperative state. However,
these dilemmas emerged some decades later than the PD, so for quite some time social
dilemmas found in Nature were generally identified with the PD (48, 81). Since coop-
eration was observed in all those examples, some mechanism had to be responsible for
its existence.
During the last decades several mechanisms have been proposed to account for
the existence of cooperation, and all of them rely on the same property - to promote
positive assortment between cooperators. This positive assortment can be caused by
genetic relatedness between individuals, repeated interactions between them, localized
interactions, etc. It is however important to note that the problem of cooperation is not
the same for all of the social dilemmas, and depending on the particular case at study
it may be possible to explain coexistence levels of cooperation and defection without
resorting to any of these mechanisms. The mechanisms we list below - kin selection
(section 3.3.1), direct and indirect reciprocity (sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 respectively),
and network reciprocity) (section 3.3.4) can explain the emergence of cooperation in
the context of the PD (in which case a rational player would never cooperate), and
promote higher levels of cooperation in other social dilemmas such as the SG and
the SH (although this is debatable in some cases (64)). Also, we schematize these
mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation in figure 3.6.
3.3.1 Kin Selection
The first mechanism proposed to explain the existence of cooperation accounts for the
occurrence of cooperative acts between genetically related individuals, and is known
as kin-selection (83).
In the 1930, the English(-born) geneticist J. B. S. Haldane said "I would lay down
my life for two brothers of eight cousins", a famous affirmation that was in the origin of
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r
A. B. C. D.
Figure 3.6: Mechanisms for the promotion of the emergence and evolution of cooper-
ation - A. Kin selection, which accounts for the occurrence of cooperative acts between ge-
netically related individuals, where r represents the degree of genetic relatedness between
donor and recipient; B. direct reciprocity, which assumes repeated encounters between the
same individuals; C. indirect reciprocity, which is based on reputation, and in which two
individuals are not supposed to interact more than once; D. network reciprocity, in which
interactions are localized. This figure is inspired in, and is similar to, the one that can be
found in (82).
what is now known as Hamilton’s law, r > c/b, where r represents the degree of genetic
relatedness between donor (who provides the effort c) and recipient (who receives
the benefit b). For instance, because brothers share on average half of their genetic
material, their coefficient of genetic relatedness is r = 12 (homozygotic twins are an
exception, as for them we have r = 1). Cooperation is explained as the consequence of
an egoistical motivation: in an extreme situation in which one could sacrifice his/her
life to save the life of one or more family members, by saving two brothers one would
guarantee that on average all his genes would pass on to the next generation.
One example that is found in nature is food sharing in vampire bats (84, 85). Vam-
pire bats feed mostly on blood, and can die if they do not have a blood meal for two
consecutive days. It has been shown that vampire bats regurgitate blood to feed other
vampire bats of their group if for some reason they were unable to go hunting on that
night, and it has also been shown that the majority of food sharing instances observed
were among relatives, supporting the kin selection theory. However, a small fraction of
the instances observed occurred between non-related individuals, a fact that requires
further explanation.
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3.3.2 Direct Reciprocity
The small fraction of occurrences of food sharing between non-related vampire bats
mentioned in the previous section requires further explanations - because kin selection
requires donor and recipient to be genetically related, this mechanism only covers a
small fraction of cooperative acts in nature. The direct reciprocity mechanism (86) does
not require genetic relatedness but assumes repeated encounters; it can be resumed by
the popular saying "You scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours".
Let us suppose that individuals play an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the harsh-
est social dilemma of cooperation. If the participants are aware of the number of
encounters beforehand, it is still impossible for cooperation to emerge: in the last en-
counter rational players opt to defect, as there is no room for future reciprocation, and
such reasoning is repeated backwards for all previous encounters. However, not know-
ing the number of encounters beforehand introduces a possibility for cooperation to
emerge.
In 1980, in order to understand what would be the best strategy to play an iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, Robert Axelrod held a computational tournament for which
he asked anyone interested to submit a strategy they thought could win this tourna-
ment (87); these strategies would then play against each other following the rules of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The payoff each strategy accumulated over all interac-
tions would be a measure of its success. Note that in the context of an iterated game,
strategy refers, not to the action taken in a single encounter (to cooperate or to defect),
but to the set of rules an individual uses to decide if he cooperates or defects in each
encounter, taking into account information from the previous round(s). The winning
strategy was the simplest in the competition: the Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy, which con-
sisted of only two lines of Fortran programming, submitted by the Russian-born math-
ematician Anatol Rapoport. This strategy starts by cooperating, and then repeats its
opponent’s previous move; in essence, TFT transforms the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
in an iterated coordination game (48). This strategy was then characterized by being
nice (as it would always start by cooperating), and forgiving (it would reciprocate a
defection, but as soon as its opponent resumes to cooperation he would start cooper-
ating too). This strategy proved to be extremely robust to others, winning a second
tournament that was also held during the 1980s.
However, these tournaments did not allow for occasional errors in decision making,
to which TFT is particularly vulnerable: in a pair of individuals using the TFT strategy,
if by mistake one defects when he was supposed to cooperate, this initiates a wave of
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retaliation that only ceases with the occurrence of another error (87, 88). It was then
shown on computer tournaments where occasional mutations were allowed to occur
that another strategy emerged as the most successful: Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS)
(89), which takes into account the previous move of both players (and not only the
previous move of the opponent, as does TFT). With the WSLS strategy (also known as
Pavlov strategy because of its reflex-like response to payoff), a player cooperates if and
only if both players opted for the same alternative in the previous move, or in other
words: if with the previous move he obtained either R or T as payoff, he repeats it;
otherwise, he switches.
3.3.3 Indirect Reciprocity
Repeated interactions between the same two individuals are frequent in the animal
world, but not so much between humans - or at least not anymore. More and more fre-
quently, we interact with individuals whom we have not met before and probably will
not meet again in the future (90), as is the case in online auctions and other electronic
transactions (91, 92). The indirect reciprocity (93) mechanism explains the emergence
of cooperation in populations where any two individuals are supposed to interact only
once (repeated interactions are excluded to avoid instances of direct reciprocity). Com-
pared with direct reciprocity, it can be translated in the saying "You scratch my back
and I’ll scratch someone else’s" (54), and is based on reputation.
Let us suppose the following scenario, illustrated in figure 3.6C: an individual A
helps an individual B, and this interaction is observed by other individuals in the pop-
ulation (the observers). How should one judge the action of individual A, that is, how
should we formulate an individual’s reputation and which actions should increase or
decrease his reputation? One could adopt an image scoring system (93) in which the
assessment of each action as positive or negative would increase or decrease an in-
dividual’s reputation by one point. Or, more simply, one can allow the reputation of
an individual to be affected only by his last action, and judge the world in "black and
white", that is, judge them as "good" or "bad" (94). Returning to the example illustrated
in Figure 3.6C, an individual C will decide either or not to cooperate with individual
A by recurring to i) an assessment rule or social norm, and ii) an action rule. The moral
assessment uses the available information to decide on the donor’s reputation; depend-
ing on the information used to reach this decision, assessment rules may be classified
either as 1st order (take into account the donor’s action, if he cooperated or not), 2nd
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Donor’s action Recipient’s reputation New reputation of the donor
Cooperated Good Good
Cooperated Bad Bad
Defected Good Good
Defected Bad Bad
Table 3.1: Example of a 2nd order social norm, in which both the donor’s action and the
recipient’s reputation are taken into account to decide on the reputation of the donor after
the action. Taking into account all the possibilities of "good" and "bad" in the rightmost
column, there are 222 = 16 possible 2nd order social norms.
order (take into account the donor’s action and the recipient’s reputation), and so on.
There are 22n possible social norms of order n - one example of a social norm of order
n = 2 is represented in table 3.1. Associated with a social norm, individuals resort
also to an action rule, which tells them if they should cooperate or not with a given
individual taking into account his reputation.
Although some examples are known in the animal world of the use of reputation
(95, 96), this mechanism is found almost only among humans. Because it is neces-
sary to track one’s own interactions, but also all the other individuals interactions, this
mechanism is very demanding at the cognitive level (97), as summarized by the Amer-
ican evolutionary biologist David Haig:
"For direct reciprocity you need a face. For indirect reciprocity you need a
name."
- David Haig as cited by Martin Nowak in "SuperCooperators" (2011)
3.3.4 Network Reciprocity
All previous mechanisms assume that populations are well-mixed. This assumption
may hold on small communities, on which everyone knows and interacts with every-
one else, but it is not realistic for larger populations: in this latter case, different in-
dividuals interact with different sub-sets of partners. This interaction structure can be
conveniently modeled with the use of networks: individuals are assigned to nodes, and
edges between them represent the possibility of interaction.
The introduction of structure in the population - a mechanism later coined network
reciprocity - has a significant impact on the fitness of individuals, as exemplified in
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figure 3.7: while in well-mixed populations (panel A) all cooperators have the same fit-
ness, because all have the same number of interactions with partners of either strategy
(the same happening with all defectors), in structured populations (panel B) fitness
becomes context dependent: the fitness of two individuals with the same strategy is
no longer the same, but depends of their position on the network, on their number
of connections to individuals playing either cooperate or defect, and in some cases it
may even depend on the social context of their neighbors as well as occurs in N -Person
games (with N > 2) played in networks (we will discuss this aspect in detail in chap-
ter 4). In 1992, Nowak and May (98) considered for the first time population structure
in the studies of emergence and evolution of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, adopting a spatial grid as a model of the underlying network of contacts in the
population. The authors showed that, compared with the well-mixed case in which
defection would dominate entirely, the spatial grid could generate chaotically changing
spatial patterns, in which both Cs and Ds would coexist indefinitely.
This pioneer work was rapidly followed by hundreds of articles investigating what
would be the impact of regular structures on other social dilemmas (surprisingly, it
was shown that it can produce a slight inhibition of the level of cooperation in the 2-
person Snowdrift Game (64)), and later on what is the impact of other, more complex
population structures on the evolution of cooperation.
The introduction of population structure has two main implications: the introduc-
tion of local interactions (already discussed), and local dispersal - that is, whenever a
strategy reproduces it can only occupy its closest neighborhood. To analytically de-
scribe the evolution of cooperation (or any other dynamical process) in a structured
population is very difficult: one has to describe not only the global fraction of Cs (and
Ds) in the population, but also where each of them is located. Sometimes, a mean-field
approach is adopted to compute individuals’ fitness (assuming that the probability of
encountering a strategy in an individual’s neighborhood is simply given by its global
prevalence in the population), but this approach amounts to simply neglecting popula-
tion structure and the existence of spatial correlations. Although difficult, it is possible
to retain more information about the spatial configuration of the system if, instead of
describing it as a well-mixed population of individuals, we describe it as a well-mixed
population of pairs of individuals, in which pairs are independent of each other. This is
the approach adopted by pair approximation (99), a method that originates in physics
and is now widely applied in the description of the evolution of several dynamical pro-
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i i
fi = fj = 10T + 8P
fi = 2T + P
fj = 3T
A. B.
Cooperator Defector
j j
Figure 3.7: Impact of structured populations on individual fitness - A. In well-mixed
populations, all individuals with the same strategy (as individuals i and j, for example)
have the same fitness. B. The introduction of structure in a population leads to localized
interactions: now individuals i and j have different fitnesses, constrained by their social
context, despite the fact that they play the same strategy.
cesses on structured populations, from epidemics spreading to opinion dynamics and
the propagation of cooperative strategies.
Let us briefly describe this formalism in the context of social dilemmas with two
(unconditional) strategies. Besides the global fraction of Cs (pC) and Ds (pD), the
system is now also described by the densities of pairs of strategies, namely CC pairs
(pCC), CD pairs (pCD), DC pairs (pDC) and DD pairs (pDD). These variables are subject
to the restrictions pC + pD = 1, pCC + pCD + pDC + pDD = 1 and pCD = pDC .
The last condition means that, when counting pairs of strategies, their spatial ori-
entation (left-right versus right-left, or top-bottom versus bottom-top, in the spatial
lattice) is equivalent. With these quantities, one can also determine the local densities
qC|C = pCCpC , qC|D =
pCD
pD
and qD|D = pDDpD .
qsi|sj represents the probability of a si strategist being connected with a sj strate-
gist. Because of the restrictions imposed by the equations introduced above, in the
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specific case of games with only two strategies the system can be described by only two
quantities (pC and pCC , or pC and qC|C , for instance).
Depending on the social dilemma considered, and on the particular update method
adopted (which affects the transition probabilities from a state with j cooperators to a
state with j ± 1 cooperators), these calculations can be far from trivial. Also, note that
pair approximation considers that pairs of individuals are independent of each other,
which amounts to say that if individual A is connected to B, and individual B is con-
nected to individual C, any influence that A may exert on C is neglected in the context
of pair approximation. In mathematical terms, this means that qsi|sjsk ≈ qsi|sj . This
is a strong assumption, and one that not always holds - given their social proximity,
in many dynamical processes A is expected to be positively correlated with C. This is
particularly evident when the system is close to a transition - from full cooperation to
full defection or vice-versa. In such cases, the (few) cooperators that survive are able
to do so by forming clusters, in which they reinforce cooperation and escape exploita-
tion by defectors. However, such clusters cannot be described by pair approximation,
and therefore its predictions fail in such regimes. Also important is the computation of
fitnesses in N -Person games, which requires studying configurations that span beyond
the first neighborhood of an individual - this particular aspect will be further discussed
in chapters 4 and 5. Also, we will shown in chapter 6 that for different dynamical pro-
cesses belonging to different universality classes the pairwise interactions between in-
dividuals give rise to spatial correlations that extend beyond individuals’ closest neigh-
bors, a scenario that cannot be described by the pair approximation method.
Pair approximation can be extended to study the frequency of larger motifs - triplet
approximation, quadruplet approximation or, more generally, n-point approximation -
but note that the number of variables one needs to keep track of in each of these cases
is much larger, which leads to cumbersome or even impossible calculations.
Modeling games on networks introduces yet another degree of freedom. Should
the fitness of individuals be computed as the payoff accumulated from all the games
in which they participate, or correspond to an average of the payoff obtained in each
of those games? Note that in equations 3.8 for infinite WM populations, and in equa-
tions 3.12 for finite WM populations, we associate the fitness of individuals to the
average payoff obtained from all interactions in which an individual engages. In fact,
in homogeneous networks performing such normalization amounts to a rescaling of the
intensity of selection in the evolutionary dynamics. If we consider the particular case
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of 2-person games, the fitness of a cooperator (fC) and of a defector (fD), each with nC
cooperator neighbors and 〈k〉 − nC defector neighbors is given by
fNORMC =
nC
〈k〉R+
〈k〉 − nC
〈k〉 S ⇒ f
NORM
C =
1
〈k〉 (nCR+ (〈k〉 − nC)S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
accumulated payoff, fACCC
(3.35a)
fNORMD =
nC
〈k〉T +
〈k〉 − nC
〈k〉 P ⇒ f
NORM
D =
1
〈k〉 (nCT + (〈k〉 − nC)P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
accumulated payoff, fACCD
(3.35b)
For the Fermi Imitation update rule, we may write
pFermi =
1
1 + e−β(fNORMC −fNORMD )
= 1
1 + e−
β
〈k〉(fACCC −fACCD )
(3.36)
That is, the intensity of selection is rescaled by the average connectivity 〈k〉 of the
network (the number of games in which an individual participates, in the case of 2-
person games), which is reflected in the evolutionary times but not on the overall
dynamics.
On the contrary, on heterogeneous networks different nodes have different number
of connections. Depending on the network class and on its degree distribution, the
difference in the number of neighbors of different nodes can be overwhelming (as is
the case in Scale-Free BA networks, for instance). In this case, although one can opt to
attribute individual fitness to the average payoff obtained by an individual in all games
in which he participates, that would amount to treating all individuals as equivalent.
One of the main advantages of the introduction of this type of networks in the study of
the problem of the emergence and evolution of cooperation is to be able to model the
(real) fact that different individuals may have different roles in the society, and interact
more frequently than others. For these reasons, we opt to associate individual fitness,
in networks, to the payoff individuals accumulate in all their interactions. In chapters 4
and 5 we will discuss in more detail how N -Person games should be formulated in
networks.
Network reciprocity is a recent and rapidly expanding area of research, in which
this thesis is included.
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4Collective Prisoner’s Dilemma
4.1 Introduction
We must abandon the conceit that individual, isolate, private actions are the
answer. They can and do help. But they won’t take us far enough without
collective action.
– Al Gore, on his acceptance speech of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007
The declarations of the American environmental activist Al Gore testify the collec-
tive nature of the global warming problem (100) – a problem that involves all individ-
uals in the planet without exception (101).
The global warming problem is just one example of collective action problems
which in Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) are best dealt-with in the framework of
N -Person games (section 3.1.3). Other problems that are contingent of the simulta-
neous decisions of several individuals are the payment of taxes and social welfare;
the participation in open source projects; group hunting; and the sharing of common
resources among countries, to mention a few examples.
In this chapter, we will focus on the framework of Public Goods Games (PGGs), and
we will consider the most used metaphor to study PGGs – the N -Person generalization
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This collective social dilemma emerges as the most suitable
metaphor for problems in which the outcome obtained is proportional to the number
of contributors in the group. We will start by presenting the model and highlighting
its relationship with its 2-person counterpart, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in section 4.3.
We will discuss the evolutionary dynamics of the NPD on infinite and finite well-mixed
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(WM) populations; the mathematical formalism introduced here will also be useful for
the next chapter (chapter 5). Then, in section 4.4 we will investigate how Public Goods
Games should be defined in social networks, that is, how the social neighborhood of
an individual defines the number of games in which he engages, and then we proceed
to evaluate the impact of the introduction of population structures of different degree
distributions and average connectivity in the evolutionary dynamics of the NPD. Up to
now, individuals have been treated as equivalent in all respects (102, 103), in sharp
contrast with real-life situations, where diversity is ubiquitous. We introduce social di-
versity by means of heterogeneous networks and show that cooperation is promoted by
the diversity associated with the number and size of the public goods game in which
each individual participates. Furthermore, we find that levels of cooperation are even
more pronounced when social diversity is also reflected in the cooperators’ individual
contribution (section 4.5). In this work we use a modified version of the traditional
contributive paradigm that takes into account the underlying population structure. Fi-
nally, we present a detailed analytical study to account for the mechanism responsible
for the impressive results obtained with the new contributive scheme, in section 4.8
4.2 The Model
We start by presenting and discussing the NPD with the traditional contributive scheme.
Let us consider a population composed of individuals behaving either as unconditional
cooperators (Cs) or defectors (Ds). Each C contributes to a common pool with a certain
cost c, while Ds do not contribute; the total contribution is multiplied by an enhance-
ment factor r (r > 0) and equally distributed among all individuals in the group (of
size N). The gain obtained by an individual i adopting strategy si (si ∈ {C,D}) in a
single group interaction is identified as the individuals’ payoff, Πsi . The payoff of Cs
(ΠC) and Ds (ΠD) can then be written as
ΠD (nC) =
crnC
N
= ηcnC (4.1a)
ΠC (nC) = ΠD (nC)− c (4.1b)
where nC is the number of cooperators in the group of size N , and η = r/N is the
renormalized enhancement factor. Note that in this case the amount of public good that
is produced is linear on the number of contributors in the group, which corresponds to
the linear production function shown in figure 3.2A and discussed in section 3.1.3.
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A direct relationship can be established between the 2-person Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) and the equations 4.1 above for the NPD. If for a moment we assume that in a
group of size N interactions are pairwise (instead of a single group interaction as we
have been discussing for the NPD) and fitnesses are computed following the general
payoff matrix 3.3 formulated in terms of the general gains R, S, T and P , the fitness
of a cooperator (fC) and a defector (fD) corresponds to†
fC = (nC − 1)R+ (N − nC)S (4.2a)
fD = nCT + (N − nC − 1)P (4.2b)
where nC is the number of cooperators in the group of size N . We can rewrite equa-
tions 4.2 as
fC = (nC − 1)β + (N − 1) γ (4.3a)
fD = nCβ (4.3b)
with
β = P (N − nC − 1)
nC
+ T (4.4a)
γ = P
(
N −NnC + n2C − 1
)
+ nC ((nC − 1)R+NS + T − nC (S + T ))
nC (N − 1) (4.4b)
With this formulation, the transformation between the 2-person Prisoner’s Dilemma
and the NPD is straightforward, and corresponds to
β → r
N
c (4.5a)
γ → N − r
N(N − 1)c (4.5b)
So, with the formulation of the NPD presented in equations 4.1, we may affirm that in
WM populations the NPD is a compound game, that is, one in which a group interaction
may be formulated as a succession of 2-person interactions. However, as will become
clear in the next section, this does not hold for structured populations.
†The deduction that follows is based on the one in (104).
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4.3 The N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma in Well-Mixed Popula-
tions
4.3.1 Infinite Populations
An individual’s fitness corresponds to the payoff obtained in all games in which that
individual participates. In an infinite well-mixed (WM) population fitness is obtained
by summing the average payoffs obtained over all the possible groups of size N that
can be formed with nC cooperators. The random selection of N individuals leads to
groups whose composition follows a binomial distribution, and therefore the average
fitness of Cs (fC) and Ds (fD) can be written as
fC(x) =
N−1∑
nC=0
(
N − 1
nC
)
xnC (1− x)N−1−nCΠC(nC + 1) (4.6a)
fD(x) =
N−1∑
nC=0
(
N − 1
nC
)
xnC (1− x)N−1−nCΠD(nC) (4.6b)
where x stands for the fraction of cooperators in the population (and (1 − x) is the
fraction of defectors). In this case (of an infinite WM population), the evolution-
ary success of each strategy is dictated by the replicator equation 3.10, x˙ = x(1 −
x) (fC(x)− fD(x)). The direction of evolution (that is, the sign of x˙) is determined by
the fitness difference fC(x)− fD(x), which for equations 4.1 and 4.6 reads
fC(x)− fD(x) =
=
N−1∑
nC=0
(
N − 1
nC
)
xnC (1− x)N−1−nC [ΠC (nC + 1)−ΠD (nC)] =
=
N−1∑
nC=0
(
N − 1
nC
)
xnC (1− x)N−1−nC (η − 1)c =
= (η − 1)c
N−1∑
nC=0
(
N − 1
nC
)
xnC (1− x)N−1−nC
(4.7)
That is, fC(x) − fD(x) < 0 whenever η < 1, and in this case cooperation is disadvan-
tageous (conversely, cooperators are in advantage with respect to defectors whenever
η > 1). This result is independent of the group size N . For η = 1 we have neutral
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Figure 4.1: Evolutionary Dynamics of the N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma in Infinite
Well-Mixed Populations - Profile of the replicator equation x˙ = x(1 − x) (fC(x)− fD(x))
for increasing renormalized enhancement factor η = r/N . Cooperators are disadvanta-
geous for η < 1, and the trivial root x∗triv = 0 is stable (x∗triv = 1 is unstable). Conversely,
cooperators are in advantage with respect to defectors whenever η > 1, and the stability
of the trivial roots x∗triv is exchanged. This latter case (η > 1) does not represent a social
dilemma. Parameters: N = 10, c = 1.0.
selection, as fC(x) = fD(x) ∀ x [0, 1]. These three distinct scenarios are illustrated in
figure 4.1 for a group size of N = 10.
4.3.2 Finite Populations
In finite WM populations of size Z, the above binomial sampling (equations 4.6) is
replaced by a hyper-geometrical sampling (without replacement),
fC(j) =
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1 N−1∑
nC=0
(
j − 1
nC
)(
Z − j
N − nC − 1
)
ΠC(nC + 1) (4.8a)
fD(j) =
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1 N−1∑
nC=0
(
j
nC
)(
Z − j − 1
N − nC − 1
)
ΠD(nC) (4.8b)
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where j stands for the number of cooperators in the population. In this case, we may
write (105)
fC(j)− fD(j)=
=
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1 N−1∑
nC=0
{(
j − 1
nC
)(
Z − j
N − nC − 1
)
ΠC (nC + 1)−
(
j
nC
)(
Z − j − 1
N − nC − 1
)
ΠD (nC)
}
=
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1 N−1∑
nC=0
{(
j − 1
nC
)(
Z − j
N − nC − 1
)
[ηc (nC + 1)− c]
(
j
nC
)(
Z − j − 1
N − nC − 1
)
ηnCc
}
=c (η − 1) + ηc
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1 N−1∑
nC=0
nC
{(
j − 1
nC
)(
Z − j
N − nC − 1
)
−
(
j
nC
)(
Z − j − 1
N − nC − 1
)}
(4.9)
We can simplify the notation by replacing x˜ = x− 1 (105), in which case we obtain
fC(j)− fD(j) = c
(η − 1) + η(Z˜
N˜
)
N˜∑
nC=0
nC
{(
j˜
N˜ − nC
)
−
(
j
nC
)(
Z˜ − j
N˜ − j
)} (4.10)
And in this case the sum simplifies to
fC(j)− fD(j) = c
[
(η − 1) + η
(
N˜
Z˜
)(
j˜ − j
)]
= c
[
(η − 1)− η N˜
Z˜
]
=
= c
[
η
(
1− N − 1
Z − 1
)
− 1
]
,
(4.11)
that is, the fitness difference fC(j) − fD(j) in finite populations is independent of the
number of cooperators in the population, but depends on both the population size Z
and the group size N . For Z > N the evolutionary dynamics is qualitatively equiv-
alent to that observed in infinite WM populations. Whenever group size is equal to
population size (Z = N), we obtain simply fC(j)− fD(j) = −c: cooperators are disad-
vantageous irrespective of the value of the renormalized enhancement factor η. Note
that this contrasts with the dynamics described for infinite WM populations, in which
case cooperation is advantageous whenever η > 1.
4.4 How public are Public Goods Games?
To model N -Person games on structured populations requires knowing how the un-
derlying network of contacts determines the pattern of interactions and which games
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A B
αA αB
Figure 4.2: Pattern of interactions in N-Person games modeled on structured popu-
lations - Above we schematize the social neighborhood of two connected individuals, A
and B. The games centered on themselves ( αA and αB respectively) are not enough to
determine their individual fitness; instead, we consider all the ki + 1 games in which an
individual i participates: those centered on the individual i plus those centered on each of
his ki neighbors.
determine an individual’s fitness. Figure 4.2 represents a small part of a square lat-
tice with an average degree 〈k〉 = 4 where two neighboring individuals, A and B,
and the games centered on each of them are highlighted. A given individual not only
participates in the game centered on himself/herself and involving his/her neighbors,
but also in the games centered in his/her neighbors. In this case, in order to compute
the fitness of an individual i in an N -Person game we take into account ki + 1 games,
where ki represents the number of neighbors of individual i: the game centered on the
individual plus the games centered on each of his neighbors. Thus, in N -Person games
it seems evident that not only the social context of an individual is important for his
fitness (as occurs for 2-person games) but also his neighbors’ social context.
However, previous works on spatial N -Person games (103) consider (for compu-
tational efficiency) only the game centered on an individual, arguing that such sim-
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plification does not significantly alter the evolutionary dynamics and the final average
levels of cooperation. We investigate to which extent this simplification is valid, by
simulating the NPD on ring regular, homogeneous random (HoRand) and scale-free
Barabási-Albert (BA) networks (see Methods – section 4.10 – for details) when individ-
ual fitness is computed taking into account:
• only the game αi centered on each individual i (which we denote as f1i =
Πsi (nC), with si ∈ {C,D}),
• the game αi centered on individual i plus the games centered on each of his ki
neighbors ( fk+1i = f1i +
∑
j f
1
j where the index j refers to the ki neighbors of in-
dividual i, and f1j represents the gain that individual i obtains when participating
in the game centered on individual j).
The initial state of the population will correspond to a random distribution of 50%
of Cs and Ds in the nodes of the network. In each time-step of the evolution of the
population, all individuals evaluate their individual fitness, by assessing all games in
which they participate in. Also, each individual is given the opportunity to revise his
or her strategy. A strategy revision occurs according to the following method: an in-
dividual A randomly chooses a neighbor B, whom he will imitate only if he is more
successful than him, with a probability proportional to the fitness difference fB − fA,
and given by equation 3.27. We evaluate the impact of population structure, and the
method adopted for computing individuals’ fitness, by studying the final average frac-
tion of cooperators when the population reaches a stationary state (that is, a state for
which the global composition of the population in terms of the number of Cs and Ds is
not significantly altered in time). Please see Methods (section 4.10) for details.
Figure 4.3 shows the final average fraction of cooperators in the population as a
function of the renormalized enhancement factor η = r〈k〉+1 assuming both f
1
i (fig-
ure 4.3A) and fk+1i (figure 4.3B). The vertical dashed line indicates the sharp tran-
sition from full defection to full cooperation that occurs in well-mixed populations,
described in section 4.3. Regardless of computing individual fitness as f1i of f
k+1
i , net-
work reciprocity (82, 98, 106) leads to an enhancement on the levels of cooperation
obtained when compared with the WM scenario. When individual fitness is given by
f1i (figure 4.3A), the transition from full defection to full cooperation begins at η ≈ 0.7
regardless of the population structure (ring regular, HoRand and scale-free BA). Note
that in this case individuals participate in just one game regardless of the population
structure and on how many neighbors they have. The only aspect that differs from
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Figure 4.3: How Public are Public Goods Games? - Final average fraction of cooper-
ators as a function of the renormalized enhancement factor η = r〈k〉+1 for the NPD on
networked populations, when for determining individual fitness we consider: A. only the
group centered on the individual
(
f1i
)
, B. the game centered on him plus the ones centered
on each of his k first neighbors
(
fk+1i
)
. Note the significant improvement on the average
level of cooperation obtained for scale-free networks from panel A to panel B. Parameters:
Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, c = 1.0.
homogeneous to heterogeneous populations when individual fitness is computed as f1i
is the group size of the Public Good Game in which individuals participate. In scale-
free BA populations there is a marked heterogeneity in the size of PGGs, but this does
not seem enough to promote higher average levels of cooperation in comparison with
homogeneous populations.
When individual fitness is computed using fk+1i , the qualitative behavior in ho-
mogeneous populations remains approximately the same but the same does not occur
in scale-free BA populations. In the latter, the departure from full defection to full
cooperation starts at approximately η ≈ 0.5 – as opposed to the value η ≈ 0.7 for
homogeneous populations. Note that the behavior of the curve for scale-free BA pop-
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ulations in figure 4.3B is quite different from the curves for ring regular and HoRand
populations in the same panel. This is due to the introduction of two levels of social
diversity:
• Diversity in the size of the PGGs, and
• Diversity in the number of PGGs in which different individuals engage.
Comparing the results presented in figure 4.3A with those from figure 4.3B for the
scale-free BA networks, we can say that allowing for different individuals to interact a
different number of times promotes a significant enhancement of cooperation levels.
Although not relevant for the present analysis, another aspect worth noticing is the
impact of computing individual fitness using f1i of f
k+1
i when individuals are part of
ring regular and HoRand networks. In both networks, all individuals participate in
the same number of games: with f1i they participate only in one game, while with
fk+1i they participate in 〈k〉 + 1 games. What differs is how neighborhoods are orga-
nized: ring regular networks are characterized by a much larger clustering coefficient
than HoRand networks (CRINGWS = 0.5 and CHORANDWS ≈ 0 for 〈k〉 = 4). It appears that
this difference is most significant for f1i (coexistence levels register a large fraction of
cooperators in ring regular than in HoRand networks), and this disparity disappears
when all 〈k〉 + 1 games are taken into account. Further ahead in this chapter we will
analyze in more detail the impact of clustering on the final average cooperation levels.
In sum, we conclude that, not only the simplification of computing individual fit-
ness as f1i is only qualitatively valid for homogeneous populations, but also that the
diversity in the number and size of PGGs an individual engages in scale-free BA net-
works promote higher average levels of cooperation for a larger range of η values. On
the following sections, we will always assume that individual fitness is computed as
fk+1i , unless explicitly stated otherwise.
4.5 Act of giving is more important than the amount given
We have so far assumed that the contribution of each individual i that is a cooperator
to the common pool of the PGG is proportional to k + 1, that is, a C individual invests
always the same cost c in each game, independently of the number of games in which
he/she participates. This implies arbitrarily large resources for highly connected Cs,
a scenario that is somewhat unrealistic – social rules often provide a more egalitarian
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Figure 4.4: Contributive paradigms on the networked N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma
- Final average fraction of cooperators as a function of the renormalized enhancement
factor η = r〈k〉+1 on ring regular, HoRand and scale-free Barabási-Albert populations, when
we consider the following contributive schemes: A. fixed cost per game, B. fixed cost per
individual. Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, c = 1.0.
contribution from individuals (107). We now consider the extreme opposite limit, in
which all Cs contribute the same overall cost, equally shared between all games in
which each individual participates. In other words, in this new contributive paradigm,
which we shall denominate as fixed cost per individual (as opposed to the conventional
one, introduced in the previous section, which we denominate as fixed cost per game),
a cooperator A with kA neighbors invests c/(kA + 1) in each game in which he/she
participates. Generically the payoff of an individual B with strategy sB (1 if C, 0 if D)
associated with the PGG centered in an individual A, ΠB,A, is given by
ΠB,A =
r
kA + 1
kA∑
i=0
c
ki + 1
si − c
kB + 1
sB (4.12)
where i = 0 is the index referring to for individual A, si is the strategy of the neighbor
i of A, and ki is his/her degree. In this limit, a new level of diversity is introduced:
that of individual contributions to each game. Real-world situations will naturally fall
somewhere between these two limits, as individuals learn to cooperate (or defect) in
better ways (43).
Figure 4.4 shows the final average levels of cooperation obtained on ring regular,
HoRand and scale-free BA populations for both the fixed cost per game and fixed cost
per individual contributive paradigms. Figures 4.4A and 4.4B show that the results for
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homogeneous networks are independent of the contributive paradigm adopted: as all
individuals participate in the same number of games, of equal size, the contributions
of Cs is simply rescaled to c〈k〉+1 , and this affects in equal manner all individuals in the
population. Under the fixed cost per individual paradigm, the contributions are lower
and therefore the final outcome for all members in a group will be proportionally lower,
but since for strategy revision the only aspect that matters if the fitness difference
between the potential role model and the focal player, this rescaling only affects the
evolutionary time towards the stationary state.
Regarding the scale-free BA networks (figures 4.4A and 4.4B), the fixed cost per
individual paradigm promotes an impressive boost in cooperation. In this case, the
marked heterogeneous nature of the underlying network of contacts introduces three
distinct levels of social diversity: besides the diversity in the number and size of PGGs
an individual engages, the contribution of a cooperator to a PGG is also determined
by his social context. Because each individual i that is a cooperator now contributes
with cki+1 to each game (where ki represents the number of neighbors of individual
i), diversity resulting from heterogeneous networks determines a richer spectrum of
individual fitness. In a single PGG, the fitness difference between a C and a D is no
longer constant and proportional to the cost c, as on homogeneous networks, but now
depends on the social context of the individual.
In fact, heterogeneity gives a natural advantage on hubs, as will be shown in detail
in section 4.8: under the fixed cost per individual contributive paradigm, the relative
fitness of a cooperator increases with its connectivity, and consequently hubs are those
that turn most quickly into cooperation. In practice, Cs survive extinction for values of
η = r〈k〉+1 of about 0.25. Because 〈k〉 = 4, η = 0.25 implies that r = 1.25, much lower
than the size N = 3 of the smallest group in the entire population†. Note that, in those
games for which ηk = rk+1 > 1 (the smallest groups), the social dilemma is relaxed,
because in this case it is better to play C than D. As figure 4.4B shows, cooperation
prevails despite ηk < 1 in every PGG played. In fact, the impact of diversity is preserved
even when the social dilemma is transformed such that defection is always preferred,
irrespective of η.
It still remains to explain how a D individual on a large hub can be taken over by
a C. This will be explained in detail in section 4.8; briefly, what occurs is that Ds are
†Because we are studying scale-free BA networks with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4, the lower number
of connections of a given node that is registered in the network is ki = 2, which corresponds to a group
size of N = 3.
64
4.5 Act of giving is more important than the amount given
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 A.
c/5
fra
ct
io
n 
of
 c
oo
pe
ra
to
rs
fixed cost per individual
B.
c/5
c/5c/5
c/5
0.2 0.8 1.0 1.20.4 0.6
η = r/(<k>+1)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Ring Regular
HoRand
Scale-Free BA
Figure 4.5: Extended study of the fixed cost per individual contributive paradigm in
the N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma - In order to understand the origin of the boost in co-
operation documented in figure 4.4 for the fixed cost per individual contributive paradigm,
we analyze the extreme situations when A. only the game centered on the individual is
taken into account for his fitness
(
f1i
)
, B. all but the game centered on himself are taken
into account to compute his fitness
(
fk+1i − f1i
)
. Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, c = 1.0.
victims of their own success: successful Ds breed Ds in their neighborhood, inducing a
negative feedback mechanism that reduces their fitness. Consequently, they become
vulnerable to nearby cooperators. Once invaded by a C, a hub will remain C, as by
placing Cs on nearby sites, successful Cs increase their fitness. The role of the Cs
is therefore crucial and twofold: they efficiently disseminate the cooperator strategy
across social networks, whereas they get a stronghold on hubs by minimizing the po-
tential loss from exploitation by free-riding Ds. It is noteworthy that the results shown
in figure 4.4B, in which selection is strong, are robust with respect to the detailed evo-
lutionary dynamics (if we use the Fermi Imitation update method (77, 78, 79) instead
of the replicator analogue in finite populations), to the updating strategy (synchronous
versus asynchronous) and even to errors (mutations cannot destroy C-dominance).
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In order to understand the origin of such a boost in cooperation, we extend our
study of the fixed cost per individual contributive paradigm. In figure 4.5 we present
the results obtained in the extreme cases when individuals participate only in the games
centered on themselves (figure 4.5A) and when individuals participate only in the
games centered on their neighbors (figure 4.5B). In scale-free BA networks, while in
the former case the transition from full defection to full cooperation occurs at approxi-
mately η ≈ 0.4, in the latter case it occurs for η ≈ 0.3. In face of these results, we affirm
that a significant contribution for the evolution of cooperation comes from individuals
playing the games of others.
Although it is difficult to apply analytical methods to complex networks (and for
that reason all our results have so far relied on computational simulations), it is still
possible to have an analytical insight on what is the reason behind this significant
boost in cooperation. In section 4.8 we provide some analytical basis to the mechanism
responsible for the cooperators advantage towards defectors.
4.6 Economical Perspective
In a more economical perspective, figure 4.6 shows the fraction of the population that
holds a given fraction of the total wealth both for ring regular and scale-free BA net-
works, when every individual in the population is a cooperator. We consider both the
fixed cost per game and the fixed cost per individual contributive paradigms.
On regular networks the wealth distribution is egalitarian, regardless of the con-
tributive paradigm considered, as represented by the thick black bar in figure 4.6. In
scale-free BA networks, on the other hand, the wealth distribution follows a power-
law, also regardless of the contributive scheme, as represented by the gray bars for the
fixed cost per game contributive paradigm, and by the open squares for the fixed cost per
individual contributive paradigm.
As discussed in detail in section 4.4 and figure 4.2, the income of an individual
depends not only on her number of social ties but also on the connectivity of her neigh-
bors. In this sense, heterogeneous graphs lead to the appearance of several classes of
individuals, both in what concerns the number of games in which they participate and
also in what concerns their wealth. Let us then consider, for simplicity, that according
to their number ki of social ties in a (heterogeneous) network individuals can either
belong to the
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Figure 4.6: Wealth distribution on the N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma - On scale-free BA
networks, the wealth (fitness) distribution follows a power-law, both when each individual
invests a fixed cost per game (gray bars) or when he/she spends an overall fixed cost (open
squares). These behaviors contrast with the egalitarian wealth distribution characteristic
of homogeneous graphs (thick black bar). Parameters. Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, r = 5.0 (that is,
η = 1.0).
• Low-Degree class, whenever ki < 〈k〉;
• Medium-Degree class, whenever 〈k〉 ≤ ki < kmax3 , and
• High-Degree class, whenever kmax3 ≤ ki ≤ kmax.
where kmax stands for the value of the largest connectivity observed in a given network.
Furthermore, based on their personal wealth (fitness) we distinguish individuals
according to the following rules:
• Lower-Class, when fi < ftotal3 ;
• Middle-Class, when 13ftotal ≤ fi < 23ftotal, and
• Upper-Class, when 23ftotal ≤ fi ≤ ftotal,
where ftotal is the total wealth of the population at a given time of the evolutionary
process.
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Figure 4.7: Time-dependence of the fraction of cooperators on scale-free Barabási-
Albert populations for the N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma - Representative run of the
time-evolution of cooperators on scale-free Barabási-Albert networks, classified according
to: A. degree, B. wealth, and C. both degree and wealth combined (at the end of the 2 x 103
generations). In panel C., ρC represents the fraction of cooperators that are classified as
having a Low, Medium or High Degree, respectively, and can be observed in the final
generations represented in panel A. Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, r = 1.7 (that is,
η = 0.34).
In figure 4.7 we show the evolution in time (generations, taking into account that 1
generation corresponds to Z strategy revisions in a synchronous update) of the fraction
of cooperators in the population when adopting the fixed cost per individual paradigm.
Individuals are classified according to both their connectivity and relative fitness, as
discussed above. The time-dependent curves in figure 4.7 provide a representative run
for a multiplication factor r = 1.7, that is, η = 0.34 (〈k〉 = 4). For this value of η,
cooperators dominate the population but are unable to wipe out defectors.
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In figure 4.7A, it is clear that individuals of High-Degree quickly become cooper-
ators and remain so for the rest of the evolutionary process. On the contrary, in the
first generations Low-Degree and Medium-Degree classes start by adopting defector
strategies, but the more individuals adopt the D strategy, the more vulnerable they
become to the influential role played by C hubs (High-Degree individuals). Conse-
quently, the situation quickly reverts to a scenario where the majority of individuals of
Low-Degree and Medium-Degree are cooperators.
This analysis is complemented by figure 4.7B, which shows that high levels of
wealth (fitness) – Upper-Class – are associated with Cs. Moreover, no Ds survive in
the Middle-Class, being all relegated to the Lower-Class.
Finally, figure 4.7C combines the information provided separately in panels A and
B, correlating fitness, degree and strategy. Only individuals of High-Degree classes
can achieve the Upper-Class in terms of wealth. On the other hand, the presence of
Ds in the population, both in the Lower-Degree and Medium-Degree classes, renders
some High-Degree individuals unable to join the rest of the "hubs" in the upper class.
The survival of Ds is therefore detrimental to the overall wealth of the population and,
individually, Ds fare pretty badly in strongly heterogeneous communities, down to small
values of the enhancement factor r. Diversity provides indeed a powerful mechanism
to promote cooperation.
4.7 Dependence on population size and average connectivity
We now investigate how the results discussed above depend on both population size Z
and average connectivity 〈k〉. To this end we carried out simulations for Z = 500, 1000
and 5000 (for fixed average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4), and for several average connectivities
between 〈k〉 = 4 and 〈k〉 = 70 for fixed Z = 1000. Results for fixed 〈k〉 = 4 are
shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9, whereas results for fixed Z and varying 〈k〉 are shown in
Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.8: Dependence of the average level of cooperation on the population size
for the N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma – ring regular networks. - Final average fraction
of cooperators as a function of the renormalized enhancement factor η = r〈k〉+1 on ring
regular networks. Results show that evolution of cooperation is independent of population
size for fixed average connectivity 〈k〉. Note that, for regular networks, the results do not
depend on the cost paradigm: fixed cost per game, or fixed cost per individual. Parameters:
〈k〉 = 4, c = 1.0
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Figure 4.9: Dependence of the average level of cooperation on the population size for
the N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma – scale-free Barabási-Albert networks - Final average
fraction of cooperators as a function of the renormalized enhancement factor η = r〈k〉+1 on
scale-free BA networks. The results show that the evolution of cooperation is independent
of population size for fixed average connectivity. Parameters: 〈k〉 = 4, c = 1.0.
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Figures 4.8 and 4.9 evidence the negligible dependence of our results on the overall
population size. We have checked that, for small 〈k〉, the results are valid down to pop-
ulation sizes of Z ≈ 250, below which the results are less smooth, given the increasing
role of finite-size fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics. Note that the results for
regular networks presented in figure 4.8 are independent of the contributive paradigm
chosen.
Concerning the dependence of the results on the average connectivity 〈k〉, several
factors work against cooperative behavior when the average number of social ties 〈k〉
increases. The increase of the average size of the groups (〈k〉+ 1) induces an overall
scaling of the value of the multiplication factor r: since in figure 4.8 we plot the fraction
of cooperators as a function of the renormalized enhancement factor η = r〈k〉+1 , this
scaling is automatically included, which means that the remaining differences between
curves are due to other factors.
The results of figure 4.10 show that, irrespective of the cost paradigm, the critical
value of η above which cooperators no longer get extinct does not qualitatively change
with the average connectivity and is equivalent to an overall rescaling of r. This reflects
the important role played by the average group size (〈k〉+ 1).
Furthermore, increasing 〈k〉 towards a fully-connected network corresponds to the
limit case of having a PGG with the size of the whole (finite) population. In this
limit, the presence of a single defector will always lead to the demise of cooperation,
independently of the value of r (with r > 0). For instance, figure 4.10A shows that,
on regular networks, 〈k〉 = 16 is enough to reduce significantly the final number of
cooperators, even when η < 1.
Similarly to simple 2-player games, spatially constrained populations are only able
to sustain sizable levels of cooperative behavior on sparse graphs (98, 103, 106) – lack
of diversity makes survival of cooperation contingent on the feasibility of cooperators to
form tight communities. With increasing connectivity, these tight communities become
increasingly vulnerable to exploitation, favoring defectors. Figure 4.10B shows the sig-
nificant boost in cooperation obtained for scale-free BA networks when compared to
regular networks. In this case, the cooperation level decreases with average connec-
tivity 〈k〉. The results of figure 4.10 correspond to the situation of a fixed investment
per individual, but the conclusions remain qualitatively independent of the investment
scheme adopted.
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Figure 4.10: Evolution of cooperation under the N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma in pop-
ulations with different average connectivity 〈k〉 - In panels A. and B. we represent the
final average fraction of cooperators as a function of the renormalized enhancement factor
η = r〈k〉+1 for ring regular (panel A) and scale-free Barabási-Albert (panel B) networks. In
panel C. we plot the final fraction of cooperators (for fixed η = 0.8 in a region of coex-
istence of defectors and cooperators – see figure 4.9). With increasing average degree z,
results for the NPD on networks follow a trend similar to that obtained for simple 2-player
games on networks (65) as one would expect. As 〈k〉 becomes sizable cooperation will
inevitably collapse as average group size increases and the overall degree of heterogeneity
(on scale-free networks) also decreases. Parameters: Z = 103, c = 1.0.
4.8 Cooperators (and Defectors) on the Star(s)
Structured populations pose some difficulties to any attempt of a simple analytical
analysis. As discussed in section 4.4, local interactions lead to a marked diversity in
the fitness of individuals adopting the same strategy, as it becomes strongly dependent
of the individuals’ neighborhood and of their position on the network. This strongly
differs from the WM scenario, in which everyone is a neighbor of everyone else (a WM
population can be modeled as a complete network).
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Figure 4.11: The star and generalized star graphs. - We shall employ the simple star
graph depicted in panel B., in this case with 1 center (h) and 8 leaves (l), as the simplest
abstraction of the sub-graph selected in panel A.. In general, we will consider a star of size
N , with 1 center (h) and N − 1 leaves (l). In panel C. we generalize the star such that
every leaf has n− 1 links. As a simplification, the overall structure exhibits no loops.
Furthermore, in the particular case of the scale-free BA networks considered in
sections 4.4 and 4.5, all individuals have at least 2 neighbors. This particularity is a
consequence of the method used to create the networks (the Barabási-Albert Method
described in section 2.4), for which we have 〈k〉 = 2m. This feature determines the
occurrence of short closed loops, for example triangles, which are responsible for the
small yet non-zero value of the cluster coefficient exhibited by these networks, as de-
picted in figure 4.11. This makes it difficult to use the pair-approximation approach
(section 3.3.4).
Despite these difficulties, it is possible to obtain some simple mathematical relations
that shed a light into the mechanism responsible for the enormous boost of cooperation
shown in the previous sections. We start by resorting to the simplest possible (and most
disadvantageous) situation for a cooperator, that of a single C in a population of Ds.
Moreover, we shall start by neglecting the connections of the neighbors of this C to
other Ds, which naturally leads to a star-graph, figure 4.11B. To the extent that the
single C may have a larger fitness than any of her D-neighbors, the C-strategy will
spread. The fact that on a star there are only two types of nodes – center and leaves –
and no loops clearly simplifies the mathematical analysis.
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4.8.1 The Single Star
Let us then consider a star of size N : one center (h), and N − 1 leaves (l) – with the
single C located on the center (figure 4.11B). In such scenario (if the C is placed on a
leaf her fitness will never exceed that of a D in the center), the fitnesses of the C in the
center (fC,h) and a D on a leaf (fD,l) are given by
fC,h =
rc
N2︸︷︷︸
game centered on h
+ (N − 1)r2
c
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
games centered on the leaves l
−c (4.13a)
fD,l =
rc
N2︸︷︷︸
game centered on h
+ rc2N︸︷︷︸
game centered on l
(4.13b)
Note that the C-hub participates in a total of N games – the one centered on him-
self/herself, and the N − 1 centered in each of his/her D neighbors. The contribution
of the C-hub to each of the games is therefore c/N , according to the fixed cost per in-
dividual contributive paradigm. In equations 4.13, the first term corresponds to the
payoff obtained by each of the players of the game centered on the C-hub, while the
second term corresponds to the payoff obtained by each of the players of the games
centered on the leaves of the star. From the expressions above, the C-strategy will
spread whenever its fitness is higher than that of the D strategists on the leaves, that is,
fC,h − fD, l > 0⇒ r > 21− 2/N (4.14)
Not only it is possible for a single C to become advantageous, but also the critical value
of the enhancement factor r above which it can occur decreases with increasing number
of leaves. The likelihood of the C-strategy to spread increases with the connectivity of
the node on which the C is located.
Clearly, the star is a gross simplification of a realistic population structure; a useful,
yet simple, structure, is the generalized star depicted in figure 4.11C, in which every
leaf has n − 1 external links to other D-neighbors. In this case, the fitnesses of the
C-center (fC,h) and the D leaves (fD,l) are given by
fC,h =
rc
N2︸︷︷︸
game centered on h
+ (N − 1) rc
nN︸ ︷︷ ︸
games centered on the leaves l
−c (4.15a)
fD,l =
rc
N2︸︷︷︸
game centered on h
+ rc
nN︸︷︷︸
game centered on l
(4.15b)
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Note that in this generalized configuration the D-leaves now participate, each of them,
in a total of n games, but of these only the game centered on themselves and the game
centered on the C-hub provide a positive gain (these are the only ones for which the
C-hub contributes). Taking into account equations 4.15, in this case, the C-strategy can
spread whenever
fC,h − fD,l > 0⇒ r > n1− 2/N (4.16)
which is a decreasing function of N , for a fixed n value. Invasion is easier the larger
the difference (diversity) between the connectivities of the center and of the leaves.
When n = N , we obtain the limit of a "homogeneous generalized star", in which we
may write for the critical threshold
r >
N
1− 2/N (4.17)
Scale-free BA networks are characterized by having a majority of nodes with a few con-
nections, whereas a minority of nodes – the hubs – have a high number of connections
and ensure the overall connectivity of the network. Naturally, most of the hubs connect
to nodes of low connectivity, which provides excellent conditions for a C on a hub to
spread to other nodes.
4.8.2 The Double Star
The above analysis considered the spread of the C-strategy starting from a highly con-
nected node. But how does a C individual invade a hub in the first place? To answer
this question let us consider to the double-star graph, depicted in figure 4.12, and once
again analyze the most disadvantageous configuration for a C individual. We have two
centers (hubs h1 and h2) with N − 2 and M − 2 leaves respectively, and one link con-
necting the two centers. Note that the size of the groups centered on h1 and h2 must
obey N > 2 and M > 2 respectively. However, this condition is met even for the low
average degrees (〈k〉 = 4) studied in sections 4.4 and 4.5: in this case, the lowest con-
nected individuals have 2 neighbors and the group size is 3. Each of the N − 2 leaves
has n− 2 external links, whereas each of the M − 2 leaves has q − 2 external links. In
this case, the fitness obtained by the cooperator on the left center (fC,h1) is given by
fC,h1 =
rc
N2︸︷︷︸
game centered on h1
+ (N − 2) rc
nN︸ ︷︷ ︸
games centered on the leaves l1
+ rc
MN︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h2
−c, (4.18)
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Cooperator Defector
1 center (h1)
N-2 leaves (l1)
n-2 external links
1 center (h2)
M-2 leaves (l2)
q-2 external links
l1l1
l1l1
l1l1
l1 l1
l2
l2l2
l2l2
l2
h2h1
Figure 4.12: The generalized double star graph - A. We have 2 centers (h1 and h2), the
left one with N − 2 leaves and the right one with M − 2 leaves. Each l1 has n− 2 external
links (no loops) whereas each l2 has q − 2 external links.
the fitness of the defector on the right center (fD,h2) is
fD,h2 =
rc
MN︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h2
+ rc
N2︸︷︷︸
game centered on h1
, (4.19)
and the fitness of the defector on the leaves of the left center (fD,l1) is
fD,l1 =
rc
N2︸︷︷︸
game centered on h1
+ rc
nN︸︷︷︸
game centered on l1
(4.20)
In this case the condition for the C-hub to spread his/her strategy to h2 is given by
the difference of the fitnesses in equations 4.18 and 4.19, that is,
fC,h1 − fD,h2 > 0⇒ r >
nN
N − 2 ≡ α, (4.21)
given that N > 2, whereas the condition for spreading to the leaves l1 of h1 is given by
the difference of the fitnesses in equations 4.18 and 4.20, that is,
fC,h1 − fD,l1 > 0⇒ r >
nMN
n+M(N − 3) ≡ γ (4.22)
for N > 3. Given that
α− γ = nN(n−M)(N − 2)(n+M(N − 3)) , (4.23)
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i) ii)
iii)iv)
Cooperator Defector
Figure 4.13: The demise of a successful D - We consider the simple double star construc-
tion, with two centers (hubs h1 and h2); the center h1 has N −2 leaves l1, while the center
h2 has M − 2 leaves l2. As a simplification, we neglect any external links of the leaves
l1 and l2. The first configuration corresponds to a single D in a sea of Cs. Whenever the
D-fitness is larger than the fitness of any of the Cs, the D-strategy will spread. We show
that such spreading occurs preferentially to the leaves, which contributes to reduce the
fitness of the D-center, making it vulnerable to a take over by the central C. Such negative
feedback mechanism of the Ds leads to their own demise.
we have α < γ whenever M > n, and in these conditions it is easier for the C on h1 to
invade h2 than the leaves of h1. In fact, the invasion of h2 depends only on the number
of leaves of h1 and of their connectivity: the larger the leaf-connectivity the harder it
will be to invade h2, whereas the larger the connectivity of h1, the easier it will be
to invade h2. In particular, note that the invasion condition does not depend on the
connectivity of h2. In other words, even on "generalized" double-stars Cs will manage
to expand to the extent that r > γ.
4.8.3 The Demise of a Successful D
Last but not least we show how Cs can resist invasion by Ds in the double-star con-
struction – a crucial mechanism to the survival of cooperation (108). To this end, we
introduce a defector in a population of cooperators, and make use of the double star
graph to show how strategies propagate and how cooperation can become advanta-
geous, as illustrated in figure 4.13. As a simplification, we resort to the simple double
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star graph, in which we neglect the external links of any of the D leaves l1 or l2 of both
centers. This allows for a significant simplification of the expressions obtained (as we
do not need to take into account the connectivities of the leaves), but the conclusions
that we draw here remain valid if we performed the more general calculations.
Figure 4.13 – from configuration i) to configuration ii):
The D strategy of the hub h1 may, according to the fitnesses difference, spread either
to the right hub h2 or to any of the leaves l1. According to the configuration i) depicted
in figure 4.13, the fitness of the C individual on the right hub (fC,h2), the fitness of the
D-hub h1 (fD,h1), and the fitness of any of the C leaves l1 (fC,l1) are given by
fC,h2 =
r
M
(
c
M
+ (M − 2) c2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h2
+ (M − 2) r2
(
c
2 +
c
M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
games centered on leaves l2
+ r
N
(
c
M
+ (N − 2) c2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h1
−c
(4.24a)
fD,h1 =
r
N
(
c
M
+ (N − 2) c2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h1
+ (N − 2) rc4︸ ︷︷ ︸
games centered on leaves
+ r
M
(
c
M
+ (M − 2) c2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h2
(4.24b)
fC,l1 =
rc
4︸︷︷︸
game centered on l1
+ r
N
(
(N − 2) c2 +
c
M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h1
−c (4.24c)
Whether a single D is the fittest individual in the double star will depend on the balance
between N and M . Indeed, we obtain
fC,h2 > fD,h1 ⇔ r >
4M
M2 − 4−M(N − 2) (4.25)
given that N > 2, and to the extent that r satisfies the inequality above, the C-center
will have a larger fitness that the D-center and consequently will spread the C-strategy
onto the D-star.
Another interesting condition is the one equating the fitness of both centers if, in-
stead of a neighborhood with Cs only, the D-center has only n ≤ N − 2 C neighbors.
We may write
fC,h2 > f
k
D,h1 ⇔ r >
4M
M2 − 4−Mn (4.26)
where fk
D,h1
represents the fitness of the D-center h1 when he has only n ≤ N − 2 C
neighbors.
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Let us imagine, however, that we start with m = N − 2 and (for example) r is
such that fC,h2 < fD,h1 . In this case the D strategy will spread. However, unlike the
symmetric situation discussed before, here we get
[fD,h1 − fC,l1 ]− [fD,h1 − fC,h2 ] =
rc
4M2
[
4 +M(M2 +M − 8)
]
> 0 (4.27)
for M > 2. Consequently, it is more likely that D will spread to l1 than to h2, given
that each player will imitate her neighbor with a probability proportional to the fitness
difference. This means the neighborhood of h1 will turn into D before h2, creating
the configuration ii) in figure 4.13 (in practice, it need not reach configuration ii) as
whenever fC,h2 > fD,hm1 the C-center may actually invade the D-center).
In other words, Ds are victims of their own success, as they efficiently spread their
strategy to the "weak" neighbors, reducing their own fitness and becoming prone to be
taken over by the C-center (108).
Figure 4.13 – from configuration ii) to configuration iii):
At this stage (configuration ii)) in figure 4.13), the fitnesses of both the D-center (fD,h1)
and the C-center (fC,h2) are
fD,h1 =
rc
NM︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h1
+ r
M
(
c
M
+ (M − 2) c2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h2
(4.28a)
fC,h2 =
r
M
(
c
M
+ (M − 2) c2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h2
+ rc
NM︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h1
+ (M − 2) r2
(
c
2 +
c
M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
games centered on leaves l2
−c (4.28b)
such that h2 easily becomes advantageous with respect to h1 (M > 2)
fC,h2 > fD,h1 ⇔ r >
4M
M2 − 4 (4.29)
In other words, evolutionary dynamics leads the population into the configuration iii)
in figure 4.13 (or, even better, the D-center will be taken over by the C-center before all
Cs on the leaves of the left turn into Ds).
Figure 4.13 – from configuration iii) to configuration iv):
At this stage we return to a configuration similar to the one of figure 4.12, but more
beneficial for Cs. The fitness of the C-hub on the left center (fC,h1) and the fitness of
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any of the D strategists on the leaves l1 (fD,l1) are given, respectively, by
fC,h1 =
r
N
(
c
N
+ c
M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h1
+ (N − 2) rc2N︸ ︷︷ ︸
games centered on leaves l1
+ r
M
(
c
N
+ c
M
+ (M − 2) c2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h2
−c
(4.30a)
fD,l1 =
rc
2N︸︷︷︸
game centered on l1
+ r
N
(
c
N
+ c
M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
game centered on h1
(4.30b)
The spreading of the C-strategy to the leaves will take place whenever ({M,N} > 2)
r >
2M2N
2(M +N) + 2MN(M − 1)− 3M2 (4.31)
which clearly favors invasion of the leaves, even for small N and M .
In practice, simulation results show that Cs will tend to dominate the population:
in figure 4.14 we show representative runs of the NPD on the simple double star, high-
lighting the main transitions. We start with a defector in a population of coopera-
tors, attributing the defector both to the largest center and the smallest center (fig-
ure 4.14A). We track the fraction of Cs on the leaves of both centers, and show how in
both cases the double star evolves until it is composed solely by Cs. We also study the
evolution of the simple double star when a single cooperator is placed in a population
of defectors, with the C located both in the largest center and in the smallest center
(figure 4.14B) – also in this case the cooperative strategy is able to invade the whole
simple double star.
As first noted in the beginning of this section, this analytical study is valid only
in the limit of the non-existence of triangles (loops) in the population. Scale-free BA
networks are characterized by a very small clustering coefficient (see section 2.4) and
therefore the results obtained in their context can be explained qualitatively by these
simple mathematical relations. But what would happen to the final average levels of
cooperation if clustering was significant? Are topological clusters beneficial or not for
cooperation in the framework of the NPD?
In figure 4.15 we compare the final fraction of cooperators obtained in scale-free
networks grown according to the Barabási-Albert model (BA) and the Minimal Model
(MM). The latter are characterized by a very large clustering coefficient (see sec-
tion 2.4), of approximately 0.7 for 〈k〉 = 4. The results show that clustering is ben-
eficial for cooperation in the NPD regardless of the particular contributive paradigm
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Figure 4.14: The N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma on double stars - Panels A. and B.
provide a typical scenario for time evolution of the fraction of Cs on the leaves of double-
star graphs. A. We start with a single D both in the largest center and in the smallest center
(A1 and B1). The overall behavior shows that the D invades the leaves of her star (A2
and B2), after which is invaded by the C in the center of the second star (A3 and B3).
Subsequently, the remaining defectors on the leaves are invaded by Cs (A4 and B4) (see
figure 4.13). As expected, the relative connectivity of both centers (C and D) determines
the overall time required for invasion (full line: r = 1.3, N = 20, and M = 10; dashed line:
r = 1.3, N = 10 and M = 20). B. We start with a single C located in one of the centers in a
population of Ds (A1 and B1), with r = 2.8 (r > γ > α, see equations 4.21 and 4.22). The
C-center starts by invading the D-center (A2 and B2), after which the C-strategy spreads
to all leaves (A3 and B3). Given that the ability of the C-center to invade the D-center
increases with the C-center connectivity, N > M leads to a faster invasion than N < M .
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Figure 4.15: Evolution of cooperation under the N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma in
scale-free networks grown according to the Barabási-Albert model and the Minimal
Model - Final average fraction of cooperators as a function of the renormalized enhance-
ment factor η = r〈k〉+1 on scale-free networks grown according to the Barabási-Albert
model (curves with filled circles) and the Minimal Model (curves with filled diamonds).
Both contributive paradigms are considered: fixed cost per game (full curves) and fixed cost
per individual (dashed curves). Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, c = 1.0.
considered: not only the time for C-dominance decreases, but also the critical values
of r above which Cs dominate also decreases, a feature which is difficult to capture
analytically. This can be understood by the fact that a high level of clustering allows
cooperators to interact more with other cooperator neighbors while escaping the ex-
ploitation of defectors. This effect is also visible in other social dilemmas, as will be
discussed in detail in the following chapters. This said, these results show that our
(brief) mathematical analysis explains the cooperation levels obtained in the "worst"
scenario for the fixed cost per individual paradigm.
4.9 Discussion
In this study, any contribution has been identified with cooperation. In communities
under the influence of social norms, individual contributions will be easily classified
as acts of cooperation (or not). In this context, our results suggest the possibility that
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successful communities are those in which the act of giving is more important than
the amount given. This may be of particular relevance whenever the survival of the
community is at stake, in which case any help is necessary (107, 109).
However, it is important to note that our model has some limitations. One of them is
the fact that the production function associated with this PGG is linear on the number
of cooperators, a configuration that is not usual in many real world situations. In
several cases, and in particular in the case of the climate change problem, a minimum
effort or a minimum number of cooperators in a group is required for the public good
to be achieved. Furthermore, this model does not encompass the role of risk, that is,
individuals do not have the perception of the gravity of the problem they are tackling.
In order to take these factors into account, in (110) we devise a new analytical model
for a non-linearN -Person game in which a minimum number of cooperators is required
for the public good to be achieved, and individuals have the perception of the risk
associated with the task they are facing.
4.10 Methods
4.10.1 Population structure
For this study we consider two network classes, depicted in figure 2.3. On the one
hand, following previous studies we consider one dimensional lattices (figure 2.3A),
suitable for the modeling of communities in which all individuals (nodes) are topo-
logically equivalent. In particular, we consider ring regular and homogeneous random
(HoRand) networks. On the other hand, we adopt scale-free networks (figure 2.3C),
grown following the model proposed by Barabási and Albert based on growth and pref-
erential attachment ((24) and section 2.4 of this thesis), to model more realistic social
structures. To investigate the role of significant clustering coefficient in the coopera-
tion levels in the NPD, we also resort to scale-free networks grown according to the
Minimal Model (MM) ((30) and section 2.4). In all simulations, networks remain fixed
throughout evolution.
4.10.2 Evolution
In each game round, each and every individual assesses his/her individual fitness, by
accumulating the payoff obtained from all the games he/she participates in. All strate-
gies are updated synchronously following the finite population analogue of the replica-
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tor dynamics discussed in Section 3.2.3.2: an individual A with strategy sA imitates a
randomly chosen neighbor B with strategy sB (sA 6= sB) if and only if the fitness of B
is higher than the fitness of A (fsB > fsA) and with a probability given by
p = fsB − fsA
G
(4.32)
where G represents the adequate normalization factor. G corresponds to the difference
between the maximum possible fitness that can be obtained with strategy sB
(
fMAXsB
)
and the minimum possible fitness that can be obtained with strategy sA
(
fMINsA
)
, that
is,
G = fMAXsB − fMINsA (4.33)
Both fMAXsB and f
MIN
sA
depend on the social context of individuals B and A, respectively.
In the context of the NPD, the maximum fitness for both strategies (C and D) is obtained
when all the game partners of all games in which an individual participates in are
Cs; conversely, the minimum fitness for both strategies is obtained when all the game
partners of that individual are Ds.
The results are robust with respect to the detailed evolutionary dynamics (if we use
the Fermi Imitation update method (77, 78, 79) instead of the replicator analogue in
finite populations), to the updating strategy (synchronous versus asynchronous) and
even to errors (mutations cannot destroy C-dominance).
4.10.3 Simulations
Results were obtained for populations of size Z = 103 (figures 4.8 and 4.9 also include
results for Z = 5 x 102 and Z = 5 x 103), and average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4 (figure 4.10
also includes results for increasing average connectivity). Each equilibrium fraction of
cooperators was obtained by averaging more than 2000 generations after a transient
period of 105 generations. We started with 50% of Cs randomly distributed on the
network. Each data point in figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 correspond to an
average over 103 simulations: 102 runs for 10 different realizations of the same class of
network.
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5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have focused on the most popular metaphor of collective
action (48), the N -Person version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD). The NPD model
is suitable for situations in which the public good depends of, and is proportional to,
the contribution of every single individual: the higher the number of contributors, the
larger and better the final public good.
However, there are several day-life situations in which individuals are supposed to
contribute to a public good which, once obtained, is constant and independent of the
number of contributors. In these cases, the game metaphor that best describes this type
of situations is the N -Person generalization of the Snowdrift Game (NSG) (111, 112).
The NSG consists of the popular 2-person Snowdrift Game (SG) (39), also known as
Chicken Game (40) or Hawk-Dove Game (61), now applied to a group ofN individuals.
A classic metaphor that illustrates this dilemma assumes N travelers trapped in a train
blocked by a snowdrift, as illustrated in figure 5.1. Each individual can choose whether
or not to cooperate by shoveling the snow: those who cooperate divide the workload,
while everyone collects the benefit of resuming their journey home. It may also happen
that the benefit is only obtained when a minimum threshold of individuals cooperates
(105, 112, 113): in line with the previous example, the timely removal of the snow
may require the combination of efforts from several individuals.
There are several examples of NSG games in the everyday life. When lions or li-
onesses gather to hunt a prey (114), sometimes not all of them participate in the hunt-
ing – yet, all have access to the same benefit. Whether the benefit is (equally) shared
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Figure 5.1: The N-Person Snowdrift Game metaphor - The metaphor for the NSG as-
sumes N travelers trapped in a train by a snowdrift. Each faces the decision whether or
not to help shoveling the snow, such that the more individuals shovel, the less effort each
one has to invest in order to surpass (in the illustrated example) a blocked rail. Moreover,
as is often the case in collective dilemmas, the benefit of resuming the trip may only be
obtained when a minimum number of individuals decide to cooperate.†
among all group members depends on of what is the benefit. Or take for instance the
construction of a church by a group of colonizers who arrived to some newfound land.
The effort of a single individual is not enough to build it up, and the more individuals
contribute, the less effort each one has to invest.
Another example is "minga", an old tradition of community work in Latin America.
One of its most common goals is the moving of entire houses, for reasons that span
from religiosity to practical (like the acquisition of a new land or the necessity to be
closer to a certain road). All the members of the community are invited to participate
in these tasks, which sometimes even require carrying the houses across the sea. Of
course one single individual could not complete this task, and the more individuals
cooperate for the completion of this enterprise, the less effort each one has to invest.
†We thank António Araújo (email: ant.arj@gmail.com) for heartedly embracing the project of illus-
trating the NSG, resulting in this exceptional artwork.
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The benefit, the same for all members of the community, would of course depend on
the goal of the task.
Here, we study how an underlying network of contacts affects the evolutionary dy-
namics of collective action modeled in terms of the NSG. We analyze the impact of
different types of networks in the global, population-wide dynamics of cooperators and
defectors. We show that homogeneous social structures enhance the chances of coor-
dinating towards stable levels of cooperation, while heterogeneous network structures
create multiple internal equilibria, departing significantly from the reference scenario
of a well-mixed (WM), structureless population. Contrary to the approach adopted in
the previous chapter, where we analyzed the final average levels of cooperation ob-
tained when starting from a population where cooperators and defectors were equally
represented and randomly distributed in the population, here our study will be more
general. We compute a numerical analogue of the right-hand side of the replicator
equation x˙ = x(1 − x) (fC(x)− fD(x)), the gradient of selection, for structured popu-
lations, which provides a general view of how population structure affects the global
game played in the population along time, regardless of the initial condition chosen.
We will start by presenting the model and its properties on both infinite well-mixed
populations (section 5.3.1) and finite well-mixed populations (section 5.3.2). Then we
proceed to introduce the gradient of selection in structured populations, and analyze in
detail how the underlying network of contacts of the population affects the evolutionary
dynamics of the NSG.
5.2 The Model
We consider a population of individuals behaving either as unconditional cooperators
(Cs) or defectors (Ds). The threshold Q (with 1 ≤ Q ≤ N) defines a minimum number
of Cs required in a group of size N to obtain the collective benefit, so as to encompass
several situations in which the contribution of a single individual (Q = 1) is not enough
to achieve the common goal. The payoffs of Cs (ΠC) and Ds (ΠD) resulting from a single
group interaction can hence be written as
ΠC(nC) = H (nC −Q)
(
c
( 1
Q
− 1
nC
)
+ b
)
− c
Q
(5.1a)
ΠD (nC) = H (nC −Q) b (5.1b)
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respectively, where nC is the number of Cs in the group (of size N), c is the total cost
involved in achieving b, the common benefit obtained by each individual of the group,
regardless of her strategy, when nC ≥ Q (we shall take b = 1). H(x−a) is the Heaviside
step function which is 1 whenever x ≥ a and 0 otherwise.
Whenever nC < Q, we obtain simply ΠC (nC) = − cQ (which represents the maxi-
mum effort each cooperator can invest in a game) and ΠD (nC) = 0. When nC ≥ Q,
we obtain ΠC (nC) = b − cnC and ΠD (nC) = b: all players obtain the benefit b, and to
the cooperators is discounted the effort invested in each game, which consists of the
cost c normalized by the number of cooperators in the group, nC . As usual in N -Person
games, nC = 0 means that no cost is invested and no benefit is obtained. Note that
the payoff functions ΠC (nC) and ΠD (nC) are non-linear (section 3.1.3), a fact that will
originate richer evolutionary dynamics than those discussed in the previous chapter.
5.3 The N-Person Snowdrift Game in Well-Mixed Populations
5.3.1 Infinite Populations
Case Q = 1
We start by taking Q = 1 – that is, we start by considering the situation in which the
effort of a single cooperator is sufficient to ensure the collective benefit. We define
individual fitness as the gain an individual accumulates from all games in which he
participates. The random selection of N individuals from an infinite population leads
to groups whose composition follows a binomial distribution. The average fitness of Cs
(fC) and Ds (fD) is given by equations 4.6 (105, 112, 115), which we reproduce here:
fC(x) =
N−1∑
nC=0
(
N − 1
nC
)
xnC (1− x)N−1−nCΠC(nC + 1) (5.2a)
fD(x) =
N−1∑
nC=0
(
N − 1
nC
)
xnC (1− x)N−1−nCΠD(nC) (5.2b)
where x represents the fraction of cooperators in the population (and (1−x) the fraction
of defectors). The replicator equation 3.10, x˙ = x(1− x) (fC(x)− fD(x)), allows us to
follow the time evolution of Cs in the population. In particular, the sign of the so-called
gradient of selection (here denoted by g(x) with g(x) ≡ x˙) indicates which strategy
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increases in abundance. To determine the interior fixed points x∗ of the replicator
equation 3.10 is equivalent to solve fC(x∗)− fD(x∗) = 0, that is,
fC (x∗)− fD (x∗) = 0⇔
⇔
N−1∑
nC=0
(
N − 1
nC
)
x∗
nC (1− x∗)N−nC−1 {ΠC (nC + 1)−ΠD (nC)} = 0⇔
⇔ (1− x∗)N−1 (b− c)−
N−1∑
nC=1
(
N − 1
nC
)
x∗
nC (1− x∗)N−nC−1 c
nC + 1
= 0⇔
⇔
N−1∑
nC=1
1
nC + 1
(
N − 1
nC
)(
x∗
1− x∗
)nC
= b− c
c
(5.3)
To solve equation 5.3, we will now rely on a couple of mathematical relations, to obtain
the equation for the internal equilibria x∗ of the NSG on infinite WM populations∫ x
0
(1 + y)Ndy = 1
N + 1
[
(1 + y)N+1
]x
0
(5.4)
On the other hand, by applying the binomial theorem (1 + y)N = ∑Ni=0 (Ni )yi, one may
also write
∫ x
0
(1 + y)Ndy =
∫ x
0
[
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
yi
]
dy =
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)∫ x
0
yidy =
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)[
yi+1
i+ 1
]x
0
(5.5)
by noticing that it is possible to invert the order between the integration and the sum-
mation. Therefore, joining equations 5.4 and 5.5 we have
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
xi+1
i+ 1 =
1
N + 1
[
(1 + x)N+1 − 1
]
(5.6)
which can be used to solve equation 5.3. Namely, we can write
N∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
xi+1
i+ 1 = x
[
N∑
i=1
(
N
i
)
xi
i+ 1 + 1
]
⇒
N∑
i=1
(
N
i
)
xi
i+ 1 =
(1 + x)N+1 − 1
x(N + 1) −1 (5.7)
If we consider the auxiliary variable A = x∗1−x∗ to rewrite equation 5.3 in terms of the
variable A, we obtain
N−1∑
j=1
(
N − 1
j
)
Aj
j + 1 =
b− c
c
(5.8)
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Figure 5.2: Internal equilibria of the N-Person Snowdrift Game in infinite well-mixed
populations. - Internal equilibria of the N -Person Snowdrift Game as a function of A.
cost-benefit ratio c/b (for different values of the group size N), and B. group size N (for
different values of c/b).
And finally, from equations 5.6 and 5.8, after some algebraic manipulation we obtain
c
b
(1− x∗)N +Nx∗(1− x∗)N−1 − c
b
= 0 (5.9)
Equation 5.9 can be solved analytically for N ≤ 4 (111); for N = 2 we recover the
conventional result for the 2-person SG in infinite WM populations, x∗ = b−cb−c/2 . For
N > 4 equation 5.9 can be solved numerically for arbitrary N to obtain the fraction of
Cs in the stationary state x∗. From the results illustrated in figure 5.2, we observe that
the higher the group size, the lower x∗ for the same c/b, also, increasing c/b for fixed
group size N leads to a decrease in the equilibrium fraction of cooperators x∗.
Case Q > 1
Q > 1 leads to a more complex scenario. In this case, the global benefit is only obtained
when the minimum number of cooperators Q (with Q > 1) in the group is gathered.
Only in that case cooperators share among them the required workload; otherwise,
when nC < Q, the effort of cooperators is in vain. The fitness difference is in this case
given by (112)
fC(x)− fD(x) =
= c
xN
N bc
(
N − 1
Q− 1
)
xQ(1− x)N−Q −
1 + Q−1∑
nC=0
(
N
nC
)
xnC (1− x)N−nC
(
nC
Q
− 1
)
(5.10)
90
5.3 The N -Person Snowdrift Game in Well-Mixed Populations
The limit Q = 1 leads naturally to equation 5.9, already studied above in detail. In the
case N = Q = 2 we obtain x∗ = c2b . This is an unstable fixed point; that is, we obtain a
dynamics akin to that of a Stag-Hunt (SH) game for a group of size N = 2 in which we
require all members of the group to cooperate in order for the benefit to be obtained.
For N > 2 and Q > 1 there is no analytical solution for equation 5.10, but we
can solve it numerically, as depicted in figure 5.3. When Q > 1, a new evolutionary
dynamics arises: the stable equilibria observed in figure 5.2 are replaced by a pair of
roots, one stable and the other unstable. This divides the system into two basins of
attraction, so depending on the initial fraction of cooperators in the population the
system will evolve either towards a fully defective state or a coexistence of Cs and Ds.
Note that the fraction of cooperators in this coexistence decreases for increasing c/b and
fixed Q (which is understandable since the cost c associated with the act of cooperating
is higher), but importantly it increases for increasing Q and fixed c/b. While at first this
could seem a paradox (since the requirements for the attainment of the public good
are higher), it can be understood by taking into account the fact that the individual
investment of each cooperator is c/Q – that is, the individual investment decreases
with Q. This dynamics characterized by two basins of attraction typically vanishes for
a critical c/b (112), above which a single stable fixed point remains for x = 0, similar
to the NPD. Both fC(x) and fD(x) are polynomials of degree N − 1, and as such g(x)
would have at most N − 1 interior roots; however, it has been shown that for the NSG
case the maximum possible number of roots is two (53, 112).
In fact the emergence of a pair of internal roots, a coordination and a coexistence,
also occurs with the introduction of a threshold in other N -Person social dilemmas,
such as the N -Person Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD) (a defectors’ dominance dilemma)
(116); and the N -Person Stag-Hunt Game (NSH) (a coordination dilemma) (105).
5.3.2 Finite Populations
For finite populations of size Z, the binomial sampling is replaced by the hyper-geometric
sampling (sampling without replacement) presented in equations 4.8, which we repeat
91
5. ESCAPING THE SNOWDRIFT
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.0
0.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
c/b
fra
ct
io
n 
of
 c
oo
pe
ra
to
rs
xcoex
xcoord
Q=5 Q=10 Q=15 Q=20
Figure 5.3: Evolutionary dynamics of the N-Person Snowdrift Game on infinite well-
mixed populations - Internal equilibria of the replicator equation for the N -Person Snow-
drift Game as a function of the ration c/b, for increasing threshold Q. Dashed lines cor-
respond to coordination points, full lines correspond to coexistence points. Parameters:
N = 20.
below:
fC(j) =
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1 N−1∑
nC=0
(
j − 1
nC
)(
Z − j
N − nC − 1
)
ΠC(nC + 1) (5.11a)
fD(j) =
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1 N−1∑
nC=0
(
j
nC
)(
Z − j − 1
N − nC − 1
)
ΠD(nC) (5.11b)
For modeling the evolution of the population, we adopt a birth-death (BD) process
combined with the pairwise comparison rule discussed in section 3.2.3.2 (77, 78, 79).
In this case, we adopt a different update method than the one we have adopted in the
previous chapter - the replicator dynamics analogue for finite populations - because for
this project we want to adopt a different approach. Namely, in this chapter we will
compute a numerical analogue of the gradient of selection for structured populations;
the Fermi Imitation update method seems to us an appropriate choice for this purpose
because it allows the study of the evolutionary dynamics for any intensity of selection.
In each time step, an individual A adopts the strategy of a randomly selected neigh-
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bor B with a probability given by the Fermi distribution
pFermi =
1
1 + e−β(fsB−fsA)
(5.12)
where β stands for the intensity of selection regulating the accuracy of the imita-
tion process, and fsA (fsB ) stands for the fitness of individual A (B) with strategy
sA (sB). As a result, evolution proceeds as a balance between the probabilities to in-
crease
(
T+(j)
)
and decrease (T−(j)) the number of Cs in the population, j, which can
be written as
T±(j) = j
Z
Z − j
Z − 1
[
1 + e∓β(fC(j)−fD(j))
]−1
(5.13)
The finite population equivalent of the gradient of selection g(x) can be written as
G(j) ≡ T+(j)− T−(j) = j
Z
Z − j
Z − 1 tanh
[
β
2 (fC(j)− fD(j))
]
(5.14)
as discussed in more detail in section 3.2.3.2. The term jZ corresponds to the probability
of selecting a cooperator in the population of size Z, while the term Z−jZ−1 corresponds
to the probability of selecting a defector among the Z−1 individuals that remain in the
population (sampling is done without replacement). Please see Methods (section 5.8)
for details.
The general dynamical picture remains the same as the one discussed for infinite
populations as long as Z  N (112), but as the group size approaches the population
size the scenario changes: in figure 5.4 we show the gradient of selection G(j/Z)
with population size Z = 102 and group size between N = 20 and N = 80. As
N ∼ Z, cooperation becomes disadvantageous: the stable root is shifted to the left
with increasing N , and the amplitude of G(j/Z) also decreases.
5.4 The Gradient of Selection in Structured Populations
The gradient of selection g(x) for infinite populations, and its analogue G(j/Z) for
finite populations, provide complete information concerning the evolutionary dynam-
ics of the population. However, in structured populations, besides tracking how the
number of cooperators and defectors varies in time, it is also necessary to track their
location since their fitness depends on their social context. Because of this additional
difficulty, the conventional approach adopted for the study of social dilemmas in struc-
tured populations is to evaluate the average final level of cooperation in the population
after a convenient transient period, when starting from one particular initial condition
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Figure 5.4: Evolutionary dynamics of the N-Person Snowdrift Game on finite, well-
mixed populations for increasing group size N - Gradient of selection G(j/Z) of the
N -Person Snowdrift Game on finite, well-mixed populations for increasing group size N .
Cooperation becomes disadvantageous as the group size N approaches the population size
Z. Parameters: Z = 102, Q = 1, b = 1.0, c = 0.2.
(usually, 50% of Cs and Ds). This was the approach we used in the previous chapter, for
the NPD model. While the existence of coexistence points can be easily inferred from
such results (since the population will evolve towards them and spend there a signif-
icant amount of time), nothing can be said about coordination points. Also, results
obtained by following this approach correspond to one single initial condition j/Z, and
may differ if we adopt a different initial condition.
In order to probe deeper into the evolutionary dynamics of the population under
the NSG, we compute a numerical analogue of the gradient of selection in structured
populations, the average gradient of selection (AGoS) (117), G(j/Z), for the determi-
nation of which we compute the transition probabilities along the links of the net-
work. For each individual i in the population that is a defector, one must calculate
T+i = k−1i
∑n¯i
m=0
[
1 + e−β(fm(t)−ft(t))
]−1
, where ki is the degree of node i and n¯i is the
number of neighbors of i that are cooperators. Conversely, for each individual i that
is a cooperator we calculate T−i = k−1i
∑n¯i
m=0
[
1 + e−β(fm(t)−ft(t))
]−1
, where n¯i is the
number of neighbors of i that are defectors. At a given time t of simulation p we define
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Gp = T+p (j, t)− T−p (j, t), with
T±p (j, t) = Z−1
All Ds
All Cs∑
i
Ti(t) (5.15)
for a state with j cooperators in a population of size Z. The time-dependent AGoS
at generation tg (1 generation means Z iterations), GA (j, tg), is then computed by
averaging over the last Z time-steps, that is,
GA (j, tg) = cj (tg)−1
tg∑
tg−1
Ω∑
p=1
Gp(j, t), (5.16)
where cj (tg) accounts for the number of times the population was observed in state j
during generation tg. Please see Methods (section 5.8) for details.
Figure 5.5 schematizes the method we adopt for determining the AGoS: the shaded
area in figure 5.5A represents the period of interest for determining the gradient of se-
lection for generation tg; we perform several simulations for each initial condition j/Z
and for each one, when the population crosses the shaded area, we register T±p (j, t) for
the corresponding number of Cs in the population, j. T±p (j, t) corresponds to an aver-
age of the transition probabilities over all individuals in the population, as expressed in
equation 5.15, measured along the links of the network that may give rise to a change
of strategy; given that we adopt the Fermi Imitation update rule, these links correspond
to those connecting nodes with different strategies.
In the following sections, we will use the conventional approach here mentioned as
a departure point for introducing the gradient of selection.
5.5 Network Reciprocity in the N-Person Snowdrift Game
We will now start by investigating the behavior of the average final fraction of cooper-
ators obtained when the population evolves according to the rules of the NSG, in line
with the study conducted on the previous chapter for the N -Person Prisoner’s Dilemma
(NPD) (chapter 4).
The population is initialized with a random distribution of 50% of Cs and Ds in the
nodes of the network. In each time-step of the evolution of the population, a randomly
selected individual is given the opportunity to revise his strategy – that is, strategies are
updated asynchronously. A strategy revision occurs according to the following method:
a randomly chosen individual A chooses a random neighbor B; both evaluate their
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Figure 5.5: Determination of the analogue of the gradient of selection on structured
populations - For the determination of the average gradient of selection (AGoS), we: A.
perform several runs for each possible initial condition j/Z and, between the interval of
interest tg−1 and tg (for determining the AGoS in generation tg) we register the transition
probabilities T±(j/Z) for each state j/Z in which the population is observed in that inter-
val. In the scheme of panel A, we represent three runs in which the fraction of cooperators
in the population evolves in time starting from three distinct initial conditions. B. Average
transition probabilities T±(j/Z) of the population in each instant t correspond to an av-
erage over all T± computed along the links of the network connecting two individuals of
different strategies.
individual fitnesses by accumulating the payoff obtained in all the games in which they
participate. If individuals A and B have different strategies (sA 6= sB) A will imitate
B with a probability proportional to the fitness difference fsB − fsA and given by the
Fermi distribution from statistical physics (references (77, 78, 79) and section 3.2.3.2).
Note that, according to the conclusions from the previous chapter regarding how N -
Person games should be formulated in structured populations, we will assume that
each individual i always participates in ki + 1 games (where ki represents the number
of neighbors of individual i): the one centered on himself plus the ki games centered
on his ki neighbors.
We investigate the impact of population structure on the evolutionary dynamics
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Figure 5.6: Average final fraction of cooperators for the networked N-Person Snow-
drift Game - ring regular and homogeneous random networks - A. Average final frac-
tion of cooperators in the NSG as a function of c/b for homogeneous populations. Line
with full circles corresponds to the results of HoRand populations, line with filled squares
corresponds to the results for ring regular populations, and dashed line corresponds to the
infinite well-mixed limit, all for Q = 1. B. The increase in the coordination threshold Q
leads to an increase on the level of cooperation obtained for a fixed c/b on homogeneous
random populations. Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, and β = 1.0 for the simulations in
structured populations.
of the NSG, and for that we consider three distinct network classes – ring regular,
homogeneous random (HoRand) and scale-free Barabási-Albert (BA) networks. In ho-
mogeneous populations every individual takes part in the same number of games, all
with the same size (〈k〉+ 1 in both cases). While in ring regular networks the neighbor-
hoods of all individuals are arranged in the same regular manner, in HoRand networks
neighborhoods are random – a distinctive fact that justifies why we opt for studying
both network classes. However, this scenario does not take into account an important
feature of social networks: its diversity. Often individuals face different number of
collective dilemmas (depending on their social position) that may also have different
sizes. Such levels of social diversity can be modeled by considering a heterogeneous
network of interactions. Please see Methods (section 5.8) for details. In this section
we investigate the impact of homogeneous networks on the evolutionary dynamics –
heterogeneous networks will be the subject of the following section.
In figure 5.6A we compare the average final fraction of cooperators obtained on
HoRand populations (line with filled circles) and ring regular populations (line with
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filled squares) with their WM counterpart in the limit of infinite populations (dashed
line) for Q = 1. The behavior is qualitatively similar in both the structured and the
structureless cases: there is a monotonic decline from full cooperation to full defection
as c/b increases. While in Horand populations the decline is smooth, in ring regu-
lar populations there is a sharp transition from full cooperation to full defection for
c/b = 0.3. Figure 5.6B shows the impact of the threshold level Q on the overall lev-
els of cooperation in HoRand populations. We observe that an increasing threshold Q
leads to an increase on the level of cooperation for a fixed c/b, a feature that is also
observed for WM populations (as illustrated in figure 5.3) and is qualitatively valid for
other homogeneous graphs such as lattices and rings. This property was discussed in
the context of WM populations (section 5.3), and the same justification can also be
applied in this context if we notice that the investment made by each cooperator (c/Q)
decreases with increasing Q. For Q = 2 and Q = 3 we observe a critical c/b after which
the final fraction of cooperators starts to decrease until they reach a second critical c/b
that marks an abrupt decline in the cooperation levels.
5.5.1 Ring Regular Networks
In figure 5.7A we represent the initial gradient of selection (that is, without performing
any evolution in the population) for Q = 1 in ring regular networks, for several values
of c/b. The results show that the global dilemma being played corresponds to a coexis-
tence, and that the coexistence point is gradually shifted to the left (that is, gradually
corresponds to a lower fraction of cooperators) for increasing c/b. Also, note that for
c/b = 0.35 the gradient becomes fully negative, that is, regardless of the initial fraction
of cooperators the population will be pushed towards a fully defective state. This is in
accordance with the results shown in figure 5.6A: the cost-benefit ratio c/b = 0.3 marks
the transition from full cooperation to full defection.
In face of these results, we now want to understand why the population evolves
towards full cooperation, while the initial gradient of selection in figure 5.7A indicates
the existence of a coexistence point for a relatively small fraction of cooperators in the
population.
In a finite population, regardless of the internal stable points that may exist in the
dynamics, the evolution only ceases when the population reaches one of the absorbing
states, full cooperation or full defection, even though the fixation time in one of these
states may be arbitrarily long. But is it just that what gives rise to the fully cooperative
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Figure 5.7: Evolutionary dynamics of the N-Person Snowdrift Game in ring regular
networks - A. Gradients of selectionG(j/Z) for the NSG for some values of the ratio c/b, B.
fraction of cooperators j/Z as a function of time (measured in generations), starting from
above xcoexistence (70% of cooperators) and below it (1% of cooperators) for c/b = 0.15,
C. j/Z, φCC , φDD and φCD as a function of time, starting from 70% of cooperators, for
c/b = 0.15. Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, β = 1.0.
population we observe in figure 5.6A? And if yes, why did the population fixate in full
cooperation and not in full defection, as the fraction of cooperators in the coexistence
level is relatively low? In order to understand better the origin of this result, we focus
on a particular value of c/b < 0.3, and follow the time evolution of the fraction of
cooperators starting from two different initial conditions – above and below the coex-
istence point xcoexistence obtained for the same value of c/b in the infinite, well-mixed
case, with xcoexistence ≈ 0.25 (dashed line in figure 5.6A). In figure 5.7B we start from
a population of 1% and 70% of cooperators respectively, randomly distributed in the
network, and allow the population to evolve for 100 generations. Figure 5.7B shows
that, although the final outcome after the 100 generations is the same (the population
is heading to the absorbing state of full cooperation), the dynamic behavior observed
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throughout evolution is quite different. While for the initial condition below xcoexistence
(1% of Cs) the fraction of cooperators increases right from the start, for the initial con-
dition above xcoexistence (70% of Cs) it starts by decreasing first, increasing only after
a considerable amount of generations. To understand the origin of such behavior, we
define the fraction of links between individuals i and j playing strategies si and sj ,
φsisj , as
φsisj =
∑Z
i=1 #sisj links
Z〈k〉
2
(5.17)
where Z〈k〉2 is the total number of links of the network and si and sj is either C or D.
Figure 5.7C shows the average time evolution of these quantities when starting
with a fraction of cooperators x > xcoexistence, along with the above defined quantities.
Analysis of these results shows that isolated cooperators are the ones specifically being
eliminated, i.e., cooperators and defectors on the population organize themselves in-
creasingly more in an assorted manner – individuals that adopt a certain strategy are
not isolated but organized in such a way that have at least one neighbor following the
same strategy. This is corroborated by the several curves shown: φCC increases slightly,
accompanied by a sudden decrease of φCD, representing the self-organization of co-
operators and defectors; the maximum "saturation value" reached by φDD corresponds
to the moment in which cooperators are less represented in the population. For these
reasons, what we actually observing in figure 5.6 is not the end of evolution after an
arbitrarily long period of time as a consequence of stochastic fluctuations, but a result
of the gradual change in the global dilemma being played in the population caused
by the self-organization of Cs and Ds in the network. For these values of c/b, regular
structures can, therefore, be favorable for cooperation under the NSG, potentiating the
self-organization of the population towards the full cooperation absorbing state.
5.5.2 Homogeneous Random populations
In order to understand the impact of the organization of strategies in the evolutionary
dynamics of the NSG in HoRand populations, we initially distribute the strategies in
the population according to two extreme methods. On the one hand, we distribute
cooperators (and defectors) randomly in the population. On the other hand, we dis-
tribute cooperators in the population in such a way that each C has at least another
C as neighbor. To distribute j cooperators in the population according to this second
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Figure 5.8: Initial gradient of selection for the N-Person Snowdrift Game on homoge-
neous random populations - Gradient of selection G(j/Z) prior to population evolution
when strategies are distributed A. randomly, and B. cooperators are distributed in a perco-
lated way. Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, β = 1.0, c/b = 0.7.
method, we adopt the following procedure: we start by randomly choosing the first in-
dividual in the population to become a C. If j > 1, after the first individual is assigned
as cooperator, we randomly choose one of his neighbors in the network and assign him
as cooperator. If j > 2, we create a list of cooperator individuals, and at each time
step we choose one random cooperator i from this list, and then one random neighbor
t of individual i. If individual t is not a cooperator yet, we assign him the cooperative
strategy, and update the list of cooperators in the population. We proceed with this
algorithm until all j cooperators are distributed in the population. Note that when in-
dividuals are distributed randomly in the population, for a sufficiently large population
the probability that two cooperators are neighbors of each other is low.
The results for the initial gradients of selection for these two cases are shown in
figure 5.8, for a cost-benefit ratio of c/b = 0.7. Note that these gradients of selection
were obtained without evolving the population, they simply correspond to an evalu-
ation of the probable direction of evolution depending on how strategies are initially
distributed in the population.
Starting from the case Q = 1, the differences between the two distributions are
striking: while for a random distribution of strategies the gradient is fully negative,
for a distribution in which all cooperators have at least one cooperator as neighbor the
global dilemma is transformed into a coexistence. This trend is maintained for higher
values of Q: while for random distributions of strategies the gradient is or either totally
negative, or exhibits a pair of coordination and coexistence internal fixed points, for a
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distribution of strategies in which each cooperator has at least another cooperator as
neighbor the gradient of selection always corresponds to a coexistence dilemma, and
the level of cooperators in the coexistence increases with increasing Q. These results
highlight the importance of the distribution of strategies in a structured population;
note that these differences would have no meaning in a well-mixed population: in the
WM scenario, there is no such thing as distributing strategies according to different
methods (as all social positions are equivalent) and therefore for a given set of game
parameters and j/Z the value of the gradient of selection will always be the same.
The update rule adopted here is non-innovative (section 3.2.3.2); this means that
a cooperator surrounded by cooperators cannot change strategy (and likewise for a
defector surrounded by defectors). More generally, with this update method "Cs breed
Cs and Ds breed Ds" (108) – along time, clusters of individuals exhibiting the same
strategy are expected to emerge. Because the gradient of selection is highly sensitive to
how individuals are distributed in the social network, we expect that it co-evolves with
the self-organization of strategies in the population and maybe even similar to the one
obtained in figure 5.8B. The AGoS will allow us to understand how the final fractions of
cooperators depicted in figure 5.6 come to be, and more generically how the population
structure affects the nature of the global dilemma played by the population.
Figure 5.9 allows the detailed study of the evolutionary dynamics in HoRand pop-
ulations along time. Figure 5.9B shows the AGoS in HoRand populations, which can
be compared both with its corresponding quasi-stationary distribution (figure 5.9) and
the corresponding results for infinite WM populations (figure 5.9A). The AGoS was
averaged over 125 generations after a transient of 25 generations – as the panel C of
figure 5.9 shows, the population macro-dynamics takes at most 20 generations to reach
a stationary regime. The vertical green dashed line shows the good agreement between
the coexistence point xcoex (panel B) and the peak of the quasi-stationary distribution
(panel D) for Q = 3.
First of all, it is worth comparing figures 5.8A (for the initial gradient of selection in
HoRand populations, when the strategies are distributed randomly in the population
and the initial gradient of selection is computed before any strategy revisions take
place in the population) and figure 5.9C (which shows the evolution of the internal
fixed points of the gradient of selection GA(j/Z) for the first 50 generations in HoRand
populations). The starting point for the results shown in both these figures is exactly the
same, in what concerns both the distribution of strategies and the population structure.
However, a detailed analysis of the two figures shows that the internal roots shown in
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Figure 5.9: Gradient of selection for the N-Person Snowdrift Game on homogeneous
random populations - A. Gradient of selection g(x) in infinite, WM populations, B. aver-
age gradient of selectionGA(j/Z) over 50 generations after a transient of 25 generations in
finite populations structured along the links of HoRand networks, C. Internal fixed points
of the GA(j, g) for the first 50 generations, and D. Stationary distributions computed for
the situations described in B.. Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, c/b = 0.6, β = 1.0.‡
figure 5.9C for the first generation differ slightly from those shown in figure 5.8A for
the initial gradient. This small discrepancy does not correspond to an error in our
results but to the fact that the internal roots shown in figure 5.9C correspond to the
roots of the gradients averaged over 1 generation (1 generation = Z iterations). For the
particular case of the roots of the first generation, this means that they correspond to
the roots of the average of the first Z iterations of the evolution of the population and in
these iterations, due to the rearrangement of Cs and Ds in the population, emerge some
internal roots, for some values of Q, that are still not present in the initial gradient of
selection.
‡I thank my colleague in the ATP-group Flávio Pinheiro for this figure, as well as figures 5.10, 5.14
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Comparing figures 5.9A and 5.9B for the gradients of selection in infinite WM pop-
ulations and for the average gradient of selection GA(j/Z) after a transient period of
25 generations respectively, we observe that while the nature of the dilemma remains
unchanged, i) HoRand networks facilitate coordination: regardless of the value of Q,
the coordination point (xcoord) is shifted to the left (requiring less Cs) when compared
with its position in well-mixed populations (for Q = 1, 2 and 3 the coordination point is
close to 1/Z). That is, a lower minimum number of Cs in the population is required for
reaching the coexistence state. Furthermore, ii), whenever individuals face stringent
requirements to meet goals (large Q/N), the coexistence point (xcoex) is shifted to the
right (coexistence involving more Cs). In both cases we obtain a more favorable sce-
nario for cooperation in HoRand structured populations compared to WM populations.
It is also noteworthy that, for large Q/N , the relative size of the two basins of
attraction combined with stochastic effects renders full cooperation as the most preva-
lent state, whereas for low Q/N , the population will remain in the vicinity of the co-
existence point (xcoex) most of the time.
The results in figure 5.9 allow the visualization of the gradients of selection for the
particular value of cost-benefit ratio c/b = 0.6. In figure 5.10 we provide an overview
of the evolutionary dynamics for the full range of c/b, by drawing the location of the
interior roots of the AGoS for different values of Q (circles), in comparison with the
well-mixed case (solid lines), showing how HoRand networks favor cooperation. This
overall picture of the population dynamics supports the conclusions discussed above.
Furthermore, both in WM and HoRand populations, xcoex shifts to lower values of the
fraction (j/Z) of Cs for larger values of c/b, a result reported in previous studies of the
2-person SG (64). Similarly, the critical c/b above which the nature of the dilemma is
transformed to that of a PD is lower than that reported on WM populations (112), a
fact that is particularly visible on panel B of figure 5.10.
5.6 Social diversity in the N-Person Snowdrift Game
Despite their theoretical interest, homogeneous networks are not good models for re-
alistic social structures, as first noted in chapter 2. Instead, real social networks exhibit
a marked degree of heterogeneity (a large number of individuals with few neighbors
whereas a minority of the population have a large number of neighbors) combined with
and 5.15, which because of the tight schedule requirements of this thesis were obtained with his faster
version of the program.
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Figure 5.10: Average gradient of selection (AGoS) for the N-Person Snowdrift Game
on homogeneous random populations - Location of the interior fixed points of the AGoS
at the 75th generation for HoRand populations (open and solid circles) as a function of
c/b and for 1 ≤ Q ≤ 4. The corresponding results for WM populations are drawn with
solid lines for comparison. Vertical dashed lines indicate the values used in figure 5.9.
Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4 and β = 1.0 (for the dynamics on HoRand populations).
small-world effects, characteristics that are both present, albeit at extreme levels, on
scale-free BA networks.
In figure 5.11 we represent the initial gradient of selection obtained in scale-free
BA populations, when cooperators are distributed randomly (figure 5.11A) and when
we assure that each and every cooperator has at least one cooperator as neighbor (fig-
ure 5.11B), for a cost-benefit ratio of c/b = 0.7. The difference observed between
these two scenarios is even more pronounced than that observed for these two same
scenarios in HoRand networks: while for the distribution of strategies adopted in fig-
ure 5.11A the initial gradient of selection is always negative regardless of the value of
Q, with the distribution of strategies adopted in figure 5.11B the global game is totally
transformed: the gradient becomes positive for all j/Z for all Q, akin to a Harmony
Game. As we will show in the next section, this transition from a D-dominance to a
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Figure 5.11: Initial Gradient of Selection for the N-Person Snowdrift Game on scale-
free Barabási-Albert populations - Gradient of selection G(j/Z) prior to population evo-
lution when strategies are distributed A. randomly, and B. cooperators are distributed in
such a way that each and every C has at least another C as neighbor. Parameters: Z = 103,
〈k〉 = 4, β = 1.0, c/b = 0.7.
C-dominance game can be explained by the position of cooperators on the network
according to node degree.
5.6.1 Biased distribution of strategies according to node degree
Taking into account the results of the previous section, here we adopt a biased dis-
tribution of strategies in the population according to node degree, and we show that
by assigning Cs preferentially to high connected nodes, the nature of the global social
dilemma is gradually transformed. For the initial assignment of strategies to nodes, we
define a probability pbias of attributing strategy C to node x with connectivity kx as
pbias =
kθi∑Z−1
j=0 k
θ
j
(5.18)
where θ is the parameter that tunes the bias introduced for assigning Cs preferentially
to nodes of higher degree (θ > 0) or lower degree (θ < 0). The denominator ∑Z−1j=0 kθj
stands for the proper normalization: the sum over the connectivities of all the nodes
in the network, each connectivity to the power θ. For θ = 0 we obtain pbias = 1Z and
therefore we recover the conventional random assignment of strategies, independent
of node degree.
Figure 5.12 shows the initial gradients of selection that are obtained for a biased
distribution of strategies with −1 ≤ θ ≤ 1, in scale-free BA populations. For θ = 0.0, co-
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Figure 5.12: Gradients of selection for the N-Person Snowdrift Game in scale-free
Barabási-Albert networks with biased distribution of strategies - Initial gradients of
selection (prior to population evolution) for the N -Person Snowdrift Game in scale-free
Barabási-Albert populations when strategies are distributed in a biased way according to
the parameter θ in equation 5.18. When θ > 0 (θ < 0) cooperators are assigned preferen-
tially to high (low) connected nodes. When θ = 0, we recover the random assignment of
strategies in the population. Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, β = 1.0, c = 0.9, b = 1.0.
operators and defectors are distributed randomly in the population and the gradient of
selection depicted in figure 5.12 is in accordance with the results shown in figure 5.11A,
only for a higher cost-benefit ratio c/b: the global dilemma, at a population level, cor-
responds to a D-dominance game. For θ < 0, cooperators are preferentially assigned
to low connected nodes, and conversely defectors are assigned to higher connected
nodes. Defectors in these positions will be more advantageous: they participate in
more games, and in each game it is sufficient for them to encounter a single C to obtain
the benefit. As a result, for θ < 0 the global dilemma naturally continues to correspond
to a D-dominance game, and the amplitude of the gradient of selection increases as |θ|
increases. That is, the population is pushed harder and harder in the direction of less
Cs in the population.
For θ > 0, cooperators are preferentially assigned to high connected nodes, and as
θ increases, the nature of the global dilemma is gradually transformed. For θ = 0.25,
we observe the emergence of a coordination point for j/Z ≈ 0.25, and for θ ≥ 0.5 the
global dilemma is transformed into a C-dominance game, akin to a Harmony Game.
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That is, despite the local rules of the game being always the same (the rules of the
NSG), which in a well-mixed population correspond to a coexistence global dynamics,
these can be highly altered when individuals are also defined by their specific position
in their social network: for the same local rules, depending on where individuals are
located and with whom they play the nature of the global dilemma can be surprisingly
different.
This gradual transformation of the game from a D-dominance dilemma to a C-
dominance for increasing θ in scale-free BA networks has to do with the particular
growth mechanism of this class of networks. In scale-free BA networks the hubs are
mostly interconnected, because of the preferential attachment of new nodes to higher
connected nodes during network growth (see section 2.4). When we impose a pref-
erential distribution of Cs to high connected nodes, not only these individuals become
more advantageous because they accumulate a higher fitness (higher than if they were
assigned to a node with low connectivity), but also most cooperators will have at least
one cooperator as neighbor. That is, the distribution of strategies we impose when
θ  0 is very similar to that we imposed for obtaining the results shown in figure 5.11.
We have verified this hypothesis by performing the same distributions of strategies in
exponential networks (results not shown here), for which preferential attachment dur-
ing network growth is replaced by random attachment.
5.6.2 Cooperators (and Defectors) on the Stars
In light of the results discussed in section 5.6.1, and of the analytical study we per-
formed for the NPD (section 4.8), we now present an analogous study for the NSG
(with Q = 1), resorting to the simple double star representative of characteristic sub-
structures of scale-free BA networks. We will show that when both hubs agree on their
strategies (be it both cooperators or both defectors) the invasion of their leaves is very
easy. Furthermore, we will consider as an initial configuration the most disadvanta-
geous situation for a cooperator (and simultaneously the most advantageous situation
for a defector) and show how even in those circumstances the C strategy can spread
and invade the whole double star.
Figure 5.13 depicts the most probable sequence of steps that occurs in the spreading
of strategies in the double star, when we depart from the following distribution of
strategies: a C-hub surrounded by D-leaves, and connected to another D-hub whom
in his turn is surrounded by C-leaves. This corresponds simultaneously to the worse
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Figure 5.13: The invasion of the double star in the N-Person Snowdrift Game - The
double star construction is composed of two centers (h1 and h2), the left one with N − 2
leaves and the right one with M − 2 leaves. The first configuration corresponds to the best
situation for a D, in the right center, and simultaneously to the worst situation for a C, in
the left hub.
configuration for a C (because he alone has to pay the effort to obtain the benefit
in almost all the games in which he participates; note that we are studying the case
Q = 1) and the best configuration for a D (there is always at least one cooperator in
all the games in which he participates, and therefore he always obtains the benefit).
In figure 5.13 we represent this initial configuration (configuration i)), as well as the
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sequence of steps that may lead to the invasion of the whole double star by the C-
strategy. We assume that the left hub (h1) has N − 2 leaves, and the right hub (h2) has
M −2 leaves. As in the analysis performed for the NPD in section 4.8, for simplicity we
neglect any other connections that the leaves of h1 and h2 may have. Our conclusions
would remain qualitatively valid if those were included in our calculations, but our
analysis would require further considerations regarding their connectivities.
Figure 5.13: from configuration i) to configuration ii)
In this initial configuration, we start by assessing the fitness of each individual to evalu-
ate which strategy invasion is more probable to occur. The fitness of the C individual on
the left hub (fC,h1), the fitness of the D individual on the right hub (fD,h2), the fitness
of the D-leaves of the left hub (fD,l1), and the fitness of the C-leaves of the right hub
(fC,l2) are, respectively, given by
fC,h1 = Nb− (N − 2)c− c−
c
M − 1 = Nb−Nc+ c−
c
M − 1 (5.19a)
fD,h2 = Mb (5.19b)
fD,l1 = 2b (5.19c)
fC,l2 = 2b−
c
2 −
c
M − 1 (5.19d)
Taking into account that
fC,h1 > fD,h2 ⇒
c
b
<
N −M
N − 1 + 1M−1
, (5.20a)
fC,h1 > fD,l1 ⇒
c
b
<
N − 2
N − 1 + 1M−1
, (5.20b)
fD,h2 > fC,l2 ⇒Mb > 2b−
c
2 −
c
M − 1 , (5.20c)
four possibilities can occur with this configuration: the C-hub, h1, can either invade
any of its leaves l1, or invade the hub h2; conversely, the D-hub, h2, can either invade
any of its leaves l2, or invade the hub h1. Taking into account the fitness inequalities
expressed in equations 5.20, we conclude that the less stringent inequality corresponds
to the invasion of the leaves l2 by the D-hub h2 (fD,h2 > fC,l2 whenever M ≥ 2). That
is, this is the more probable scenario that can happen, and so we will assume that this
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is the next possible configuration. Once one of the leaves l2 is invaded by the D-hub
h2, the fitnesses of h2 and any of the cooperative l2 now are
fD,h2 = Mb (5.21a)
fC,l2 = 2b−
c
2 −
c
M − 2 (5.21b)
While the fitness of the D-hub remains unaltered (because he always obtains the ben-
efit b in all the games in which he participates), the fitness of the remaining C leaves
decreases slightly, which means that invasion of the remaining C leaves l2 by the D-hub
h2 becomes progressively easier, and we reach configuration ii) in figure 5.13.
Figure 5.13: configuration ii)
Once configuration ii) is reached, the fitness of the C-hub (fC,h1), the D leaves l1 (fD,l1),
and the D-hub h2 (fD,h2) correspond to
fC,h1 = Nb− (N − 2)c− 2c = Nb−Nc (5.22a)
fD,l1 = 2b (5.22b)
fD,h2 = 2b (5.22c)
Given that
fC,h1 > fD,l1 ⇒
c
b
<
N − 2
N
, (5.23)
and the same result holds for fC,h1 > fD,h2 , it is more probable for the C-hub h1 to
invade either the D-hub h2 or the D-leaves l1 (than to be invaded by any of them).
Regarding the possible invasions from the C-hub to the leaves or the other hub, these
are equally probable, and for that reason we will consider both possibilities. Of course,
it is more probable that a leave l1 is chosen to be invaded than the hub h2, because they
are in greater number. We will start by exploring all the consequences of the invasion
of the D leaves l1 by the C-hub h1, and in the end of that reasoning we will come back
to this configuration and explore what happens when the C-hub h1 invades the D-hub
h2.
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Figure 5.13: from configuration ii) to configuration iii)
Once one of the leaves l1 becomes C, the fitnesses of the C-hub (fC,h1) and of the
remaining D-leaves l1 (fD,l1) are modified to
fC,h1 = Nb− (N − 3)c−
c
2 −
c
2 − c = Nb−Nc+ c (5.24a)
fD,l1 = 2b (5.24b)
which means that, while the fitness of the D-leaves l1 is unaltered regarding its value
prior to this invasion, the fitness of the C-hub slightly increases; therefore, the invasion
of the remaining leaves becomes progressively easier and configuration iii) is attained.
Figure 5.13: from configuration iii) to configuration iv)
The fitnesses of the C-hub (fC,h1) and of the D-hub (fD,h2) now correspond to
fC,h1 = Nb− (N − 2)
c
2 −
c
N − 1 − c (5.25a)
fD,h2 = 2b (5.25b)
and
fC,h1 > fD,h2 ⇒
c
b
<
N − 2
N−2
2 +
1
N−1 + 1
(5.26)
This condition is deterministic whenever the numerator is greater than the denomina-
tor (since we assume b > c), that is, whenever
N − 2 > N − 22 +
1
N − 1 + 1 (5.27)
After a little algebra, we obtain that this condition is obeyed whenever N > 5, which
is a small value. Furthermore, for 2 < N ≤ 5, this condition is also very likely to occur
for rather high cost-benefit ratios c/b.
Figure 5.13: from configuration iv) to configuration v)
Once configuration iv) is reached, it is very easy for the cooperative strategy to invade
the whole double star. The fitness of the C-hub h2 (fC,h2) and of the D leaves (fD,l2)
can be written as
fC,h2 = Mb− (M − 2)c−
c
2 −
c
N
= Mb−Mc+ 32c−
c
N
(5.28a)
fD,l2 = 2b (5.28b)
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and we obtain
fC,h2 > fD,l2 ⇒
c
b
<
M − 2
M − 32 − 1N
(5.29)
which is a valid inequality for most values of c/b < 1.0, and therefore it is possible and
probable that the C-hub h2 invades the leaves l2. Furthermore, when the first leaf is
invaded, the fitnesses of the C-hub h2 and of the remaining defective leaves l2 become
fC,h2 = Mb− (M − 3)c−
c
2 −
c
2 −
c
N
= Mb−Mc+ 2c− c
N
(5.30a)
fD,l2 = 2b (5.30b)
That is, while the fitness of the D-leaves l2 remains unchanged, the fitness of the C-
hub h2 slightly increases; and therefore the invasion of the remaining defective leaves
becomes easier, and we eventually reach configuration v), in which all individuals in
the double star are Cs.
Figure 5.13: configuration vi) to configuration v)
When, in the double star, both centers are Cs, and all the remaining nodes (the leaves)
are Ds, we may write the fitness of either one of the centers (fC,h1 and fC,h2) and either
of the leaves (fD,l1 and fD,l2) as
fC,h1 = Nb− (N − 2)c−
c
2 −
c
2 = Nb−Nc+ c (5.31a)
fC,h2 = Mb−Mc+ c (5.31b)
fD,l1 = fD,l2 = 2b (5.31c)
Depending on the relationship between N and M , it will be either the l1 leaves or the
l2 leaves the first ones to get invaded by the corresponding hubs. For simplicity, now
we will consider N > M . In this case, it will be more probable that the l1 leaves get
invaded first (because the left hub has a higher fitness), according to
fC,h1 > fD,l1 ⇒
c
b
<
N − 2
N − 1 (5.32)
which is a valid condition for most values of c/b. When one of the leaves becomes a
cooperator, the fitness of the C-center (fC,h1) and of the remaining D-leaves (fD,l1) is
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modified to
fC,h1 = Nb− (N − 3)c−
c
2 −
c
3 −
c
2 = Nb−Nc+
5
3c (5.33a)
fD,l1 = 2b (5.33b)
and
fC,h1 > fD,l1 ⇒
c
b
<
N − 2
N − 5/3 (5.34)
which is a less strict condition than the one we have met before in equation 5.32,
meaning that it becomes increasingly easier to invade the remaining D leaves. The
situation is symmetrical in the right hub, and therefore the double star evolves until
reaching configuration v).
We are aware that, while in the previous chapter we considered the replicator dy-
namics analogue in structured populations as an update method, here we are consid-
ering the Fermi Imitation update method. In the replicator dynamics individuals only
imitate the strategy of neighbors that have a fitness larger than theirs (that is, selection
is strong), while in the Fermi process individuals can imitate, with a certain probability
(regulated by the intensity of selection β) the strategy of individuals with a lower fit-
ness. Nevertheless, we have verified that even for high values of the cost-benefit ratio
c/b, close to 1, the double star is totally invaded by the cooperative strategy even for
the intensity of selection β = 1.0 considered here. Higher values of the intensity of se-
lection β reduce, on average, the evolutionary time taken to reach the full cooperative
state of the double star starting from the configuration i) described in figure 5.13.
5.6.3 Average Gradient of Selection in Heterogeneous Populations
We now proceed to explore the more general scenario Q ≥ 1 in scale-free BA networks,
by analyzing the corresponding average gradients of selection. Figure 5.14 depicts the
trajectories of the internal points of the gradient of selection for the first 150 gener-
ations of evolutionary time. The intrinsically dual nature (co-existence and coordina-
tion) of the NSG creates a multitude of internal roots which result from the occurrence
of evolutionary deadlocks associated with particular motifs of the network (117, 118),
reflected in the appearance of quasi-stationary states close to full cooperation and full
defection. For this reason, and contrary to the case of HoRand networks, the AGoS
in scale-free BA networks does not converge rapidly into a stationary state, due to the
continuous invasion and counter-invasion induced by highly connected nodes.
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Figure 5.14: Trajectories of the internal points of the average gradient of selection
(AGoS) during the first 150 generations for the N-Person Snowdrift Game on scale-
free Barabási-Albert populations - We consider A. c/b=0.3, B. c/b = 0.7, C. c/b = 0.9
respectively. Each curve corresponds to the fit of the obtained points: dashed (full) lines
correspond to the trajectory of coordination (co-existence) points. Parameters: Z = 103,
〈k〉 = 4, β = 1.0.
For Q = 1 we observe a transition phase during the first 50 generations at which
the population-wide dynamics changes abruptly. This phase is characterized by two
bifurcations: the first in which two internal points bifurcate at generation gA and a
second when at generation gB a bifurcation gives rise to two internal points (xcoex
and xcoord) that will mainly dominate the evolutionary dynamics. Overall, we see that
gA (gB) increases (decreases) with increasing c/b, a fact that is particularly evident in
figures 5.14A and 5.14B. The effective dilemma between generations gA and gB is akin
to a Harmony Game, that is, the fraction of cooperators tends to increase regardless of
the state j/Z.
We also note the existence of a critical c/b value (0.7 < c/b ≤ 0.9) at which gA and
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Figure 5.15: Evolutionary dynamics of the N-Person Snowdrift Game on scale-free
Barabási-Albert populations - Position of the internal roots of GA(j/Z, g) at the 150th
generation as a function of c/b for: A. Q = 1, B. Q = 2, and C. Q = 3. Solid (open) circles
indicate a co-existence (coordination) point. Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, β = 1.0.
gB merge resulting in a different dynamical pattern, as the transient period akin to a
Harmony Game is omitted – results depicted in figure 5.14C. However, we continue
to observe a bifurcation which gives rise to a coexistence point, xcoex, now closer to
j/Z = 0.0.
Figure 5.15, similar to figure 5.10 but now for scale-free BA populations, provides
the location of the internal roots ofGA(j, tg) at the 150th generation as a function of c/b.
We consider the cases Q = 1 to Q = 3, the latter corresponding to impose unanimity of
cooperation for the smallest groups of the population (for our particular choice of the
average connectivity 〈k〉, for which we used 〈k〉 = 4).
For Q = 1, we observe that the population-wide dynamics is characterized by two
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basins of attraction, each dominated by a co-existence point. Overall, whenever highly
connected nodes (hubs) are Ds, the population may remain in a co-existence state
for low values of the fraction of Cs, since some intermediate degree nodes (and their
neighborhood) may remain cooperating. Differently, whenever hubs adopt a cooper-
ative behavior, the population is driven towards a co-existence point in which a small
fraction of Ds may free ride when located on the leaves (low degree nodes) of the net-
work. Between these two regimes, the stochastic nature of the evolutionary process,
together with the method adopted for the computation of the AGoS, allows one to ob-
serve the fingerprints of short-lived equilibria, as shown in figure 5.15, whereas the size
of each basin of attraction is ultimately defined by the strength of the dilemma, i.e., by
the cost-to-benefit ratio c/b.
As we increase the coordination requirements needed to achieve a collective benefit
(Q > 1, see figure 5.15), local co-existences become harder to achieve which, combined
with harsher dilemmas (large c/b), in the long run lead the population-wide dynamics
towards pure coordination, with a single unstable root and two stable monomorphic
states. For large values of Q and c/b, it is noteworthy that global coordination can be
reached for values of c/b in which widespread defection would pervade in well-mixed
populations (i.e. Q = 1 and c/b = 1.0), showing how heterogeneous networks may
transform a defection dominance dilemma into a coordination problem.
5.7 Discussion
The present study shows the impact of the population structure in the dynamics of
cooperative collective action associated with the NSG. Due to its twofold nature of
coordination and coexistence (112) – in well-mixed populations the game exhibits a
pair of coordination and coexistence points when a threshold Q is introduced – the
NSG is more complex than most dilemmas previously studied in structured populations
(119, 120).
In order to handle such a degree of complexity, we have studied the global dynamics
(117) created by each network structure, and compared it with the results previously
obtained in unstructured populations (111, 112). We show that evolution on homo-
geneous networks exhibits a population-wide behavior qualitatively similar to that ob-
served in well-mixed populations. Notwithstanding, homogeneous social structures are
able to reduce the efforts needed to achieve a stable fraction of cooperators which, in
turn, increases with increasing Q. Heterogeneous networks, on the other hand, lead to
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more complex evolutionary dynamics scenarios, with a multitude of internal equilibria,
whereas for high value of c/b and Q > 1, the increasing difficulty to locally coordinate
actions transforms the overall population-wide dynamics into a coordination problem.
Finally, our results support the idea that stringent requirements to achieve a collec-
tive benefit significantly raise the chances of cooperation, thereby escaping the tragedy
of the commons.
5.8 Methods
5.8.1 Population structure
We compare the evolutionary dynamics on both homogeneous and heterogeneous net-
works. As representative of the former, we consider ring regular networks in which
the neighborhood of all nodes is regularly organized in the same fashion; and homo-
geneous random networks (HoRand) (23), obtained by randomly swapping the ends
of pairs of links of a ring regular network. As representative of the latter, we take
scale-free networks generated with the Barabási-Albert algorithm (BA) of growth and
preferential attachment (section 2.4 and reference (24)). In all simulations, networks
remain fixed throughout evolution. We consider populations of size Z = 103 and aver-
age connectivity 〈k〉 = 4.
5.8.2 Evolution
In each game round, a randomly chosen individual A is given the opportunity to revise
his strategy, by comparing it with the one adopted by a randomly chosen neighbor
B. Individuals A and B assess their individual fitness by accumulating the payoff
obtained from the ki + 1 games (with i ∈ {A,B}) in which they participate: the one
centered on themselves, and the ones centered on their ki neighbors. If individuals A
and B have different strategies (sA 6= sB) A imitates B according to the Fermi Imitation
process (references (77, 78, 79) and section 3.2.3.2), with probability given by the
Fermi distribution from statistical physics
pFermi =
1
1 + e−β(fsB−fsA)
(5.35)
Note that individual A can still imitate individual B if fsA > fsB , the Fermi imitation
process allows for occasional mistakes in the decision-making process.
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5.8.3 Simulations
We evaluate the steady state by averaging the final fraction of cooperators after 1500
generations (see panels A and B of figure 5.6) starting with 50% of Cs and Ds placed ran-
domly in the population. We also compute the quasi-stationary distribution, that is the
fraction of time the system spends in each non-monomorphic state j (j ∈ {1, ..., Z − 1})
along the first 2500 generations (1 generation = Z time-steps) over 5 x 104 simulations
(see panel D of figure 5.9), starting from an initial random composition of strategies
in the population. Concerning the determination of the average gradient of selection
(AGoS) (117), for each individual i we compute the probability that this individual
changes behavior at time t,
Ti(t) =
1
ki
n¯i∑
m=1
1
1 + e−β(fm(t)−fi(t))
, (5.36)
where ki stands for the degree of node i and n¯i for the number of neighbors of i having
a different strategy. At a given time t of simulation p we define
Gp(j, t) = T+p (j, t)− T−p (j, t) (5.37)
with
T±p (j, t) =
1
Z
All Cs
All Ds∑
i=1
Ti(t) (5.38)
for a state with j Cs in a population of size Z. The time-dependent AGoS at generation
tg is then computed by averaging over the last Z time-steps, that is,
GA(j, tg) = cj(tg)−1
tg∑
tg−1
Ω∑
p=1
Gp(j, t) (5.39)
where cj(tg) accounts for the number of times the system was observed in state j during
generation tg. For a given network type, we perform Ω = 2.5× 107 simulations (using
102 networks of each type) starting from random initial conditions.
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6Peer Influence (of cooperation and
more)
6.1 Introduction
A brief search on the Internet reveals that there are approximately two hundred no-
table, well-known social networking websites currently online, a number that corre-
sponds only to those that have the highest number of members and excludes thou-
sands of other, smaller, online social networks (121). Of these, Facebook is currently
the largest online social network, with more than 908 000 000 members, approximately
1/7 of the total world population.
The advent of the World Wide Web has enabled the popularity and massive access
to online social networks, and as a consequence has made it possible to obtain large
amounts of data on them. Data from social networks is valuable in the sense that it can
help to shed a light on how humans interact with each other, how they react to the in-
formation transmitted by their peers (do they imitate them? can they be influenced by
them?), and how these interactions are affected by the structure of that social network.
In fact, the study of social networks goes back far farther than the networks’ modern
day computer incarnations: the true foundation of the field is attributed to the psy-
chiatrist Jacob Moreno, a Romanian immigrant in America, who in the 1930s became
interested in the dynamics of social interactions within groups of people (122). How-
ever, until recently, because of the effort involved in compiling them, it was impossible
to obtain networks with more than a few dozens or hundreds of elements. Nowadays,
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there is no reason why social networks cannot be as large as the Internet or the World
Wide Web; the difficulties that previously existed in gathering the data are now the
handling of the enormous amounts of data available for academic studies. Such con-
straints, together with privacy issues, are now determinant for the size of the social
networks available nowadays. This growing tendency to socialize online carries with it
a huge research potential: not only the evolution of the social structure is registered,
but also all the interactions. Some centuries from now, if this data is accessible it will
provide a very valuable resource to study human culture in this century.
Behaviors or strategies (as to cooperate or defect) are examples of information that
propagates in social networks – other examples can be emotions, gossip, ideas, fads.
How this information flows and what determines the flow patterns has become ex-
tremely valuable with applications extending to all areas of human activity. Several
studies have focused on the role played by social networks on the spread of informa-
tion between individuals, by making use of email and blog databases, and online social
networks such as Twitter and Facebook (123, 124, 125, 126). Both empirical stud-
ies and theoretical models have shown how social networks affect the propagation of
health issues (127, 128, 129), ideas (130), criminal behavior (131, 132), economic
decisions (133, 134, 135), school achievement (136) and cooperation (52, 65, 120),
among other human traits.
Recently, Fowler and Christakis (137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144) under-
took a series of statistical analyses applied to several social networks, in order to study
the propagation of traits on those social networks. They focused on the Framingham
Heart Study (FHS) database (145), from which they obtained a social network and
analyzed correlations between individuals for traits as diverse as smoking habits, alco-
hol consumption, loneliness, obesity, happiness or cooperation. Correlations reflect the
relative probability (when compared with a random arrangement) that two individu-
als share the same trait, as a function of their social distance, defined as the smallest
number of hops connecting those individuals in the social network. Besides the social
network obtained from the FHS database, other social networks were studied. A sam-
ple from the Facebook social network was used to check whether the individuals were
smiling or if they exhibited signs of overweight on their profile pictures. Also, data from
the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) (146) was used to
investigate how habits of sleep and marijuana consumption propagated on that social
network. All these studies revealed the emergence of similar and non-trivial patterns
of correlation: individuals were positively correlated up to a social distance between 2
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and 4. These results reveal that not only our "friends", but also our friends’ friends, and
even our friends’ friends’ friends, exhibit a positive correlation of traits. That is, when
studying the example of propagation of the smoking habits in social networks, Fowler
and Christakis discovered that it is likely that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd neighbors of a smoker
are also smokers.
These results are surprising in several aspects. The first one, concerning the fact
that the traits analyzed were of very different nature, and because of that we expect
that their propagation follows different "rules" – how we opt for a given profile picture
is different from how we decide to cooperate or defect with someone, or from how
we decide for a more or less healthy meal. Nonetheless, the adoption of these behav-
iors/traits, although following different dynamical rules, reveals a similar global pat-
tern. On the other hand, these similar patterns were obtained for social networks with
different topological properties. From the network data that we were able to collect
from the published papers, we observed that while the FHS and the Facebook networks
exhibited a degree distribution akin to that of exponential networks, the degree distri-
bution of the AddHealth network could be modeled more closely by the Erdös-Renyi
model. Furthermore, these networks have sizes that span from a few hundreds to a
few thousands, and average connectivities that range from values as low as 2 or 3, to
values of more than one dozen.
We use the term peer influence when referring to this empirical observation that
individuals influence the behavior of their nearest neighbors. Here we investigate the
degree of peer influence that emerges from different dynamical processes propagating
in networked populations – the spread of cooperative strategies, opinions and diseases.
Individuals are assigned to the nodes of a complex network, whereas links between
them represent interactions. We show that, for each network class considered, different
processes lead to identical degrees of influence, suggesting that peer influence does not
depend on the process at stake. On the other hand, we find that simple topological
properties of the underlying social networks, such as the average connectivity and the
clustering coefficient, ultimately determine the intensity of influence observed, which
systematically falls between 2 and 3 for typical social networks, in agreement with the
results stemming from empirical analyses of correlations in present (137, 138, 139,
140, 142, 143, 144) and past (147) social networks.
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6.2 Dynamical Processes
We adopt three dynamical processes to investigate peer influence: the 2-person Pris-
oner’s Dilemma as representative of the propagation of cooperative strategies (sec-
tion 6.2.1); the Voter Model as representative of opinion dynamics (section 6.2.2);
and the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered epidemic model as representative of disease
spreading dynamics (section 6.2.3). We adopt these three particular dynamical pro-
cesses because we believe they are representative of the majority of processes that oc-
cur on social networks, and because there exist several results already in the literature
in which we can base our research.
6.2.1 Evolution of Cooperation
In contrast with the previous two chapters, we now focus on 2-person one-shot so-
cial dilemmas, in particular the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PD) – although we also
confirmed our conclusions with other 2-person social dilemmas, namely the Snowdrift
Game (SG) and the Stag-Hunt game (SH), all discussed in chapter 2. In the case of
the 2-person Prisoner’s Dilemma, individuals can either cooperate or defect with all of
their (first) neighbors, with returns of R = 1 for mutual cooperation, P = 0 for mutual
defection, S = −λ when playing C against D, and T = 1 + λ when playing D against
C, where λ > 0 measures both the temptation to defect and the fear of being cheated.
This can be summarized in the payoff matrix

C D
C 1 −λ
D 1 + λ 0
, λ > 0 (6.1)
We adopt the Fermi Imitation update rule already discussed in chapter 3 (section
3.2.3.2 and references (77, 78, 79)). When the 2-person one-shot PD is played in a
population without any social structure, the population evolves towards full defection,
a fate which may change when individuals are embedded in a social network repre-
sented by means of a graph (65, 120, 148) in which structural diversity is ubiquitous
(65, 149, 150).
6.2.2 Opinion Dynamics
In practice, the population dynamics of peer-influence need not be fitness driven by
any type of social dilemma. To this end, we adopt a simple model of opinion formation
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– the Voter Model (VM) (151). This model owes its name to the fact that it was first
proposed to model, in a very simple manner, a voter’s attitude towards one particular
subject or election. In general, in the literature exist several different variants of the
Voter Model concerning how an individual adopts a given opinion, and in general there
can be nVM different opinions in the population. However, we will consider the simplest
case of only two possible different opinions (nVM = 2). We consider that in each time-
step a randomly chosen individual A adopts the opinion of a random neighbor B with
probability pVM . Due to its simplicity, there are several studies on this model not only
on WM populations but also on structured populations (152, 153, 154, 155).
6.2.3 Epidemics
Information transmission has been sometimes regarded as "contagious" (130, 156),
similar to the propagation of infectious diseases. As an example, we employ the
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model (SIR), a model created in 1927 by W. Kermack
and A. McKendrick (157), in which individuals can be in a Susceptible (S), Infected (I)
or Recovered (R) epidemiological state. Flow of individuals in this model is character-
ized as S α−→ I γ−→ R, where α and γ are the rates of infection and recovery, respectively†.
This means that a susceptible individual meets an infected individual and gets infected
with a probability determined by the infection rate α. Later, that infected individual
may recover according to the recovery rate γ.
Assuming a well-mixed population of constant size Z = S(t) + I(t) + R(t) (where
S(t), I(t) and R(t) represent the number of susceptible, infected and recovered individ-
uals in the population as a function of time t, respectively), evolution is characterized
by the coupled differential equations
dS(t)
dt
= −αS(t)I(t) (6.2a)
dI(t)
dt
= αS(t)I(t)− γI(t) (6.2b)
dR(t)
dt
= γI(t) (6.2c)
†It should be stressed that we are committing an abuse of notation: the symbols α and γ, which in
section 4.8.2 of chapter 4 denote fitness differences, are now used to denote the infection and recovery
rates in the SIR epidemic model respectively.
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Figure 6.1: Evolutionary dynamics of the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) epi-
demic model on well-mixed populations - Fraction of susceptible (s(t) = S(t)/Z), in-
fected (i(t) = I(t)/Z) and recovered (r(t) = R(t)/Z) in a WM population as a function of
time t. Parameters: α = 0.5, γ0.1, s(0) = 0.9, i(0) = 0.1.
Alternatively, we may define the normalized variables s(t) = S(t)Z , i(t) =
I(t)
Z and
r(t) = R(t)Z that stand for the fraction of susceptible, infected and recovered individuals
in the population over time.
An important quantity on epidemiology is the basic reproduction ratio R0, defined
as the expected number of infections generated by a single infected individual in a
completely susceptible population. An infectious disease is said to be endemic if the
fraction of infected individuals increases over time, that is,
di(t)
dt
> 0⇔ αs(t)i(t)− γi(t) > 0⇔ αs(t)i(t)
γ
> i(t) (6.3)
As R0 is defined considering the secondary infections caused by a single infected in a
population of susceptible individuals, we have s(0) ≈ 1, and therefore an infectious
disease is said to be endemic when R0 > 1. Correspondingly, an infectious disease
will die out whenever R0 < 1. In figure 6.1 we illustrate how disease spreads in
a well-mixed population for a particular choice of parameters. We have numerically
integrated† the set of equations 6.2 and assumed, as initial conditions, that r(0) = 0.
s(0) = 0.9 and i(0) = 0.1.
†For a fixed population size an exact solution for SIR can be obtained by applying direct integration
methods, please check (158) for details.
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In the following sections, we adopt a stochastic version of the SIR epidemic model
on networks, which proceeds as follows: in each time-step, a randomly chosen infected
individual can recover with rate γ; if not, we evaluate the possibility of infecting a
randomly chosen susceptible neighbor according to rate α. The study of epidemic pro-
cesses on complex networks has been subject to intense attention over the last years
(159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164). This is important to understand how contagious traits
(not only diseases but also emotions or rumors, for instance) propagate on social net-
works and what can be done to prevent it (in the case of diseases) or foster it (in the
case of publicity, for instance).
6.3 Measuring Peer Influence
In order to measure the degree of peer influence, we let the dynamical process evolve
in the network (of size Z). If j is the number of individuals exhibiting a certain trait,
we calculate the probability Pn(j/Z) that two individuals at a distance n from each
other share that same trait. The social distance between individuals corresponds to the
smallest number of hops separating two members of a complex network, as illustrated
in figure 6.2. At the end of the simulations, for each j/Z we calculate the average of
Pn(j/Z), evn (j/Z) = 〈Pn(j/Z)〉. We then subtract from this value its random compo-
nent randn (j/Z), that is, we perform the difference ∆n(j/Z) = evn (j/Z)− randn (j/Z).
randn (j/Z) is the average probability that a node shares the same trait with nodes lo-
cated at a social distance n resulting from a random distribution of traits.
In figure 6.3A we illustrate evn (j/Z) for a Prisoner’s Dilemma game played on a
ring regular network after a transient period – in this case, we measure the correlations
between cooperators as a function of the fraction j/Z of cooperators in the population,
and for that reason evn (j/Z) is an increasing function of j/Z. If we measured the
average probability of a defector finding another defector at a social distance n (that
is, if we measured correlations between defectors), it would be a decreasing function
of j/Z. Also, note that in the example depicted in figure 6.3A for a fixed j/Z the value
of evn (j/Z) decreases for increasing social distance.
The quantity that we use in order to measure the degree of peer influence is δn(j/Z),
with
δn(j/Z) =
∆n(j/Z)
|∆1(j/Z)| , (6.4)
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Figure 6.2: Social distances in a social network - Social distance of a given node to the
focal individual (black circle) defined as the shortest number of hops between the two.
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Figure 6.3: Determination of δn(j/Z) - A. evn (j/Z) as a function of the fraction of co-
operators in the population j/Z for the social distances n = 1 to n = 3, B. ∆n(j/Z) =
evn (j/Z)−randn (j/Z) as a function of j/Z for the social distances n = 2 to n = 4, C. δn(j/Z)
as a function of j/Z for the social distances n = 2 to n = 4. δn(j/Z) remains approximately
constant for most values of j/Z. These examples correspond to the values obtained for the
PD game in ring regular networks. Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, λ = 0.03, β = 1.0.
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In equation 6.4, |∆1(j/Z)| ensures a convenient normalization; we take the absolute
value so that δn(j/Z) is only affected by the change of sign of the numerator, ∆n(j/Z).
figure 6.3B illustrates some |∆n(j/Z)| for the social distances n = 2 to n = 4, and
figure 6.3C illustrates the value of δn(j/Z) for n = 2 to n = 4 – for correlations between
cooperators in a Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a ring regular population. Given the
normalization we chose, δn(j/Z) is approximately constant and independent of j/Z.
The expression we have adopted for δn(j/Z) mimics the one adopted in the empirical
work of Fowler and Christakis, allowing a direct comparison between theoretical and
experimental results. In our case, we simply added a normalization factor such that we
obtain an approximately constant δn(j/Z) regardless of the value of j/Z, something
that does not occur in their case.
As a final remark, we would like to stress that an analytical study of this problem
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. While estimating the values of ev1 is
feasible in homogeneous networks by making use of the pair approximation method
(section 3.3.4 and reference (99)), estimating the correlations for higher social dis-
tances n would require tracking the frequency of larger motifs in the network (that is,
larger than merely pairs of nodes), and would require obtaining the solution of sys-
tems of equations of several ordinary differential equations. For these reasons, here
we rely solely on computational simulations of these dynamical processes on complex
networks.
6.4 Universality of Peer Influence
We will now analyze the patterns of correlations obtained for the three dynamical
processes discussed in section 6.2 – the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), the Voter Model
(VM) and the SIR epidemic model. Given the structural diversity of social networks
(1, 52, 150, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169) in which some individuals interact more often
than others, we investigate the role that diversity in the number of social ties, average
connectivity and clustering play in the emerging patterns of correlations. To this end,
we will use various types of static networks: random, exponential and scale-free net-
works (1, 149, 165, 166). Individuals are assigned to nodes, with the links between
them representing a social interaction. Homogeneous random networks (HoRand)
were obtained by repeatedly swapping the ends of pairs of randomly chosen links of a
regular ring. Heterogeneous scale-free networks were obtained combining growth and
preferential attachment, following the model proposed by Barabási and Albert (BA)
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Figure 6.4: Temporal evolution of δn for the Voter Model for homogeneous random
populations - Correlations δn for the first 50 generations for the Voter Model with A.
probability pVM = 0.1, B. pVM = 0.5 and C. pVM = 1.0. Note that different values of
pVM only lead to an overall rescaling of the evolutionary timescale without altering the
qualitative results. Shaded areas correspond to the transient period until all δn reach
stationary values (on panel A no stationary value is reached in the period represented).
Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4.
(24, 166). Exponential networks were obtained by adopting the same algorithm, with
preferential attachment being replaced by random attachment (166). Random net-
works were built adopting the limit prewire = 1 of the Watts-Strogatz model (7), in
which all links are rewired.
In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we assume that individuals revise their
strategies based on the perceived success of others. Following the Fermi Imitation
update method (section 3.2.3.2 and references (77, 78, 79)), an individual A with
strategy sA imitates a randomly chosen neighbor B with strategy sB (sA 6= sB) with
probability p =
[
1 + e−β(fsB−fsA)
]−1
, where fA (fB) stands for the fitness of A (B) and
β denotes the intensity of selection.
In the case of the Voter Model, individuals adopt with probability pVM the opinion
of a randomly chosen neighbor. In figure 6.4 we represent the results obtained for the
evolution of the behavioral correlations 〈δn〉 for the Voter Model and various values of
pVM . We represent by 〈δn〉 the average of δn(j/Z) over all j/Z; in other cases, further
ahead, it will be more useful to consider only the value of δn at a single state j/Z.
We observe that the value of pVM determines the transient period after which the be-
havioral correlations stabilize: the smaller the value of pVM , the larger this transient
period. Nevertheless, the value of the correlations 〈δn〉 after the transient period is
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Figure 6.5: Peer influence in social networks - Behavioral correlations 〈δn〉 in homo-
geneous networks (random, white background) and heterogeneous networks (scale-free
generated with Barabási-Albert algorithm, grey background) for the following traits and
processes: Correlations among A. cooperators in the PD game, B. individuals with the same
opinion in the VM, and C. recovered individuals in the SIR epidemic model. Normalization
ensures that δ1 = 1.0 in all cases. Parameters: Z = 103, 〈k〉 = 4, pVM = 1 (Voter Model),
λ = 0.03, β = 1.0 (Prisoner’s Dilemma), α = γ = 0.5 (SIR).
the same regardless of the value of pVM , and for this reason we wil adopt its maxi-
mum value (pVM = 1) to ensure faster computational simulations. The results for the
temporal evolution of behavioral correlations 〈δn〉 for the Voter Model in scale-free BA
networks (not shown here) are qualitatively equivalent (regarding the impact of the
value of pVM on the transient period towards the stationary state).
Now, we proceed to compare the correlations 〈δn〉 for the three different dynam-
ical processes adopted – Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), Voter Model (VM) and SIR epi-
demic model. These results for δn are shown in figure 6.5 for both homogeneous
networks (random, in panels with white background) and heterogeneous networks
(scale-free BA, in panels with gray background). Figure 6.5A shows the 〈δn〉 associated
with the evolutionary dynamics of cooperators and defectors interacting with each of
their neighbors via the 2-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. We define ncritical
(ncritical = 3 in references (137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144) and ncritical = 2 in
reference (147)) as the largest distance n for which δn remains positive. ncritical sys-
tematically exhibits a value between 2 and 3, which depends only on how connected in-
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dividuals are and if one’s own neighbors are also neighbors of each other (measured by
the clustering coefficient; these dependencies will be discussed in detail in section 6.6).
We have chosen the particular value λ = 0.03 for the Prisoner’s Dilemma because that
corresponds to a coexistence global dilemma in homogeneous random networks and to
a C-dominance game in scale-free BA networks. That is, with this value we could en-
sure that we found both strategies (cooperate and defect) in the population. However,
we have verified that our conclusions remain qualitatively valid for other λ values, if
we allow different transient periods.
Figure 6.5 demonstrates that the ncritical value does not depend on the underlying
dynamical process that determines how information flows. We have also verified that
these values of ncritical are not sensitive to the parameters inherent to each dynamical
process. We find that the same degrees of peer influence also apply to other famous
social dilemmas, such as the Stag-Hunt Game (43) or the Snowdrift Game (39), as well
as alternative update rule parameters (77), which affect mainly the overall time-scale
of the population dynamics as it evolves towards the stationary state.
6.5 Finite size effects
To investigate finite size effects, we study below how the correlations behave as a func-
tion of the network size. Let us denote by 〈σn〉 the average fraction of the population
that has neighbors at a social distance n, and by 〈ηn〉 the average size of a neighborhood
of order n. These two quantities turn out to play an important role in the characteri-
zation of the finite-size effects one necessarily observes when dealing with populations
as small as Z = 103.
Figure 6.6 shows how 〈ηn〉 varies with the social distance n for different values of
the population size Z, both for HoRand and scale-free BA networks. In both network
classes, these functions reach their single peak at intermediate values of n, which are
systematically smaller in heterogeneous networks than in homogeneous ones. This, in
turn, leads to averages sizes "at peak" somewhat larger for heterogeneous networks.
With increasing population size Z, we observe that peaks shift to larger n, therefore
warranting better statistics for larger values of n.
Figure 6.7, in turn, shows how 〈σn〉 changes with the social distance n for different
values of the population size Z, both for HoRand and scale-free BA networks. Clearly,
for low n all individuals in the population have neighbors at that social distance, even
for small population sizes
(
Z = 103
)
and irrespective of network class. The differences
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Figure 6.6: Normalized average size of nth neighborhoods, 〈ηn〉, in homogeneous
random and scale-free Barabási-Albert networks of variable size - 〈ηn〉 is plotted as
a function of social distance n and for different values of population size Z for both ho-
mogeneous random (panel A.) and heterogeneous scale-free Barabási-Albert (panel B.)
networks. Each point corresponds to an average over 10 different realizations of the cor-
responding networks with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4.
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Figure 6.7: Average fraction of individuals with nth neighborhood, 〈σn〉, in homo-
geneous random and scale-free Barabási-Albert networks of variable size - 〈σn〉 is
plotted as a function of social distance n and for different values of population size Z
for both homogeneous random (panel A.) and heterogeneous scale-free Barabási-Albert
(panel B.) networks. Each point corresponds to an average over 10 different realizations
of the corresponding networks, with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4.
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Figure 6.8: Peer influence in social networks – finite size effects - δn in homogeneous
random networks (panel A.) and heterogeneous networks (scale-free generated with the
Barabási-Albert algorithm – panel B.) for correlations among cooperators in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Normalization ensures that δ1 in all cases. All values were obtained for networks
of average degree 〈k〉 = 4.
show up for larger n. After a critical social distance (which depends on the population
size and network class), 〈σn〉 undergoes a sudden drop, which occurs systematically
for lower values of n in heterogeneous networks. This behavior strongly influences the
statistics associated with the computation of the correlations δn, since larger values of
〈σn〉 ensure better statistics for δn.
With these results at hand, we have performed extensive numerical simulations to
investigate the impact of these two factors in the accuracy obtained in the determina-
tion of δn for the dynamical processes under study. In figure 6.8 we demonstrate how
correlations and errors depend on the population size for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for
both homogeneous random networks (figure 6.8A) and scale-free BA networks (fig-
ure 6.8B). The uncertainty decreases with increasing population size Z, for fixed social
distance n. While for small network sizes there is a lower bound on the uncertainty
which cannot be further decreased, in view of the small network diameter and the lim-
ited values of 〈σn〉 and 〈ηn〉, for larger networks correlations for large values of n ap-
proach a random pattern, as one would naturally expect. More important, the positive
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values of the correlations obtained for small n, however, remain robust and statistically
significant with increasing network size and the existence (and actual value) of the
critical social distance remains unchanged whenever we define such critical value as
the one above which positive correlations become statistically irrelevant. The behavior
of correlations and errors with population size is qualitatively equivalent for the other
dynamical processes, namely the Voter Model and the SIR epidemic model (results not
shown here).
6.6 Dependence of ncritical on network topological properties
Besides being heterogeneous, social networks often exhibit high clustering coefficients
(166), contrary to the negligible values that characterize the ones used in figure 6.5. To
evaluate the impact of this property, we generated networks with arbitrary clustering
coefficient by swapping the ends of pairs of links chosen according to the algorithm
defined in (170), starting from a network with a given degree distribution, designed
beforehand using the algorithms described in the Methods section (section 6.8).
In figure 6.9 we show how the values of ncritical for scale-free networks remain lim-
ited between 2 and 3, irrespectively of their clustering coefficient and average degree.
Similar results, not presented here, are obtained for other heterogeneous networks,
such as random and exponential networks. Indeed, to break down these surprisingly
steady values of ncritical, one must artificially produce highly sparse, highly clustered
and strictly homogeneous networks where all nodes share the same number of part-
ners, such as regular rings or lattices (figure 6.9, panels A, C and E). However, it is
worth emphasizing that social networks are intrinsically heterogeneous (150, 165),
and as such it is remarkable how resilient ncritical is to changes in realistic topological
features. This said, ncritical shows an overall tendency to increase with increasing levels
of clustering, mostly whenever networks are sparse.
6.7 Discussion
Overall, our results suggest that the extent of peer influence emerges as a natural out-
come of dynamical processes on structured populations, being pervasive in a wide-
range of phenomena occurring in social networks. Despite the importance of social
networks in defining the paths and ends of the dynamical processes they support, show-
ing how important it is to address and understand social dynamics from a complex
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Figure 6.9: Dependence of ncritical on the clustering coefficient and average connec-
tivity 〈k〉 - ncritical in A. homogeneous and B. heterogeneous (scale-free) networks for
different values of the clustering coefficient and average connectivity 〈k〉. Results were
obtained for populations of size Z = 103 among individuals: with the same opinion in
the Voter Model (panels A. and B.), cooperators in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (panels C. and
D.), and recovered individuals in the SIR epidemic model (panels E. and F.). We normal-
ized the clustering coefficient of each homogeneous network by the corresponding values
for a ring regular network with the same (average) connectivity. Values of ncritical were
obtained for δn(j/Z = 0.5) when all δn have reached a stationary value.
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networks perspective (117, 171, 172), the patterns of peer-influence they exhibit are
extremely resilient and surprisingly independent of their structure.
On the other hand, our results also show how networks naturally entangle individ-
uals into interactions of many-body nature: Indeed, social networks effectively extend,
in non-trivial ways, the dyadic interactions we started from. The fact that the distance
between any two individuals in social networks is small (18) and comparable to ncritical
further enhances the significance of the present results, as they stress how our individ-
ual actions may have wide repercussions on every other individual of the network.
6.8 Methods
6.8.1 Population structure
We investigate the role that degree distribution, average connectivity and clustering
coefficient play in the emerging patterns of correlations. To this end, we consider
(homogeneous) random, exponential and scale-free networks. Homogeneous random
networks were obtained by repeatedly swapping the ends of pairs of randomly chosen
links of a regular ring. Heterogeneous scale-free networks were obtained combining
growth and preferential attachment, following the model proposed by Barabási and
Albert (24). Exponential networks were obtained by adopting the same algorithm,
with preferential attachment replaced by random attachment (24). Random networks
were built adopting the limit prewire = 1 of the Watts-Strogatz model (7), in which all
links are rewired. We consider 10 different realizations of each class of network, and
networks remain fixed throughout all the evolution of the dynamical processes.
6.8.2 Network Topological Properties
The social distance n between two individuals in the population corresponds to the
shortest path length between those two individuals. Shortest path lengths between any
pair of individuals in the network are determined by applying the Dijkstra’s algorithm
(173). In the particular problem at study, it consists of the following: for a given node
i, we start by determining the first neighbors of i, attributing them a social distance
of n = 1. Each of these nodes is tagged so as to identify that their social distance
to i has already been determined. This avoids some effects that could be introduced
by clustering, namely a given node being identified as being at two different social
distances. Then we proceed to determine the first neighbors of each of i’s neighbors; in
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Figure 6.10: Increasing clustering coefficient of networks of arbitrary degree dis-
tribution - In each iteration, we select two distinct neighbors y1 and y2 of a randomly
chosen node x; then we select a neighbor z1 of y1 and a neighbor z2 of y2, ensuring
that x 6= y1 6= y2 6= z1 6= z2. Between these 5 chosen nodes exist 4 edges, namely
{{x, y1}, {x, y2}, {y1, z1}, {y2, z2}}; if edges {{y1, y2}, {z1, z2}} do not exist, we create
those links, deleting in their place the links {{y1, z1}, {y2, z2}} – this way we create a
triangle between nodes x, y1 and y2. This rewiring is accepted if it does not produce a
disconex network, and if it increases the clustering coefficient of the entire network.
case they are not tagged yet, they will be identified as being at a social distance n = 2
of node i. We proceed with this algorithm until we reach the desired social distance n
for the given simulation.
We employ the method described in (170) for increasing the clustering coefficient
of a given simulated network without altering its degree distribution, which consists
of iteratively applying rewirings that increase network clustering without altering its
degree distribution, as schematized in figure 6.10.
6.8.3 Evolution
We adopt three distinct dynamical processes to model social dynamics: the 2-person
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (sections 6.2.1 and reference (174)), the Voter Model (VM)
(section 6.2.2 and reference (151)) and the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) epi-
demic model (section 6.2.3 and reference (157)). In opposition to the work exposed in
the previous chapters, here we assume that all interactions are pairwise.
In each round, a randomly chosen individual is given the opportunity to revise its
state, be it a strategy (in the case of the PD), an opinion (in the case of the VM) or an
epidemiological state (in the case of the SIR epidemic model). That is, trait updates
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are asynchronous. In the case of the VM, a randomly chosen individual A adopts the
opinion of a randomly chosen first neighbor B with a probability pVM constant in time.
Since this update method is non-innovative (individuals can only adopt a certain strat-
egy when at least one of his neighbors is using it) the evolution of the population ceases
when it reaches either one of the monomorphic states. In the case of the SIR epidemic
model, a randomly chosen infected individual either recovers with a probability γ; or,
if not, we evaluate if he has any susceptible neighbor and if that is the case he infects
a randomly chosen susceptible neighbor with probability α. Maintaining a list of the
infected individuals in the population at every time t, and in each instant randomly
choosing one individual from that list instead of from the whole population helps to
speed the simulations. Finally, in the case of the PD, we assume that individual fitness
corresponds to the accumulated payoff from all pairwise interactions in which individ-
uals participate with their first neighbors. Individuals revise their strategies according
to the Fermi imitation update method (references (77, 78, 79) and section 3.2.3.2),
which consists of the following: a randomly chosen individual A chooses a random
first neighbor B to compare strategies. If individuals A and B have different strate-
gies (sA 6= sB), A imitates B with a probability proportional to the fitness difference
fsB − fsA , and given by the Fermi distribution from statistical physics,
pFermi =
1
1 + e−β(fsB−fsA)
. (6.5)
where β regulates the intensity of selection.
6.8.4 Evaluation of Correlations
We evaluate the likelihood δn(j/Z) that two individuals at a social distance n self-
organize in the same trait, with
δn(j/Z) =
∆n(j/Z)
|∆1(j/Z)| , (6.6)
where ∆n(j/Z) = evn (j/Z)− randn (j/Z). The expression we have adopted for δn(j/Z)
mimics the one adopted in the empirical work of Fowler and Christakis, allowing a
direct comparison between theoretical and experimental results. In our case, we simply
added a normalization factor such that we obtain an approximately constant δn(j/Z)
regardless of the value of j/Z, something that does not occur in their case. However,
we have checked that our conclusions remain qualitatively valid when adopting their
method.
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To obtain evn (j/Z), we simulate each process for all possible initial conditions. For
the PD and VM dynamics and for each initial j/Z, we randomly distribute traits and
evolve the population for a transient period until all δn have reached a stationary state,
in which |δn(G = x) − δn(G = x − 5)| < ξ, for all δn, where G denotes generations
of evolutionary time (1 generation = Z iterations). We took ξ = 0.02 and computed
the average correlations during the final 5 generations. After each trait update we
determine, for each individual, the fraction of those who exhibit the same trait at a
distance n. The value of evn for that particular configuration of strategies and for that
instant t corresponds to evn (j/Z; t) =
∑Z
i=0 
ev
n,i
Z where 
ev
n,i corresponds to the fraction of
individuals at a social distance n of individual i that exhibit the same trait as i. Note that
we normalize by the size of the population, Z, and not by the number of individuals
that exhibit the trait we are investigating (and for which it makes sense of talking
about this average probability). We have made this choice so as to be able to relate
the values obtained for evn with the gradients of selection in structured populations,
an issue that will be subject to further investigation in the near future. Furthermore,
we have confirmed that normalizing by the number of individuals that exhibit a given
trait, instead of normalizing by the population size, does not qualitatively alter our
conclusions regarding the patterns observed for ncritical.
We perform 105 different runs for each initial condition. For the dynamics of the
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model, and for each initial fraction of Ss and Is (we ini-
tialize the population without any recovered individuals), we evolve the population
until an absorbing state is reached (i.e. no I individuals left) and measure the cor-
relations among all Rs. In this case, δn was computed averaging over 108 runs for
each initial condition. In what concerns the determination of randn (k/N), we average
over 103 simulations in which the traits are randomly distributed onto the nodes of the
corresponding network.
The standard deviation σδn associated with each value of δn is computed as follows:
σδn = δn
√(
σ∆n
∆n
)2
+
(
σ∆1
∆1
)2
− 2Cov [∆n,∆1]∆n∆1 (6.7)
where σ∆n is the standard deviation associated with the difference ∆n(j/Z) = evn (j/Z)−
randn (j/Z) and is given by
σ∆n =
√
σ2evn + σ
2
randn
(6.8)
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and the covariance Cov [∆n,∆1] of the differences ∆n(j/Z) = evn (j/Z)− randn (j/Z)
and ∆1(j/Z) = rand1 (j/Z)− rand1 (j/Z) is given by
Cov [∆n,∆1] = E [∆n∆1]− E [∆n] E [∆1] (6.9)
Taking into account that
∆n∆1 = evn ev1 + evn rand1 − randn ev1 − randn rand1 (6.10)
the only quantity that can prevent us from ensuring that Cov [∆n,∆1] = 0 is the
product evn 
ev
1 . However, as an approximation and for computational efficiency (the
denominator ∆n∆1 in equation 6.7 can reach very small values that lead to some
problems when computing σδn) we will consider Cov [∆n,∆1] = 0. Note that, if
Cov [∆n,∆1] > 0, this would cause a smaller standard deviation σδn , so the results
we present on this chapter correspond to the worst case possible.
Given the large size of some of populations that were studied in this chapter, for
computational efficiency we opted for parallelizing the simulations and obtaining the
values of δn for each network separately. We computed the final average value and
associated standard deviation by resorting to the following formula (175):
σ2 =
n2xσ
2
x + n2yσ2y − nyσ2x − nyσ2y − nxσ2x − nxσ2y + nxnyσ2x + nxnyσ2y + nxny
(
X¯ − Y¯
)2
(nx + ny − 1) (nx + ny)
(6.11)
where nx and ny represent the number of trials performed to obtain the average value
of variables x and y, as well as the associated standard deviations, σx and σy (which
are X and Y respectively). In this case, we have nx = ny.
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7Final Conclusions and Outlook
We analyzed the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in structured populations and
studied in detail, using different approaches, two collective social dilemmas of cooper-
ation: The N -Person Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the N -Person Snowdrift Game. Further-
more, we studied how peer influence emerges from dyadic interactions in three distinct
dynamical processes modeled in structured populations, demonstrating the many-body
implications arising from pairwise interactions.
Regarding the N -Person Prisoner’s Dilemma, we have shown that diversity in the
number and size of the games in which individuals participate, as well as diversity in
the contributions made by cooperators, leads to a very significant improvement in the
levels of cooperation observed in the population. That is, whenever the act of giving
is considered more important than the amount that is given, cooperation blooms. This
effect is robust with respect to the details of the evolutionary dynamics, the updat-
ing strategy (synchronous versus asynchronous) and even to errors. Furthermore, we
provide a detailed analytical study of the mechanism responsible for the boost in co-
operation observed in highly heterogeneous networks, when cooperators’ contributions
are rescaled by the number of games in which individuals participate. By making use of
sub-structures representative of the architecture of scale-free Barabási-Albert networks,
we have shown that even in the worst configurations possible for cooperators it is still
possible, and probable, for the cooperative strategy to propagate.
We have also evaluated the impact of structured populations on the evolutionary
dynamics of the N -Person Snowdrift Game – but in this case, we followed a different
approach, more appropriate to deal with a social dilemma which, from the outset, pro-
motes the coexistence between cooperators and defectors. We computed a numerical
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analogue of the gradient of selection in complex networks that provides a complete
(mean-field) description of the evolution of the population for all possible initial con-
ditions. We show that evolution on homogeneous networks exhibits a population-wide
behavior qualitatively similar to that observed in well-mixed populations. Evolution in
heterogeneous networks reveals the emergence of a multitude of internal equilibria and
of more complex evolutionary dynamics scenarios. The heterogeneity in the number of
connections of each individual generally turns the global dilemma into a coordination
dilemma.
Finally, we measured the degree of peer influence between individuals exhibiting
the same trait (strategy, opinion or epidemiological state) in simulations of dyadic dy-
namical processes for different network classes. We have shown that the pattern of
peer influence observed is independent of the particular dynamical process adopted,
being determined by the network class and particular topological properties (cluster-
ing coefficient and average connectivity). With respect to this last point, we perform a
detailed study of the dependence of the degree of peer influence on the average connec-
tivity and clustering coefficient on both homogeneous and heterogeneous (scale-free
Barabási-Albert) networks. Real social networks are highly heterogeneous and exhibit
high values of clustering coefficient, and in these cases the degree of peer influence we
observe is very robust and similar to the results we had previously observed.
We believe our work is an important contribution to the understanding of the evo-
lutionary dynamics of cooperation. During the research several interesting problems
emerged and they will be the focus of future research. The same applies to our study of
peer influence in social networks, which can also be explored in more detail. Definitely,
the road ahead is exiting and encouraging, given the capacity of the methods used have
to provide clear cut answers.
Finally, it would be very interesting to test the models discussed in this thesis with
social experiments involving humans. This poses many difficulties, both in setting up
the experiments and also in analyzing the results. Because of the inherent difficul-
ties, while theoretically this research is very rich, experiments that can corroborate the
models are still lacking. Fortunately, this trend has been changing in the last years
with new experiments being set up making use of the numerous possibilities that the
Internet nowadays offers us.
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